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GLOBAL POVERTY ALLEVIATION AS A DUTY NOT TO HARM 
 
ANANDITA MUHKERJI 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2018 




Do global financial institutions and the governments of developed nations owe 
anything to the global poor? I argue that they do. In my view, the global poor are owed a 
form of assistance because of the unjust harms imposed upon them. The negative rights 
of the global poor, which are the rights involving freedom from unjust interference, are 
consistently violated by the global economic order (GEO). I demonstrate that the causal 
chain that connects global poverty directly with the policies of institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization reveals that the negative 
rights of the global poor are being violated. These violations occur through the effects of 
trade policies, unjustified sovereignty, and loan conditions, which serve to trap the poor 
in inescapable cycles of poverty. I argue that rather than relying on controversial accounts 
of the positive rights of the poor, and the appeals to charity that follow from them, we can 
ground the obligation to alleviate global poverty in negative rights, which are more 
minimal and widely accepted.  
My argument establishes that poverty poses a problem even if one does not see 
inequality as a problem in itself. I argue in support of Amartya Sen’s Capability 
Approach to poverty, which discusses the effects of poverty as a deprivation of a person’s 
abilities to do and be what she has reason to value. This approach identifies what is really 
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at the heart of the problem with poverty: a deprivation of the ability to act in ways that 
allow the expression of basic freedoms, rather than merely a lack of resources or income. 
The negative rights approach to grounding an obligation to alleviate global poverty has 
traditionally been based on a conception of wrongdoing as a deprivation of basic needs. 
However, I contend that wrongdoing should be seen as a deprivation of fundamental 
capabilities instead. Using capability deprivations as a baseline for wrongdoing presents 
us with the theoretical resources required to create a foundation for an ecumenical theory 
of global justice, and the framework within which to demonstrate that the GEO has an 
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“I ask no favor for my sex. All I ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our 
necks.”  
-Sarah Grimké, as quoted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in RBG 
 
Sarah Grimké, a 19th century abolitionist and feminist, argued passionately that women 
do not need to be given special treatment in order to thrive. What women do need, 
however, is not to be stifled. When Grimké appeals to men to “take their feet off our 
necks,” her powerfully evocative words paint a picture of a woman struggling to breathe, 
not because she does not know how to, or that she does not want to put in the work to do 
so, but because she is incapable of doing so.  
 There are plenty of ways to take issue with Grimké’s picture. First, and most 
common at the time, is to deny that what is keeping women down is men. Women were 
seen as either intellectually inferior, or as naturally only suited to be in the household. 
Either way, their subordination was considered natural. Grimké was publicly criticized 
for “threaten[ing] the female character with wide spread and permanent injury,” because 
she advocated for women having public identities and voices, which for many was not 
the correct role for women:  
“The appropriate duties and influence of women, are clearly stated in the 
New Testament. Those duties and that influence are unobtrusive and 
private, but the sources of mighty power. When the mild, dependent, 
softening influence of woman upon the sternness of man's opinions is fully 
exercised, society feels the effects of it in a thousand forms. The power of 
woman is in her dependence, flowing from the consciousness of that 
weakness which God has given her for her protection and which keeps her 




the nation” (Pastoral Letter of the General Association of Massachusetts, 
1837).  
 
These words were published by The General Association of Congregational Ministers in 
Massachusetts on June 28, 1837, in response to Grimké and her sister’s public lecture 
against slavery. Such responses, therefore, denied the claim that women were being 
oppressed; they were simply being kept in the place they should naturally be. Grimké 
publicly dismissed such worries about the nature of women, as well as similar concerns 
about the natural inferiority of slaves. Responding to the Association’s worry about the 
idea that Grimké’s concerns were threatening to the “female character,” Grimké writes,  
“I rejoice that they have called the attention of my sex to this subject, 
because […] I am persuaded that the rights of woman, like the rights of 
slaves, need only be examined to be understood and asserted, even by 
some of those who are now endeavoring to smother the irrepressible desire 
for mental and spiritual freedom which glows in the breast of many, who 
hardly dare to speak their sentiments” (Grimké 1837).  
 
Underlying her fight for the rights of women and slaves was this certainty that everyone 
desires this “mental and spiritual freedom,” and that the figurative foot on the throat was 
a suffocation of this freedom. 
 Another reaction to Grimke’s words, from the opposite end of the spectrum, could 
come from those who argue that a view like Grimké’s is naïve and potentially 
counterproductive in relation to what women actually need to thrive. After millennia of 
having men’s figurative feet on their throats, women require not just freedom from the 
oppression, but a helping hand to pull them up. Theories of affirmative action insist that 
historical domination cannot simply be remedied by stepping away from those structures 




to overcome and thrive. Simply asking to be left alone may counterintuitively undermine 
the women’s rights movement, as it may result in creating a false impression that women 
are actually inferior if they cannot immediately thrive in a world created by and for men. 
 In public discourse on women’s rights today we see less of the response that 
women are simply intellectually inferior, unable to do jobs outside the household, or that 
their ‘proper place’ is in the house. Instead, we see arguments that US society has 
achieved equality between the sexes, and therefore we no longer require affirmative 
action for women’s benefit. This response effectively denies that Grimké’s picture is true 
for women today. 
 The following dissertation is not specifically about women’s rights, and is not 
meant to take a side about the need for affirmative action for women in the US today. It 
does, however, argue that Grimké’s metaphor for the plight of women applies today to 
those around the globe who live in extreme poverty. There are many feet standing on the 
necks of the global poor, and this dissertation takes aim at one of them: the Global 
Economic Order (GEO). In arguing for this, I will face similar responses to those Grimké 
faced. On the one hand, there will be skepticism that those in extreme poverty have 
anything other than their own lack of initiative to blame, or that the corrupt state of their 
national politics keeps them from success, or that somehow their race or culture prevents 
them from achieving success. On the other hand, there will be worries that calling on the 
GEO to simply lift its foot from the throats of the global poor is woefully insufficient. 
Centuries of colonization, resource devastation, and racism, does not simply go away 




inequality is caused by a natural inequality in abilities seriously, I will take seriously both 
the concern that the GEO simply does not play the same role as men do in Grimke’s 
picture, as well as the worry that that my proposal is insufficient or weak in the fight 
against global poverty.  
The argument of this dissertation can be boiled down into its most basic premises 
and conclusions as follows: 
(P1) The most helpful way to think about poverty is as a deprivation of capabilities, 
and extreme poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities. 
(P2) The deprivation of basic capabilities causes a hindrance to fundamental 
freedoms. 
(P3) When fundamental freedoms are hindered, negative rights are often violated.  
(P4) The policies of the GEO have a large causal role to play in the deprivation of the 
basic capabilities of the global poor. 
(C1) Therefore, the GEO violates the negative rights of the global poor 
(C2) Therefore, the GEO has a responsibility to help alleviate global poverty.  
 Terminologically, when I discuss the Global Economic Order I am adhering to 
Joshua Cohen’s definition:  
“[I]t comprises treaty- and convention-based rules about security, trade, 
property rights, human rights, and environment: rules that govern global 
rule-makers, the norms and standards associated with territorial 
sovereignty, policies adopted by global rule-making bodies (say, TRIPS or 
the decisions of the WTO’s Appellate Body), and the security and 






The GEO therefore primarily refers to global institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank, which are institutions 
that have a lot of power in dictating terms of trade and international finance. The term 
also includes the governments of large developed nations that, due to their size and 
economic power, also play a large role in dictating the terms of international trade. 
 Methodologically, political philosophy and ethics can be done in numerous ways, 
and due to the nature of this project, the social sciences are essential. This project aims to 
show that responsibility follows from wrongful harm, and that wrongful harm is being 
done. In order to show the latter claim, much of this project deals with the empirical data 
on poverty and its effects, and the effects of the policies of the GEO. Though none of the 
empirical work is my own, it is crucial as evidence for the premises of the larger 
philosophical argument. Additionally, while I discuss some international law as it 
pertains to the policies of the global institutions, the project is fundamentally a moral one, 
and therefore its conclusions are moral in scope, not necessarily legal. 
 In this Introduction to the project, I build the foundation of my argument by first 
providing an overview of the ways in which responses to global poverty today have been 
approached from an ethical standpoint, followed by explaining and justifying the ethical 
framework I will be working within, i.e. the theory of negative rights. I also make clear 
the assumptions I must make in order to get the project off the ground, and explain my 






Section 1: Ethical Responses to Global Poverty  
 
In Chapter 1, I discuss some of the ways in which poverty has been thought about, 
and present data on the state of poverty in the world today. While those specifics are 
important for building my argument, it is helpful here to consider some of the ethical 
arguments that have already been made for the alleviation of global poverty, particularly 
in relation to responsibility. I consider arguments based on utilitarian concerns for 
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, as well as Kantian, autonomy-based, and 
egalitarian arguments. While it is not the goal of this introduction is to explicitly disprove 
the ethical arguments I present, it is important that we notice the kinds of background 
assumptions necessary in order to accept these views. 
 In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer famously argues for moral 
responsibility proportionate to an ability to help. Pain must be minimized, and the pain of 
the poor can be reduced by the comparably minimal sacrifices of the rich. Therefore, the 
rich have an obligation to give to charity, in order to help minimize the pain of the poor. 
To probe this intuition, a number of thought experiments like the following have been 
proposed. You are walking through a park wearing an expensive outfit, and you see a 
child drowning in a nearby pond. There is nobody else around. Do you have an obligation 
to save the child despite the fact that in doing so you would incur $20 in dry-cleaning 
costs? The common intuitive response is that you do have an obligation to save the child. 
In another scenario, however, you receive a letter in the mail from UNICEF, with the 
picture of a child on the front, asking for a $20 donation that will save the life of that 




an innocent child with relatively minimal interference in your own life, and therefore we 
are equally morally obligated in both scenarios. Both jumping in the pond, as well as 
donating $20 to UNICEF, cause the minimization of suffering, and therefore must be 
performed.    
Another aspect of the debate that emerges from Singer’s view is that individuals 
have a great moral obligation to alleviate the suffering of others, and that obligation 
arises whether or not we have caused that suffering. This view, however, is not entirely 
intuitive. We are less certain of our obligation to donate the $20 to UNICEF than our 
obligation to spend the $20 in dry-cleaning costs in order to jump into the pond to save 
the child. The source of this discrepancy in intuition could be due to a number of factors, 
but they boil down to this: either our intuition is wrong in the UNICEF case, which 
means that we have the same responsibility in both cases, or our intuition is right in the 
UNICEF case, in which case the responsibility is different in each scenario. Singer argues 
that our intuition is wrong; we should feel the same way about both cases because in both 
cases we can save the life of a child at a minimal cost to ourselves (Singer 1972, p. 230-
233).  
For Singer’s view, we must accept that the minimization of suffering and 
maximization of pleasure are our strongest moral obligations. There is a vast literature 
arguing against this principle, so I will not go into it here, except to say that the principle 
comes with significant pitfalls if we believe that there are fundamental individual rights 
that cannot be outweighed by group benefits. We must also accept that moral 




the drowning child whether I am an innocent bystander, or whether I pushed him into the 
pond. On similar lines, Singer has been criticized for relying on a view of “positive 
rights” in order for his argument to work, because in both situations you are required to 
act to save the child. Since much of this project focuses on the distinction between 
positive and negative rights, I will only briefly sketch this worry here. Positive rights 
involve the rights to certain goods that allow people to achieve a certain standard of 
living. Correspondingly, if people have positive rights, others have positive obligations to 
ensure that people’s rights are not being violated. Thus, if we have a right to education, 
we also have an obligation to ensure that other people’s right to education is being 
fulfilled. This is contrasted with negative rights, which are our rights to be free of unjust 
interference. The obligations that follow from these rights are typically far more minimal; 
we must simply not unjustly interfere in the lives of others. This worry about Singer’s 
view being based in positive rights also connects to another concern: demandingness. For 
Singer, we must give to charity until we are about to become as badly off as those we 
seek to help (Singer 1972, p. 241). For many, the idea that we are not fulfilling our moral 
obligations unless we make ourselves almost as poor as the poorest in the world seems 
extremely counterintuitive and overly demanding, and they therefore question the quality 
of the moral theory.  
 One of the worries about Singer’s view most relevant to this project is the 
question of who bears the most responsibility and who has the greatest obligation to help 
the poor. For Singer, the more wealth you have, the greater your obligation. As discussed 




and the UNICEF case. For Singer, our intuition is simply wrong in the UNICEF case. 
However, there is reason to believe that our intuition may be right, and the two cases are 
different. Perhaps we can explain the difference in intuition about the scenarios by 
understanding the problem of the death of the child in the impoverished nation as one that 
is best solved by appealing to collective, rather than individual, responsibility. We 
recognize that the starving child is in that condition due to an artificial system that was 
created and can be changed, whereas in the case of the drowning child, the water cannot 
be changed in such a way that the child does not drown, or the child cannot immediately 
be taught how to swim. Thus, the passer-by has an individual responsibility to save the 
drowning child, but perhaps the person considering the UNICEF donation understands 
that the child can be saved in a different, larger-scale way, and therefore the child’s local 
and global community have a collective responsibility to do something for the child (and 
others in his position) to ensure that he is permanently free from concerns about survival, 
rather than temporarily free for as long as the $20 lasts. Although UNICEF certainly 
works on a larger scale than the individual by herself, the intuition hits on the idea that 
putting Band-Aids over deep wounds is inefficient, and that we should, instead, be 
focusing on the cause of the wound instead. Therefore, the difference in intuition between 
the two cases is reasonably grounded, and we recognize that the obligation to help the 
drowning child is different from that of giving the money to UNICEF. This presents a 
serious worry for Singer, because he does not believe the moral responsibility for 




 While Singer’s argument may be the most widely referenced today, there are 
numerous Kantian arguments for the alleviation of global poverty as well. As with 
Kantian interpretation generally, the ways in which Kant has been used to fit into the 
topic at hand runs the gamut from denying that there is a Kantian reason to set up an 
egalitarian institutional scheme, (including those who argue that such a structure would 
be a contradiction to Kant), to arguing that a Kantian theory of justice entails that we 
must set up a global institutional scheme that eradicates all poverty.  
 Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel argue that under a coercive global 
institutional structure (i.e. a single world government), all individuals would have 
distributional obligations to all other individuals in the structure. However, since such a 
structure does not exist, there are no such obligations (Dworkin 2013 and Nagel 2005). 
Additionally, they argue that Kantian theory does not give us an obligation to create such 
a structure, based on Kant’s arguments in Perpetual Peace (Dworkin 2013, p. 29, and 
Nagel 2005, p. 121). While Dworkin and Nagel argue that we are not obligated to form 
such an institution, Katrin Flikschuh argues that such obligations either cannot be 
administered or cannot exist, and therefore are contradictions (Flikschuh 2010).  
 On the other hand, scholars like Merten Reglitz argue that for Kant, we have a 
duty to institute a powerful global political institution, and in doing so we must ensure 
that everyone who falls within that political structure ought to be free from poverty, as it 
undermines individual rationality and independence (Reglitz 2016, p. 2). While the 
principal axiom for Kant’s theory of right is that everyone has equal moral worth and is a 




coercive is that his idea of right “is coupled with the authorisation to coerce others into 
refraining from violating our freedom: coercion is in Kant’s sense a ‘hindering of a 
hindrance to freedom’ (1797: DR VI, 231)” (Reglitz 2016, p. 3). Thus, on this account, 
we have a Kantian duty not only to eradicate poverty because it undermines our 
independence, but we also have a duty to put into place a global political structure that 
enforces this eradication of poverty.  
 On this view, moral obligation is certainly demanding, and can require a kind of 
coercion (economic and social) in order to ensure that all are equally able to act in such a 
way that they are self-determined. Just as with Singer’s position, this is a moral view that 
is very demanding, though, in itself, that is not a reason to believe that either view is 
incorrect. The coercive aspect of the view in relation to freedom and self-determination, 
however, is puzzling. As Flikschuh argues, setting up a coercive regime in order to 
guarantee freedom is a self-undermining idea, and many worries about the power of such 
a government arise (Flikschuh 2010).  
 In Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations, 
Nicole Hassoun considers the notion of autonomy from a different perspective. Instead of 
arguing that coercion is necessary for independence, she argues that a coercive global 
system already exists, and in order for the undermining of individual autonomy that 
follows from such a system to be morally legitimate, it must ensure that the basic needs 
of everyone under the system is met. This is because a coercive system of this manner 




of autonomy to be met, which involve the provision of things like food, shelter, and 
education. 
 All the arguments for the alleviation or eradication of poverty thus far have been 
based upon what follows from poverty. In the case of Singer it is suffering, and in the 
case of Kant it is an undermining of self-determination, and on Hassoun’s view it is a 
lack of the conditions of autonomy necessary for consent. However, there are others who 
see poverty as a problem because it undermines the natural equality of all people. Some 
egalitarians, therefore, argue for the eradication of poverty in order to create equality. 
Once again, there is a large scope for what can be considered an egalitarian view, but it 
primarily involves a concern with inequality, rather than a specific concern for suffering 
or lack of self-determination. This is not to say that egalitarians do not care about 
suffering, but rather that focusing on equality can have the effect of ending or reducing 
suffering. 
 “Humanist egalitarianism,” as Pablo Gilabert refers to it, is the view that due to 
the equal moral status of human beings, we must be concerned with the equality of all 
individuals, regardless of race, religion, gender, sex, nationality, etc. (Gilabert 2012, p. 
9). “Associative egalitarians,” on the other hand, argue that our moral concern should be 
focused on those we stand in some associative relationship with. Nagel, for example, 
argues that we have egalitarian duties only to members of the society we are in, i.e. those 
who are joint authors of the laws that restrict our actions (Tan 2013, Section 2). As we 
will see in Chapter 1, John Rawls argues that equality is important in relation to some 




commitment is nonetheless to equal distribution, and thus the alleviation or eradication of 
poverty is in the service of this goal.   
 I have considered only a handful of reasons that poverty alleviation is a moral 
duty; there are countless additional perspectives that I do not have the space to consider 
here. It is clear, however, that these views I have described begin from diverse premises, 
but end up with similar conclusions regarding the problematic nature of poverty. Most of 
these views require individual, state, or international obligations to work to fix the 
problem. Even those views grounded in a notion of liberty or autonomy either require 
coercive force to ensure such liberty, or require the assurance or provision of resources 
that create autonomy to justify coercion. In the next section I will consider the view that 
obligations of any kind, not just obligations to those in poverty, primarily follow from 
two circumstances: unjust harm, and contract or agreement. In doing so I am describing 
the framework for the rest of this project. In order to show that global poverty alleviation 
is an obligation for the GEO, I will show that the GEO has, most importantly, unjustly 
harmed the poor, and secondarily, that the organizations that comprise the order have 
broken their self-proclaimed missions of helping the developing world. 
 
Section 2: Negative Rights and Duties  
 
 
As discussed above, the basis for Singer’s argument for the obligation to help 
alleviate global poverty relies on a notion of positive rights. As indicated, however, these 
rights are controversial. Of course, rights-talk in general is controversial, but even within 




the obligation falls on to ensure positive rights, are topics that tend to create widely 
divergent intuitions. These disagreements do not mean that positive rights do not exist, or 
that Singer is wrong to point to the moral consequences of death and great suffering. 
What they do entail, however, is that there may be good reasons to examine whether a 
different approach to the problem of poverty is possible, particularly one that depends 
less on principles that are hugely controversial and unintuitive to many. None of this is to 
argue that negative rights certainly exist, or are unproblematic, or that the account I 
present of them is the “true” negative rights account. Instead, by gaining a fuller 
understanding of the advantages of a theory of negative rights, we can see why it is 
fruitful to investigate the commonly-held belief that negative rights preclude moral 
obligation to the global poor given our current economic system.  
A quick note here about terminology. When considering the negative rights 
approach, scholars like Thomas Pogge often refer to those who hold the view that 
morality entails the protection only of negative rights as “libertarians”. As we will see, 
historically this characterization has been quite true of libertarians. However, as 
libertarian philosopher Matt Zwolinski has pointed out, contemporary libertarians may 
not see a strict adherence to only negative rights as an essential part of libertarianism. 
Instead, Zwolinski argues that many forms of libertarianism situate themselves in relation 
to a skepticism about governmental power, rather than a commitment to purely negative 
rights and duties (Zwolinski 2018, p. 324). Many libertarians may not strictly adhere to 
negative rights, but most negative rights theorists are libertarians. My focus in this project 




theorists and libertarians. However, many issues related to libertarianism also relate to 
negative rights, and therefore I use some libertarian thinkers to explain and justify the 
principles of negative rights.  
 In this section I will describe the difference between positive and negative rights, 
and attempt to give an account of negative rights that would be acceptable to many. There 
are certainly ongoing fundamental debates within the sphere of negative rights theory, but 
my goal is to create an account of the basic principles of the view by considering some of 
the major voices within the tradition. As one of the main aims of this project is to 
determine whether negative rights theory is compatible with an obligation of the GEO to 
help alleviate global poverty, we must understand the central tenets of negative rights 
theory. 
 The distinction between positive and negative rights has been called everything 
from “reasonably clear,” (Van Duffel 2004, p. 353) to “conceptually confused” (Daskal 
2013, p. 369) and “difficult to sustain” (Dimova-Cookson 2003, p. 508). One of the 
simplest ways in which negative and positive rights have been distinguished is that 
negative rights involves the freedom from something, whereas positive rights involve the 
freedom to something. In other words, negative rights involve being free of obstacles in 
one’s path, whereas positive rights involve having certain things that help one actually 
achieve one’s goals. Another way of conceiving of this simple distinction is articulated 
by Jan Narveson in The Libertarian Idea: “'A has the negative right against B to do X' 




has the positive right against B to do X' means 'B has the duty to assist A to do X'” 
(Narveson 1988, p. 58). 
 The negative rights tradition has its roots in figures like Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and 
Mill. For example, Locke argues that in order to be free, the law protects us from 
“restraint and violence from others” (Locke 2003, p. 289). Additionally, in an early 
passage in the Second Treatise, Locke distinguishes between positive and negative 
obligations:  
“Everyone […] when his own preservation comes not in competition, 
ought […], as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may 
not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, 
or what tend to the preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb, or goods 
of another” (Locke 2003, p. 264).  
 
When he describes what we would think of as positive obligations (preserving mankind) 
he argues that everyone “ought” to do it, whereas in his description of violating negative 
obligations (taking away what preserves mankind), he claims that we “may not” do it. He 
also qualifies positive obligations, arguing that they arise only when an individual does 
not have to worry about self-preservation, and implies the demandingness of positive 
obligations by saying that he should do “as much as he can”. This could indicate that for 
Locke the duty not to violate negative rights is stronger than that to ensure the positive 
rights of others. More importantly, however, Locke makes the distinction between 
positive and negative obligations as distinguishing between the obligation to preserve 




 Another important historical example of the articulation of the need for negative 
rights comes from J.S. Mill. In On Liberty, Mill formulates what comes to be known as 
the “Harm Principle”: 
“[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number 
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant” (Mill 2011, p. 9).  
 
This principle is often taken to be the modern birth of the libertarian ideal, as it is a 
picture of extremely limited government, or government that can legitimately act only to 
prevent harm to its citizens. His rationale for this is that the utilitarian ideal for society is 
one in which people are left to govern their own lives as they see fit, because it is through 
a number of “experiments in living” that we can achieve “individual and social progress” 
(Mill 2011, p. 54). Thus, lack of government intervention is key to the development of 
our faculties, both individual and societal. Mill therefore argues that the government’s 
purview extends only to the protection of negative rights, not positive rights.  
From a contemporary perspective, Isaiah Berlin most prominently lays out the 
systematic distinction between positive and negative liberties in “Two Concepts of 
Liberty.” Berlin’s sustained treatment of the distinction lays the groundwork for current 
discussions about what exactly we are talking about when we make statements like, 
“Freedom is important!”   
 “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity” (Berlin 1969, p. 122). Berlin therefore defines negative 




do not imply coercion; I may not be able to jump 15 feet into the air, but this does not 
mean that I am coerced into not doing it. “Coercion implies the deliberate interference of 
other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. […] Mere incapacity 
to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom” (Berlin 1969, p. 122). 
 In relation to poverty and negative rights, Berlin argues that the way in which we 
conceive of the cause of our poverty is connected to the way in which we determine 
whether or not we see ourselves as free. Consider my inability to jump 15 feet into the 
air: my inability does not make me feel like I am not free to jump into the air, unless 
someone is holding me down. Similarly, my inability to afford to buy an apple will not 
make me feel like I am not free to buy the apple, unless I view the economic system as 
preventing me from being able to afford the apple. If I do not view the situation this way, 
then I realize that I am merely unable, not unfree, to buy the apple. 
 Positive liberty, on the other hand, involves the freedom to achieve a certain 
standard of living or well-being. Unlike negative liberty, which requires the absence of 
something (like coercion or obstacles), positive liberty requires the presence of something 
(like food, healthcare, shelter, etc.). Berlin famously concludes that a government that 
attempts to ensure positive rights is in danger of becoming authoritarian, as in order to 
ensure the positive rights of all its citizens, it may ‘legitimately’ utilize coercion and 
violence. Writing during the Cold War, Berlin was eminently aware of the ways in which 
the rhetoric of positive rights had been used by world leaders, like those of the Soviet 




 There are numerous disagreements among negative rights theorists about the 
details of what these rights entail. For example, Locke argues that the duty not to violate 
negative rights is of the utmost importance, but the duty to ensure the positive rights of 
others is an additional, though less important good, while others like Berlin argue that 
positive and negative rights are incompatible. There is also substantial disagreement 
about the consequences of past injustices: Robert Nozick argues in favor of rectification 
for past negative rights violations (Nozick 1974), while David Bernstein argues that 
reparation or affirmative action laws go against the fundamental tenets of the libertarian 
negative rights approach (Bernstein 2010).  
 Despite these important disagreements, however, there are overarching principles 
that bring negative rights theorists together. Most fundamentally, “[p]ersonal liberty is 
the supreme moral good,” and therefore most negative rights theorists argue that negative 
rights gain their moral status from the fact that they promote maximum personal liberty 
(LaFollette 1978, p. 194). The freedom of individuals can only be restricted by their 
consent. In terms of rights, this means that “Each human being has the right to live his 
life as he chooses, compatible with the equal right of all other human beings to live their 
lives as they choose” (Hospers 1974, p. 3). The right also entails a corresponding duty for 
everyone else in the world not to unjustly interfere in the right-holder’s life, and this duty 
does not require consent (LaFollette 1978, p. 194-5).  
Negative rights theorists have thought about freedom in a number of ways. In The 
Libertarian Manifesto, John Hospers argues that libertarian ideals of freedom could be 




relationship with each other. Even if one person has the power to enslave another, he 
does not have the right to do so. Hospers is clear here that he means slavery as literally 
being owned by another; a man with a gambling addiction may say, “I am a slave to my 
desire to gamble,” but he is speaking merely metaphorically, and is not a slave in a 
politically relevant way (Hospers 2013, p. 1). Second, freedom entails that “other men’s 
lives are not yours to dispose of” (Hospers 1974, p. 1).  To explain this point Hospers 
considers the example of a person who enjoys going to the opera. Given the expense 
required to put on an opera, the opera-lover may want the government to subsidize the 
opera. This would allow the man to watch the opera, and would allow other people do so 
as well, an outcome he believes would be beneficial for others. Hospers argues that it is 
this man’s right to try to convince others to go to the opera, but there is no right for the 
government to “take by force from the worker’s pockets to pay for what I want” (Hospers 
1974, p. 2). If the government were to do so, it would effectively be forcing others to 
work harder so that the opera-lover can enjoy what he wants, and in doing so, would be 
treating the lives of other people as disposable to the opera-lover’s interests. Hospers’ 
third articulation of freedom is that it requires that no one is a burden on another person. 
Freedom therefore involves responsibility for oneself and one’s actions; we are not free 
to use the labor of others for our benefit, and thereby become burdens on them. A person 
who steals, even if it is in order to care for his sick mother, is thereby becoming a burden 
on the victim of the theft, and therefore infringing on his freedom. 
For many libertarians and negative rights theorists, taxation is, for the most part, a 




example, argues that when taxation is used as a method of redistributing wealth, it is a 
violation of a basic moral right. Taking money away from a well-off person in order to 
give it to a poor person involves treating the first person merely as a means to an end. As 
long as the well-off person came about her money in a legitimate manner, the poor person 
has no right to it, and the government has no right to facilitate that redistribution (Nozick 
1974, p. 28-35, 150-152). As we see with this example, as well as the example above of 
the man who steals to help his sick mother, negative rights theorists believe that the 
violation of the negative rights of an individual is not justified by the claim that the result 
may be in the interest of the greater good, or even in the interest of the individual 
themselves (Nozick 1974, p. 30). 
Another interesting aspect of the theory deals with the notion of private property. 
Many libertarians and negative rights theorists think of property as absolutely crucial to 
freedom, and therefore as a fundamental right. This is clear in figures like Locke, Nozick, 
and Rothbard. Other libertarians, however, have gone in entirely the opposite direction on 
this issue. Zwolinski points out that Thomas Paine, Henry George, and Herbert Spencer 
(in his early works) all argue that private property is a violation of negative rights as 
“[f]or one individual to claim the right to exclude all others from using it without his 
permission, was to violate of the rights of others. For Paine, private property in land is a 
violation of the equal right of all to its free use, and the primary cause of contemporary 
poverty” (Zwolinski 2018, p. 335). While abolition of private property may not be a very 




important question of what counts as legitimately gained private property. This will be an 
aspect of a theory of negative rights that will underlie much of this project.  
Responsibility for negative rights violations is determined by an investigation into 
how the rights violation was caused, and whom it was caused by. In order to maintain 
both freedom and security, we must be careful while utilizing the notion of causation. 
Negative rights theorists typically argue that the causal link between the victim and 
perpetrator must be clear, so that our freedom to act is not constrained by worries about 
the distant effects of our actions. Additionally, our freedom is not curbed by having to 
help all those who have been harmed by others. Thinking back to Singer’s example of the 
drowning child, we can see how your freedom is infringed upon if you have to save the 
child, despite the fact that you had no hand in putting it in this precarious position. In 
order to avoid this hindrance of freedom, moral responsibility and duties lie only with the 
perpetrator of the action.  
 While freedom is one side of the negative rights coin, we must also explore the 
duties and obligations that come along with it. Hospers states most clearly the basic duty 
that arises from negative rights: “Every right entails a duty, true – but the duty is only that 
of forbearance – that is of refraining from violating the other person’s right.” 
Consequently, as Hospers points out, these rights will not protect individuals from the 
natural ills that befall man, like floods or hurricanes or sickness, but will provide 
protection against the “aggressive activities of other men” (Hospers 1974, p. 5). The right 
to property is the right to work for the property, and to “obtain it non-coercively,” and 




(Hospers 1974, p. 5). Everyone has these rights in the service of freedom, and everyone is 
equally obligated not to violate the negative rights of all others.  
 While this universal obligation may exist, there still remains a question of 
whether we are merely obligated to refrain from violating these rights ourselves, or 
whether we are obligated to prevent other people from violating each other’s negative 
rights. This would mean that a positive obligation (i.e. an obligation to do something 
rather than merely refraining from doing something) follows from a negative right. While 
there is disagreement about this, most negative rights theorists do not believe that this 
obligation exists for individuals, and that is why it is the job of the government to handle 
such situations.  
 As mentioned above, libertarians and negative rights theorists are not in entirely 
overlapping categories. However this aspect of punishment for the violation of negative 
rights demonstrates why the two views are often so closely linked. While we may 
naturally have negative rights and duties even in the state of nature, they are not 
enforceable to a great extent without government. Therefore, in order to secure our 
negative rights, we create government to protect us from harm by others. This protection 
is its chief function, and when it exceeds this function, it goes beyond its appropriate 
scope.      
We must also note that negative rights theorists do not have to claim that no 
positive rights or duties exist. If, for example, I have borrowed $100 from you on the 




and duties are not natural, and do not exist by the mere fact that we are people. They are 
constructed, and arise from consent (LaFollette 1978, p. 195).   
 Although certain aspects of negative rights are still disputed, we could take the 
following as the more widely agreed-upon tenets of the theory.  
1) Negative rights are rights to be free from unjust obstruction or interference.  
2) Negative rights claims are often based on natural right theories that do not 
presuppose social recognition or enforcement. The fact that these rights are 
natural is coextensive with the fact that we do not have to consent to them, or 
consent to the duties that arise from them.  
3) Negative rights are based on self-ownership and aim at self-determination. 
4) Governments and institutions should not encroach upon the rights of citizens 
except in cases where they violate the negative rights of others, or if they violate 
legally enforceable agreements. 
5) In order to determine responsibility for an unjust harm, the causal connection 
between the actions of the alleged perpetrator and the harm done must be 
established. 
6) Negative rights and freedoms are so essential that broader notions of group 
welfare may not override these rights.  
7) Positive rights and duties only arise out of consent or contract. 
There are those who take negative and positive rights to be incompatible. For 




violations or contractual violations, then how can it also be the job of the government to 
ensure positive rights more generally? Relatedly, if the government’s main purpose is to 
ensure maximum freedom for its citizens, but ensuring positive rights requires actions 
like taxation that reduce a certain kind of freedom, how can the government legitimately 
do both? However, the dichotomy may not be quite as strong as it appears. We could, for 
example, assert that government should ensure both negative and positive rights, but take 
violations of negative rights more seriously. We could also assert that government must 
take freedom seriously, but not ignore important questions of well-being. There are 
numerous spaces that could be occupied upon that spectrum, and there are many good 
reasons to take negative rights particularly seriously.  
 In this project, however, I will attempt to stick to a view that most strict negative 
rights theorists would agree with. The goal is therefore not to create a compromised view 
of rights and duties, but to determine whether a duty to help alleviate poverty could arise 
from a strict view of negative rights and the individual and institutional duties they imply.  
 
Section 3: Necessary Assumptions  
 
Attempting to base this project on entirely uncontroversial premises would be a 
foolhardy task, given the immense complexity of the nature of ethical obligation and 
global poverty. I must therefore begin with a few structural presuppositions, none of 
which I am presently able to demonstrate conclusively to an opponent. However, I do not 




 Most fundamentally, I am assuming the vision of negative rights I lay out above. I 
have made it clear that not all negative right theorists will agree with my characterization 
of the view, but I have sketched the principles that most proponents of the view endorse. 
Leaving aside the internal disagreements among negative rights theorists, however, my 
assumption would be problematic for those who make either of the following claims: (1) 
Rights, and the obligations that follow from them, do not exist or are not morally binding, 
or (2) Negative rights undermine positive rights, and therefore negative rights either do 
not exist or are not important.  
While the existence of rights, and particularly the acceptance of the importance of 
negative rights, may not be philosophically axiomatic, rights in their various forms are 
intuitively appealing and are part of our everyday discourse. More importantly, however, 
the goal of this project is to examine whether a certain kind of obligation follows from a 
view of negative rights. Thus, while I do not make a metaphysical claim about the 
existence of rights or the importance of negative rights, I hope to have shown that the 
negative rights view deserves to be considered, and it is a worthwhile project to 
determine what follows from the view in terms of obligations to the global poor.  
In presupposing the theory of negative rights, the reader must remember that the 
supreme moral good according to this view is freedom. Berlin articulates a very 
important consequence of this commitment:  
“Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or 
justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. If the liberty 
of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of 
other human beings, the system which promotes this is unjust and 




of such inequality, and do not thereby materially increase the individual 
liberty of others, an absolute loss of liberty occurs” (Berlin 1969, p. 5).  
 
The only amendment I would make to this view is that for many negative rights theorists, 
minimizing that which undermines liberty is fairness and justice. Therefore, criticizing 
the theory of negative rights by appealing to notions of fairness or justice external to the 
theory may not be absolutely fair. In a similar vein, it is important to notice that although 
liberty is being prioritized, the view does not ignore morality; liberty is the supreme 
moral good in this theory. 
 Other than the theory of negative rights, two other commitments I must accept 
are cosmopolitanism and collective responsibility. Cosmopolitanism is the view that our 
ethical obligations to each other do not simply extend to those in our neighborhood, 
country, society, race, gender, religion, etc., but instead that all humans have moral 
obligations to all other humans. I must thus reject the associativist view described above, 
that all moral obligation is restricted to those within our society. The negative rights view 
presupposes this because our right to not be unjustly interfered with or harmed is a 
natural one that exists even in the state of nature, and therefore the artificial idea of 
nations does not undermine that right and its corresponding obligations. We could also 
accept a more metaphysically minimal justification for cosmopolitanism. Given the 
interconnectedness of our world today, the consequences of our business and actions are 
no longer confined to our society, and therefore based simply on the fact that our 
institutions do interfere in the lives of most people in the world, an obligation not to 




These cosmopolitan ethical obligations can, I assume, apply to institutions and 
collectives. There is a vast literature on whether anything other than an individual can 
bear moral responsibility, and this project cannot take on the nuances of these debates. 
Instead, I argue that because these institutions have the power and freedom to act, they 
also bear obligations for the consequences of their actions. As problematic as this 
assumption may be, it allows us to make sense of our differing intuitions if we return to 
Singer’s thought experiment about the drowning child and the child on the UNICEF 
brochure. I suggested that one of the differences in our intuitions about our obligation in 
those situations arose from the fact that the circumstance of the drowning child could not 
be changed, but our individual action could save that child. On the other hand, the 
poverty affecting the child on the brochure is part of a much larger system that requires 
institutional power that can create substantial change in the child’s circumstances. Given 
the complex arrangement of power structures within international institutions, it would be 
nearly impossible to determine individual responsibility for the actions of these 
institutions. Therefore, focusing on collective responsibility appears to be a more 
promising route to address the problems of poverty. 
Finally, by utilizing the negative rights framework, I am also bracketing the 
history of the development of the current GEO. The current system may have been 
unrecognizably different were it not for the horrors of centuries of colonialism and 
slavery, for example, but for the sake of this project, and the need to demonstrate a close 
causal connection between an action and its consequent harm, I will only consider the 




imbalances within it -- came to be historically. The idea here is not to erase the past, or 
undermine its significance, but to demonstrate that even if we are to interpret causality in 
a very strict way, certain obligations still follow.   
 
Section 4: Structure of the Project  
 
Having laid out some of the arguments typically given for the alleviation of global 
poverty, as well as the framework of negative rights, I will now briefly describe the 
structure of this project. In order to show that the GEO is unjustly harming the global 
poor, I must show that the economic policies of the global institutions I am focusing on 
create a coercive economic system in which the global poor are deprived of the 
capabilities that allow them to act freely. I must also show that the effects of these 
policies are foreseeable and preventable.  
 In order to achieve this goal, Chapter 1 explores the nature of poverty, and the 
ways in which it has been conceived of and measured thus far. I argue that traditional 
ways of thinking of poverty have important shortcomings. The Capability Approach, 
however, is one of the most helpful ways of thinking about poverty, as it comes closest to 
accurately describing the disadvantages of poverty. I also describe the current state of 
poverty in the world today, as well as some of its effects, in order to fully flesh out the 
extent of the problem. 
  Chapter 2 investigates the complexity inherent in determining causation, and of 




and the WTO. I also lay out an account of harm and wrongdoing based on the principles 
of negative rights. The goal of Chapter 2 is to provide significant evidence for the causal 
connection between much of extreme global poverty and the policies of these global 
institutions, and to begin to demonstrate that the harms done by the GEO are moral 
wrongs.  
 Chapter 3 attempts to bring the conclusions of Chapters 1 and 2 together. I 
establish that within the framework of a theory of negative rights, the GEO is harming the 
global poor by depriving them of basic capability sets through coercive economic 
policies, and therefore has a responsibility to help alleviate global poverty. In this chapter 
I delve further into the connection between capabilities and freedom, demonstrating that 
the Capability Approach to poverty helps us understand how poverty’s harm to the global 
poor can justifiably be called a negative rights violation.  
 Finally, I would like to clarify one of the largest possible misinterpretations of the 
goals of this project. The arguments are not meant to culminate in a dismantling of our 
globalized economies. Insofar as a globalized system that does not systemically hinder 
the basic capabilities of all those within it is possible, I believe that globalization brings 
many powerful and morally important benefits with it, particularly international 
communication, commiseration, knowledge sharing, and freedom of movement. 
However, the goal of the project is to identify the unfair enforcement of policies, along 
with the anti-democratic structures of our global institutions, in order to find ways to 
ensure that we have international organizations that effectively and fairly allow for 




members of the global community in its decision-making, does not equally secure rights, 
does not sufficiently promote liberty and often undermines it, and selectively enforces 
freedom of expression, particularly when it benefits Multinational Corporations based in 
developed nations. The project therefore does not decry globalization, but rather some of 




















CHAPTER 1:  





 This chapter contains a discussion about what poverty is, how some of the major 
approaches have understood it, how pervasive extreme poverty is around the world today, 
and what it does to those it affects. Given the theoretical constraints of the project as laid 
out in the Introduction to the project, the goal of this chapter is to establish the kind of 
harm that poverty inflicts, and show that some popular ways of thinking about poverty 
can obscure this understanding. I argue that poverty can be seen as a problem even if one 
does not see inequality as a problem per se, and that the Capability Approach to poverty 
(the CA) most helpfully reveals this.  
In Section 1, I will look into some of the principal ways in which poverty has 
been conceived of and measured thus far, such as the distinction between absolute and 
relative poverty, as well as views that define poverty as a lack of income, resources, and 
nutrition. I also consider the Multidimensional Poverty Index, a metric that has been 
developed to measure poverty more holistically. I then examine the CA, which defines 
poverty as a deprivation of important human capabilities.  
Section 2 is devoted to understanding the extent and effects of extreme poverty 
today. I will show that extreme poverty does not simply cause suffering, but rather that it 
has biological, social, and psychological effects, which together diminish the freedom 




my argument in Chapter 3, as it describes the large range of ways in which extreme 
poverty can prevent individuals from having a real opportunity to live freely.  
In Section 3, I will argue that the CA is the one of the most helpful ways to 
conceive of poverty. I do not claim that the other methods are wrong, or that they do not 
contribute to our understanding of the ways in which people are poor, but rather that the 
CA uniquely captures something very important that is common to most instances of 
poverty. Additionally, the CA, particularly the version I propose in Chapter 3, fits best 
within the negative rights framework.  
It is important to note here that this chapter is not arguing for the elimination or 
even alleviation of poverty; it aims instead to lay out the facts, and argue that a particular 
approach (the CA) brings out the issues with poverty in a particularly intuitive way. This 
approach allows for a common starting point in our discussions about poverty, even 
among those who have differing political and ethical commitments. 
An important terminological distinction that must be made is between ‘inequality’ 
and ‘inequity’. The terms are often used interchangeably, but their distinctions are crucial 
for any nuanced debate on poverty. Essentially, equality and inequality are ideas subject 
to measurement, whereas equity and inequity are normative concepts, and therefore more 
theoretical than empirical (Kawachi et. al. 2002, p. 647). Inequality is a term of fact: A 
and B are unequal in a particular respect P if they do not line up exactly in respect to P.  
These terms are often used when discussing public health issues, for example, so we can 




disease significantly affects one part of the population more than another, there is an 
inequality in the distribution of the disease. Therefore, inequality states the facts of 
differences between or among populations. However, this does not necessarily have any 
moral consequences. Inequalities that may not have moral consequences could stem from 
personal choice, absolute chance, or different life stages. Inequity, however, is a 
normative term. Inequity “refers to those inequalities…that are deemed to be unfair or 
stemming from some form of injustice” (Kawachi et. al. 2002, p. 647). When it comes to 
global poverty, this distinction is imperative, as not all inequality in income and standard 
of living is necessarily an inequity; in fact part of the purpose of this inquiry is to 
determine exactly where there is real inequity.   
 
Section 1: Conceptions and Measurements of Poverty  
 
 
 In order to understand what poverty is, let us first explore the ways in which 
poverty is currently thought about. Poverty is a value-laden concept. At its most basic 
level, poverty is a deprivation of some kind of necessity, but what counts as a 
deprivation, and what lies within the realm of necessity, often depends upon an 
individual’s political and ethical commitments. I follow Edward J O’Boyle in asserting 
that a student of poverty must begin her approach to the topic with the question, “What 
does it mean to be human?” (O’Boyle 1999, p. 283). Approaches to poverty vary so 
widely because of the number of potential answers to this question. This Aristotelean 




deprivation to the idea that there is some kind of achievement or path required for a 
human to fulfill her functions, and therefore poverty must be an inability to reach that 
standard. Regardless of the details of one’s understanding of poverty, this basic notion of 
humanity is at stake. This is, of course, not to say that we need to have a fully-fledged 
understanding of what it means to be human before we can define poverty. However, 
thinking of poverty in terms of our humanity, even though our understanding of what that 
means may be limited, allows us to see it as a concept in relation to the kind of creatures 
we are.  
 In this section I will consider ways of thinking about and measuring poverty; 
some are theoretical frameworks of poverty, others are concrete empirical indexes, and 
others are moral frameworks from which we can extract a notion of poverty. The 
methods presented are in no way meant to be an exhaustive list of how poverty has been 
thought about; instead, I consider a few of the most common and intuitive pictures of 
poverty to gain a broad understanding of the complications arising from the debate.1 The 
idea here is to examine the different ways in which poverty is seen as a deprivation, and 
the moral status of that deprivation. As I go through each approach, I will examine its 
shortcomings, which will give a sense of why it has been so difficult to pin down one 
‘best’ way of conceptualizing poverty. The issues that arise with each approach may not 
be disqualifying, but we must acknowledge or respond to the concerns for any approach 
we choose to use.  
                                                        
1 A particularly helpful overview of empirical measures of poverty can be found in “Poverty and its 





Part 1.1: Absolute and Relative Poverty 
 
Two of the most common ways of conceiving of poverty are absolute poverty and 
relative poverty. Absolute poverty is “a situation in which the individual's basic needs are 
not covered, in other words, there is a lack of basic goods and services (normally related 
to food, housing and clothes)” (INE, p. 2). It does not attempt to measure the overall 
“quality of life” or the inequality in a society, but rather focuses purely on how many 
people have access to the absolute basics (UNESCO). Absolute poverty was originally 
conceived of as living on less than a dollar a day, but it has since been redefined 
internationally by the World Bank as living on less than $1.90 a day (World Bank 2015). 
A subset of absolute poverty is “Ultra Poverty.” This category encompasses the poorest 
of the poor who live in low-income countries, and have less than 80% of minimum 
caloric intake, while at the same time spending more than 80% of their income on food 
(Lipton 1986, p. 1). It has also been defined as living on less than $0.50 a day (Akhtar 
2007, p. x).  
Relative poverty, on the other hand, “locates the phenomenon of poverty in the 
society under study. From this perspective, a person is considered poor when they are in a 
clearly disadvantaged situation, either financially or socially, with regards to other people 
in their environment” (INE, p. 2). Thus, relative poverty is primarily focused on 
inequalities in societies, and the disparities of quality of life between the rich and poor in 
each individual society. It is typically measured in relation to median income, as a 
percentage of those below the median. Relative poverty is a much more contextual 




relation to their society. Relative poverty lines are typically measured as a fixed 
percentage of national median income. Therefore to be relatively poor could be, for 
example, to be in the lowest 30th percentile of people in a society. 
There are a number of advantages to using absolute poverty as a measurement. 
First, it is one of the most straightforward measures available, because once a basket of 
necessities has been determined, and its price has been calculated, finding the number of 
people in a society who do not earn enough to be able to attain that basket of necessities 
is relatively straightforward. Additionally, it fits with a common intuition that there is 
something it looks like to be in poverty; poverty is not merely in the eye of the beholder. 
Were we to deduce a moral obligation to help the poor as defined by those in absolute 
poverty, we would be giving more consideration to those who are ‘objectively’ very 
badly off than those who are ‘merely’ not as well-off as their peers. While the absolute 
poverty line changes over time, it is typically fixed across nations (accounting for 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)). 
However, this second advantageous aspect of absolute poverty is also seen as one 
of its major flaws, as it does not adequately consider the contextual differences in needs, 
societal structure, and resources across the globe. To solve this issue, many countries 
have developed their own National Poverty Line, rather than relying on an international 
measure that may not reflect upon the well-being of their own citizens. For example, the 




of four (Wissman 2017), whereas in India it was set at $0.52 per day for those living in 
villages and $0.76 for those living in cities in 2014 (Ghosh 2014).2  
As would be expected, however, there are many issues with governments setting 
their own poverty lines. Most importantly, it is often seen as being in a government’s 
interest to downplay the number of its citizens who live in absolute poverty, and therefore 
the lines governments draw may be lower than what is actually required to even acquire 
basic human necessities.  
Due to the fact that absolute poverty is measured in relation to income, it 
immediately faces methodological issues. Should we measure the income of the 
individual or of the household? Household income measures do not tend to take the size 
of the household into account. If a household has many people in it, it may have a high 
income as a household, but a low income per head. Issues of economy of scale come into 
effect in large households, and therefore a lower per head income may not tell us much 
about the quality of life in that household. Additionally, as with most measures, it faces 
issues of the reliability of survey data to truly reflect income.3 
The criticisms of absolute poverty extend far beyond these worries, however. 
Another fundamental concern about absolute poverty arises from its insistence on the 
centrality of income for an accurate understanding of poverty. However, this also applies 
to relative poverty, and therefore we will return to it at the end of this section. An issue 
unique to absolute poverty, however, is that regardless of whether absolute poverty is 
                                                        
2 Please note that the conversion of rupees into dollars reflects the exchange rate between India and the US 
on February 5th, 2015. 
3 For an in-depth analysis of the methodological issues faced by those who attempt to measure poverty, 




measured by a set international line or determined by the individual states, it only 
measures citizens’ income in relation to their access to basic human necessities. 
However, the contents of this basket of necessities are not universally agreed upon. Even 
if there were such a set basket of necessities that every country had to include in their 
measurements, many argue that human well-being requires far more than basic survival. 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith defines poverty as the lack of “not only the 
commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the 
custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, 
to be without” (Smith 1979, p. 869-70). For Smith, a person can be poor even if she has 
basic necessities, but does not have the things her society deems as necessary for 
“creditable people” to have. 
Given these problems with measures of absolute poverty, relative poverty is often 
seen as the answer. The turn to the use of relative poverty seems to imply that the well-
being of citizens should be a priority for a community, rather than merely the survival of 
these citizens. Relative poverty taps into a very important psychological element of what 
it means for something to be essential. “Two individuals with identical consumption 
patterns, one placed in a very prosperous society and one placed in a very poor society, 
can experience considerable differences in the extent to which they are able to engage in 
activities customary in their respective societies” (Niemietz 2010, p. 241). Relative 
poverty, therefore, rests on the assumption that the social element of humanity is so 
important that without it, a measure of well-being is incomplete. However, some of the 




relative poverty. For example, the problem of whether to consider household or 
individual income, and how to incorporate economies of scale into such measurements, 
still holds for relative poverty.  
There is also a more fundamental issue with relative poverty. Because it is 
comparative in character, relative poverty does not seem to match up with our intuitions 
about what it means to be poor in societies where there is either widespread wealth or 
widespread poverty. In the former, one could be classified as poor if, in a society where 
most people owned two yachts, one could ‘only’ afford to buy one. In the latter case, one 
is only poor if one is the poorest of one’s society, and thus an individual who cannot 
afford reasonable healthcare may still not be classified as poor, simply because they can 
keep starvation at bay a little better than someone else can. These situations demonstrate 
the concern that relative poverty tells us much more about inequality than it does about 
poverty. The lives of the poorest 30% of people in a developed country like Germany is 
significantly different in terms of well-being than the poorest 30% in a developing nation 
like Bangladesh. To talk about these two groups in the same light seems fundamentally 
mistaken. Additionally, a very wealthy country with high income inequality would be 
seen as poorer under this measure than a low income country with low income inequality. 
Thus, while it may be worthwhile to care about societal inequality, we must not treat a 
measurement of inequality as sufficient for a measurement of poverty.  
Both absolute and relative poverty measure income, and are thus subject to 
worries that income is too narrow an indicator to give us all the information that poverty 




is not able to tell us the full story about poverty in affluent societies. If we take the 
scenario mentioned above of an affluent society in which a person would be poor if he 
were unable to buy two yachts, we see one kind of problem. However, a more insidious 
and realistic concern is that the juxtaposition of the lives of the rich and poor within a 
rich country are very stark. The poor in a wealthy society seem so out of step with the 
rest of their society that they may experience more career-related barriers than those with 
similar incomes who live in poorer societies. For example, if unemployment in a wealthy 
society is low, then someone who has been unemployed for a year may experience more 
discrimination than someone who has been unemployed for a year in a poorer country 
with higher unemployment. Thus, a poor person in a poor country may not face the same 
obstacles as a poor person in a rich country, but both relative and absolute poverty, as 
measures of income, could show the poor person in the affluent society as better off than 
the poor person in the poor society. As Amartya Sen argues, “This dollar-a-day measure 
doesn’t take into account many variations that influence the conversion of income into 
good living” (Sen quoted in Morrell 2011).  
Poverty also makes us more vulnerable to climate change, economic volatility, 
domestic abuse, sexism, mental and physical degradation, etc. Sen presents an example of 
flood victims in Pakistan: not only do these people have greatly reduced income due to 
their lands being destroyed by the floods, but they also have to face all the harmful 
effects of resettlement, including negative changes in essentials like education and 




measure like GDP per capita […but] would be captured in a properly multidimensional 
measure” (Sen quoted in Morrell 2011).  
When studying the poverty levels in a society, governments and NGOs tend to 
measure income, because it is seen as a predictor of the quality of life. Often it is a good 
predictor of the quality of life. However, while income may be an easy approximation of 
the likelihood of individuals to have these necessities, it does not accurately reflect so 
many of the important nuances a study of poverty should reflect.  
 
Part 1.2: The Rawlsian Resourcist Approach 
 
 
Due to the numerous issues with using either absolute or relative poverty as a sole 
measure of poverty, many have argued that poverty should be seen as something other 
than merely a lack of income. The Rawlsian Resourcist Approach (RRA) is one such 
model, as it measures poverty as a lack of resources, rather than a lack of income. The 
RRA attempts to “find an appropriately neutral way of assessing the respective advantage 
in life enjoyed by different people” (White 2015). This approach was popularized by 
John Rawls (1971), and is also known as “Resourcism.” Resourcism, however, has taken 
many forms, so we will focus here on Rawls’ version of the approach.  
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls lays out the foundation of the “primary goods” 
metric, which discusses needs as that which “every rational man is presumed to want” 
(Rawls 1971, p. 62). These include “social” primary goods like liberties, opportunities, 




and imagination. He argues for a more-or-less equal distribution of the social goods, 
though inequalities, if they are in the interest of the whole, are to be accepted. The 
“Original Position”, Rawls argues, is a theoretical state of being in which representative 
parties are placed behind the “veil of ignorance” and thereby blind to their own 
socioeconomic status, or any interests they may have. In this position, Rawls argues that 
one can find objective principles of justice more clearly and utilize them to reach a just 
and fair society. Rawls’ claim is that in the Original Position we will find that access to 
primary goods should be fairly distributed.  
Rawls sets out to find a set of principles that can be used to determine justice in 
the Original Position, with the hope that these principles can be widely agreed upon. The 
two main principles Rawls suggests are: 1) All individuals have a claim to “the most 
extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others,” and 2) Social and economic inequalities are to be allowed and arranged in such a 
way that they (a) are attached to positions and offices that everyone has an opportunity to 
obtain, and (b) can be reasonably expected to be advantageous to all, especially the least 
well-off (Rawls 1999, p. 53).  
Rawls does not see these principles as equal in terms of their demands on us. The 
first principle, also known as the Principle of Equal Liberty takes precedence over the 
second principle, and within the second principle, the equality of opportunity (2a) takes 
precedence over the need of an inequality to benefit the worst-off (2b). The first principle 
is a political one, whereas the second primarily relates to economics. These principles are 




advantage. Of the justifications for inequalities that Rawls discusses, 2(b) is also known 
as the “difference principle.” The difference principle insists that inequalities need to 
benefit the worst-off in society in order to be justifiable. 
Rawls’ focus is primarily on inequality rather than poverty, but we can 
extrapolate an idea of poverty’s deprivations. The principles above show that for Rawls, 
poverty is a lack of very important resources necessary for his political conception of the 
person. Thus, the goal of a just society built on notions of mutual advantage should be 
that everyone has equality of basic rights and liberty, and access to primary goods, and 
that everyone has an equal opportunity to achieve goods beyond that. This is referred to 
as a “resourcist” approach because primary goods are not achievable merely through an 
increase in income, but require particular resources. This is because primary goods can 
include non-tangible and non-commodifiable resources like self-respect and imagination.  
 The RRA has been criticized in a number of ways, but let us focus on those 
criticisms that are most relevant to the project at hand. First, Sen has questioned the 
theoretical helpfulness of “primary goods.” Human beings differ in the amount and kinds 
of primary goods needed, and are able to utilize income and resources in very different 
ways. Determining well-being by appealing to resources glosses over this fact. A disabled 
and an able-bodied person would use resources differently, and therefore ensuring they 
have a fair distribution of resources does not reflect their well-being (Sen 2005, p. 154). 
In Section 3.1, I return to this worry, and explain how the Capability Approach responds. 
 Relatedly, the RRA is an example of “ideal theory.” As Rawls argues, the 




and equal citizens from one generation to the next” (Rawls 1985, p. 232). Therefore, 
applying the primary goods metric to the world in which we currently live is often 
unhelpful. This is not necessarily a critique of the approach itself, but rather my 
application of the approach to the current project and circumstances. However, regardless 
of its status as ideal theory, the RRA claims that resources are fundamental to our 
understanding of justice, and therefore there is an aspect of the theory that can safely be 
applied to our current world. Moreover, even in an ideal world, however, it is not clear 
that simply because a society is just that its people will not utilize resources differently, 
and therefore the fundamental premise faces the same issue in relation to poverty in our 
world or in an ideal world.  
 Third, the RRA seems insufficient when we consider “more complex social 
achievements,” such as appearing in public without shame. These complex social 
achievements require us to look at cultural factors that affect the achievements, like class 
structure, social convention, or religious customs. These cultural factors are not reducible 
to resources or commodities, even non-tangible resources like self-respect. Therefore, 
“not enough information is provided by looking only at the commodities each can 
successfully command” (Clark 2006, p. 35). This further adds to the picture of resources 







Part 1.3: Lack of Happiness or Desire Satisfaction 
 
 
Numerous utilitarian moral theorists have described the ultimate goal of life as 
happiness or desire satisfaction. Within this framework, a life has gone badly if overall 
one has not achieved more happiness than sadness or pain, or one has not managed to 
fulfill many of one’s desires. This is not a definition of poverty per se, but suggests that 
insofar as poverty causes a lack of happiness or desire satisfaction, it is a bad state of 
affairs. This approach, therefore, does not view poverty not as an evil in itself, but rather 
sees it as a state in which we are less likely to have or do the things that will bring us 
happiness or satisfy our desires. 
This is a prominent view, particularly in political discussions of poverty. Its 
primary advantage is that it is certainly intuitive that often people in poverty are unhappy, 
and are unable to satisfy their desires. It also has the characteristic of being flexible about 
value judgments about poverty; if poverty does not prevent an individual from being 
happy or satisfying desires, then there is nothing wrong with it. It is also a standard that is 
relative to individual societies; the same amount of income or resources that would allow 
an individual to be happy in one society would not suffice for an individual in another. 
Thus, while it is similar to the notion of relative poverty discussed above, the central 
difference is that it focuses on the outcome of resources, whereas relative poverty is 
defined by a percentage of the median income of the society.  
There are, however, a number of objections to this view that reveal its 
shortcomings. First and perhaps most fundamental, is a resistance to the claim that 




important aspect of our lives, “[h]appiness or desire fulfilment represents only one aspect 
of human existence” (Sen 1984, p. 512). Additionally, though utilitarian arguments like 
those of Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill have been prominent for centuries, the worries 
about situating moral goodness in feelings of happiness are grounded in the belief that 
morality aims at something outside ourselves. Even if we interpret the utilitarian 
argument as divorced from morality, i.e. if we take it that happiness or desire satisfaction 
should be our goal simply for the sake of living our best lives, rather than because they 
are good, it is not obvious that even the best life is achieved simply through happiness 
and desire satisfaction (Sen 2009, p. 282-4). 
This leads to two related concerns about the approach, both involving the issue of 
adaptive preference. Because as humans our desires are often shaped by the 
circumstances we are used to, it is easy to see that people in poorer situations shift their 
expectations to fit within their reality. We see this often within patriarchal societies, 
where women are conditioned to perceive themselves as inferior and therefore expect to 
be treated that way. Living a life of deprivation could similarly condition people to 
believe that they can be happy and have their desires satisfied if only they adjust their 
desires to meet their circumstances. On the flip side of the coin, the second worry is that 
we may find those who live in particularly lavish circumstances being unhappy with what 
they have, simply because those around them have more, or for a host of other reasons. 
Constructing the notion of poverty in relation to happiness would not be able to account 
for these kinds of circumstances; happiness and unhappiness may be correlated to the 




 Another concern regarding this approach is that happiness and desire satisfaction 
are very hard to measure. Because of the aforementioned issues regarding the subjectivity 
of happiness and desire satisfaction, it would be difficult to develop a minimum standard 
of happiness, and measure poverty or deprivation as being under the standard. The United 
Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network has come up with an index by 
which to measure happiness, named the World Happiness Report, and provides a ranking 
of countries based on this measurement. The index considers factors like “income, 
healthy life expectancy, social support, freedom, trust and generosity” (Helliwell et al. 
2018). However, this index has faced criticisms about its own statistical methodology, as 
well as worries about the reliability of its data because it bases much of its conclusions on 
surveys produced by numerous agencies, many of whom have vastly different methods of 
interviewing people and gathering data. There are also vast cultural and linguistic barriers 
to measuring happiness; Japanese culture, for example, looks down upon boasting about 
one’s happiness, whereas Scandinavian countries have “immense societal pressure to tell 
everyone how happy [they] are, right up to the moment when [they’re] sticking [their] 
head in the oven” (Smith 2017). Joseph Juhász argues that research on happiness is “done 
cross-culturally--translating 'happy' from one language and one culture to another ... 
When a Hungarian says 'boldog vagyok' does he mean what an American means when he 
says 'I am happy'? When an Englishman says 'I am happy' does he mean what an 
American means when he says the 'same' words?” (Juhász 2010). Philosophers are 
particularly aware of the problem of this linguistic difference; any student of Aristotle 




 Additionally, one of the most fundamental criticisms of this standard is that it 
focuses on happiness at the communal level, whereas the fact that a society scores high 
points communally may not give us much information about whether an individual in that 
society is happy, or how the happiness is distributed. If happiness is fundamentally an 
individual feeling, the premise of the measurement seems backwards, or counter to its 
own purpose. The measurement is particularly baffling when one looks at the 2018 World 
Happiness Report. In the report, Finland is ranked as the world’s happiest country, but 
when we look at the countries in the world with the highest suicide rates, we find Finland 
in the top 20th percentile in the world, at number 35 (WHO 2015). This does not 
disqualify Finland from being the world’s happiest country, but it does raise suspicions 
about the relationship between the survey and our intuitions about happiness. 
 
Part 1.4: The Biological Conception 
 
 
An inability to feed oneself, resulting in death or disease by starvation, is one of 
the clearest and most tangible results of poverty. Therefore in 1901, Seebohm Rowntree 
argued that families are in “primary poverty” if their ‘”total earnings are insufficient to 
obtain the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency” (Sen 
1983b, p. 11). In more recent measurements of poverty, malnutrition has frequently been 
considered an essential indicator of poverty, if not the sole indicator. Malnutrition has 
been measured by factors like a “weight for height indicator…or by a measurement of a 
child’s mid-upper arm circumference” (Arunkumar et. al 2015, p. 10). In “Child 




malnutrition is a good poverty indicator because the health of children tells us not only 
about the content of that measure, but also reflects a society’s future productivity, 
“improvement in gender-equality, intra-household distribution, and health environment 
quality” (Setboonsarng 2005, p. 7). 
In Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Sen argues 
that this biological approach to poverty encounters some serious objections, but does not 
deserve to be discounted. The most fundamental problem with this approach lies in the 
fact that we still do not have sufficient knowledge about the numerous facets of nutrition, 
and nutritional requirements vary widely based on a community’s climate conditions, an 
individual’s activity level, physical features, and genetics. Because of the diet that many 
in the developed world have had over the last few decades, the average American, for 
example, would have considerably different nutritional requirements than the average 
Indian (Sen 1983b, p. 12). Determining universal minimal nutritional requirements is 
close to impossible.  
Measuring poverty biologically also tends to prescribe food that is, “low‐cost 
indeed, but monumentally boring,” and therefore entirely unrealistic (Sen 1983b, p. 12). 
People’s consumption habits cannot be entirely determined by an equation. Additionally, 
biological measurements are usually used to determine the minimum income 
requirements. The minimum income required to obtain the minimum nutritional 
requirements, however, also varies based on custom and habit, and also depends on the 
availability of certain goods and services. Sen uses the example of Lord Beveridge, 




proved to be far from correct, since the British were spending a much lower proportion of 
their income on food than was assumed” (Sen 1983b, p. 13) . 
While it is clear that the biological measurement of poverty is unable to 
accurately measure the factors it needs to, Sen argues that biological deprivation is still 
an important part of poverty, and therefore this approach should not be ignored despite its 
flaws. In its defense, Sen argues that while nutritional requirements may vary, its fuzzy 
boundaries are only an issue if poverty itself has clear boundaries. Given its complexity, 
the definition of poverty must in some sense be vague, so the pertinent question is 
whether or not the biological conception is vague in the same ways that poverty is vague. 
If it is, then it may fit well as a characteristic of poverty.  
Sen also argues that the issue of a minimum income necessary to achieve the 
minimum nutritional requirements unnecessarily complicates the biological approach; we 
should focus on whether people actually achieve the nutritional minimums, rather than 
determine whether their income is sufficient to do so. Additionally, even if there was an 
important reason that income levels were necessary, he argues that the process could be 
“substantially simplified by the wide prevalence of particular patterns of consumption 
behaviour in the community in question. Proximity of actual habits and behaviour makes 
it possible to derive income levels at which the nutritional norms will be ‘typically’ met” 
(Sen 1983b, p. 14). 
Perhaps most importantly, though, an account of poverty that does not take its 




indicator of poverty, and might present substantial worries for quantification, it must be 
an important factor in any conception of poverty. 
 
Part 1.5: The Multidimensional Poverty Index 
 
 
In 2010, the Oxford Poverty & Human 
Development Initiative (OPHI) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) put forth 
the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), a 
measurement of poverty that measures the 
numerous aspects of poverty. The previous 
measurement used by the United Nations (UN) 
was the Human Poverty Index (HPI), which was 
primarily based on slightly simplistic 
interpretations of three factors: health, education, 
and standard of living. The MPI seeks to improve 
upon that measurement by acknowledging the 
myriad ways in which poverty affects lives by 
expanding on these three major indicators, and 
delving into their constitutive sub-factors.  
 
The developers of the MPI intended it to be “used as an analytical tool to identify 
the most vulnerable people, show aspects in which they are deprived and help to reveal 




resources and design policies more effectively” (Alkire and Santos 2010, p. 1). In order 
to do so, the index considers ten weighted indicators of poverty (see Box 1). As part of 
Education, it considers the number of years of schooling received, and the enrolment of 
children in a household in school, particularly in grades one through eight. As part of 
measuring Health, it primarily looks at child mortality and nutrition. And finally, the 
Standard of Living factor is broken up into six categories: electricity, drinking water, 
sanitation, flooring, cooking fuel, and assets. A close look at these factors makes clear, 
however, that the threshold for what counts as a deprivation in some of these categories is 
quite low. For example, a deprivation of electricity is judged by whether a household has 
any electricity, so people who live in households that have an hour of electricity a day 
would not count as deprived under this measurement.  On the other hand, some may see 
the category of assets as too extensive, as if a household does not own one or more of the 
stated assets (radio, TV, telephone, bike, motorbike, car, or tractor), it is deemed poor.  
Each of the three major indicators is weighted equally, and each individual 
category is weighted as an equal part of the indicator. Therefore, each of the two 
categories related to Education are weighted as half of the total weight of Education, and 
therefore weigh 1/6th of the total measure (Education is 1/3rd of the total measure, and 
therefore each of the two sub-indicators are 1/6th of the total measure). This holds true of 
the Health categories as well. The categories under standard of living weigh 1/6th of the 
1/3rd held by the Standard of Living indicator, and therefore have a weight of 1/18th of the 




The MPI exists on a sliding scale, but it determines whether someone is in 
poverty by looking at whether they are deprived in at least 1/3rd of the categories. The 
first time the MPI was used, it found that by its measure approximately 1.7 billion people, 
or 1/3rd of the world’s population, live in poverty. The World Bank’s measurement was 
that 1.3 billion people were living in extreme poverty (based on an absolute poverty 
measure of $1.25 a day), and therefore the MPI brought to light that .4 billion more 
people than were previously counted as poor are, in fact, poor. In some regions the MPI 
measurement provided a stark contrast to the World Bank’s measurement. In Ethiopia, 
for example, the World Bank measured that 39% of people live in extreme poverty, 
whereas the MPI measures the poverty rate to be 90%. In the other direction we can see 
the example of Tanzania, where the World Bank measured an 89% poverty rate, while 
the MPI’s rate was 65%. The reason for this discrepancy, the report states, is that “[t]he 
MPI captures deprivations directly – in health and educational outcomes and key services 
such as water, sanitation and electricity. In some countries, these resources are provided 
free or at low cost; in others, it is very hard even for working people with an income to 
obtain them” (Alkire and Santos 2010, p. 4). While income measurements are often used 
as a catch-all to demonstrate deprivations, using the MPI shows that so many of the 
important factors that poverty causes need to be measured by themselves to get an 
accurate picture of what poverty looks like, and what it does to those it affects.  
All the aforementioned approaches put together seem to paint a picture of what 
we think of when we think of severe poverty: an inability to feed oneself, to afford other 




thrive, or to be happy, or to satisfy one’s desires. While all these visions of poverty are 
problematic in certain regards, they come together to show that poverty creates 
deprivations of very important aspects of our lives. These conceptions view poverty 
either entirely as a lack of a particular kind of input, i.e. a lack of resources or income or 
nutrition, or entirely as a lack of a particular outcome, i.e. lack of happiness, or lack of 
education, health, etc. I will now present the Capability Approach to poverty, and in 
Section 3 will argue that it is a preferable way to think about poverty for three main 
reasons: (1) it thinks of poverty in terms of both input and outcome (2) it encompasses 
many of the worries and intuitions the previous methods have already brought out, and 
(3) it is compatible with a negative rights viewpoint, and therefore requires fewer 
controversial premises than many competing theories. In this chapter I will focus on (1) 
and (2), whereas (3) will be taken up in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Part 1.6: The Capability Approach 
 
“[W]ealth is evidently not the goal we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake 
of something else” (Aristotle quoted in Sen 2000, p. 14). 
 
The Capability Approach (CA), popularized by Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum, is a theoretical framework that argues that the freedom to do or be certain 
valuable things is of primary moral importance. It is therefore used in many fields, but for 




The CA conceives of poverty in relation to its effects on a person’s abilities to do certain 
things, or actualize certain potentialities. Instead of focusing on “inanimate objects of 
convenience…[like] GNP …[and] GDP,” Sen argues that we must focus on “the 
centrality of human lives” and “the well-being and freedoms that human lives can bring” 
(Sen 2009, p. 225).  This approach picks up on what is really at the heart of the problem 
with poverty: a deprivation of the ability to live freely, and perform valuable actions. The 
CA contributes to the idea that poverty should be seen as far more insidious than the 
pangs of hunger due to starvation, or the feeling of freezing due to homelessness, as these 
physical aspects of poverty are components of the detrimental effects of systemic 
poverty. 
Sen’s 1979 Tanner Lecture, “Equality of What?” contained the seeds of the CA, 
which has since been significantly expanded upon by Sen and many others. One of the 
foundational ideas of the CA is that different people and different communities vary in 
their abilities to convert income and possessions into valuable achievements. For 
example, a deaf person may need more resources than a non-deaf person to achieve the 
same goals. Thus, the question is not merely one of how many resources a person has, but 
what one can accomplish with those resources. Regarding the question of whether 
poverty should be seen as absolute or relative, the CA demonstrates that this binary 
serves primarily to confuse the issue. Everyone certainly needs some amount of resources 
to survive and thrive, but neither absolute nor relative poverty determine that amount 
based on how individuals can actually utilize that wealth, and therefore they do not lead 




There are three points of terminology essential to thinking about what the CA 
offers.  
1)  A “functioning” is “an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or 
be” (Sen 1985a, p. 10). It is therefore a function of the utilization of the social 
structures, income, or possessions a person has access to, rather than the social 
structures, income, or possessions themselves. 
2) A “capability” is a person’s ability to accomplish a functioning. If a person can 
choose whether or not to achieve an outcome, then they have that capability.  
3) A “capability set” is “the alternative combinations of simultaneously attainable 
functionings that are available to the person,” meaning a set of abilities that 
represent a certain way of living (Sen 1992, p. 40).  
Thus, for example, traveling is a functioning, something that someone could achieve, but 
having the “real opportunity” to travel is a capability that corresponds to that functioning 
(Robeyns 2016b). Another example that can be helpful here is that of the distinction 
between an affluent person who fasts for his religious beliefs, and a poor person who is 
starving because he cannot afford to eat. In this case, the two have identical functionings 
(i.e. neither of them are eating), but since the affluent person is choosing to fast, he has a 
different capability set, because he can choose to eat at any point (Sen 1985b, p. 201).  
To understand the CA in relation to some of the theories above, let us consider the 
role of nutrition in poverty. As seen above, it is close to impossible to pin down a single 




mean that nutrition is irrelevant to the study of poverty. When determining whether a 
person is in poverty, therefore, a resourcist may ask the subject of the study about the 
amount of food (or the amount of money to buy food) that the subject has access to. A 
utilitarian of the kind that measures preference satisfaction may ask whether the subject’s 
nutritional preferences are being met. In contrast, a capability theorist will measure the 
nutrition level of the subject, and determine whether that level is sufficient for the subject 
to perform valuable functionings (Berges 2007, p. 17). The CA focuses most on what 
follows from nutrition, looking into how it helps us perform basic actions, and therefore 
gives us far more information about the state of the subjects than the other approaches to 
poverty. 
The details of what we can and should consider central capabilities to be are 
contentious. Nussbaum, for example, has created a neo-Aristotelean list of fundamental 
human capabilities that must be guaranteed to every individual within a just society. This 
list includes, for example, life, bodily health, being able to play, and having control over 
one’s environment. However, Sen argues against this “canonical list of capabilities” (Sen 
2004, p. 77), preferring instead to obtain empirical knowledge of what individuals and 
communities value in order to determine which capabilities should be promoted in 
particular regions. In Chapter 3, I go into detail about the consequences of this 
disagreement.  
Most important for our purposes here, however, is the connection Sen presents 
between capabilities and freedoms. For Sen, when we evaluate a person’s standard of 




person is free. This freedom amounts to the ability to choose what kind of life one wants 
to lead, based on one’s values (Kaufman 2006, p. 291). “The focus of the capability 
approach,” Sen claims, “[is] not just on what a person actually ends up doing, but also on 
what she is in fact able to do, whether or not she chooses to make use of that opportunity” 
(Sen 2009, p. 235).  For Sen, what is important is not just what someone does, but which 
choices they have, and what they are free to do. Without this focus on freedom as the end 
of capabilities, Sen believes that the CA is reduced to some form of utilitarian calculus, 
whereas one of the key strengths of the CA is that it brings together freedom of will and 
action. In Chapter 3, I return to the importance of capabilities as a means to freedom.  
Sen has been criticized for this connection between freedom and capabilities by 
egalitarians, who believe that making freedoms central to the egalitarian process makes it 
so that equality is no longer the primary focus of egalitarianism (see for example, Okin 
2003). In this project, however, I am not concerned with whether capabilities and 
egalitarianism can work together, but whether capabilities and a negative conception of 
freedom can do so. As Sabina Alkire argues, “according to the capability approach, the 
objective of both justice and poverty reduction (for example) should be to expand the 
freedom that deprived people have to enjoy ‘valuable beings and doings’” (Alkire 2005b, 
p.117). 
In order to understand why the CA is a particularly helpful framework in relation 
to poverty, determining the scope of the problem of poverty is crucial. In the next section, 





Section 2: The Extents and Effects of Poverty Today 
 
 
As discussed above, measuring poverty meets with innumerable problems, both 
practical and theoretical. While I have suggested that the Capability Approach gives us 
one of the best frameworks by which we can think through what we should look at when 
we measure poverty, understanding the extent of poverty today requires us to look at the 
empirical data that a variety of approaches deliver, as well as an examination of what the 
effects of this poverty are. In this section, therefore, I briefly lay out the state of poverty 
in the world today according to a number of metrics, given the most recent numbers 
available. Additionally, because the CA focuses primarily on what poverty prevents the 
poor from being able to do, I will spend most of this section detailing, in particular, the 
effects of malnutrition on individuals and their abilities.    
Approximately 768.5 million people live in absolute poverty (i.e. under $1.90 a 
day), as of 2017. Thus, approximately 10% of the world's population lives in a situation 
in which they cannot afford minimal food, clothing, healthcare, and shelter, according to 
the World Bank (Ferreira 2017). The Multidimensional Poverty Index, however, 
demonstrates that 1.46 billion people (of the 5.5 billion people measured) are multi-
dimensionally poor, as of January 2018 (OPHI 2018). 815 million people (11% of the 
global population) are undernourished and chronically hungry (FAO 2017). As we see in 
Table 1, malnutrition of numerous forms affects huge numbers of people, particularly 
children, across the globe. “Hidden hunger is the number one cause of death in the world, 




Kraemer 2012, p. IX). By “hidden hunger,” the authors are referring to the malnutrition 




At least 71% of the world’s population live on less than $10 a day, and are thus 
considered either poor or low-income (Kocchar 2015). Additionally, 22,000 children die 
daily for poverty-related reasons. That is the death of one child every four seconds 
(Ravallion et al. 2009). Every day approximately 800 women die during childbirth from 
absolutely preventable causes, and 99% of those women are in developing countries 
(WHO 2010). 
Additionally, more than 750 million people do not have access to safe drinking 
water, which is one of the leading causes of diarrhea, which kills approximately 2300 




pneumonia kill 2 million children a year who cannot afford adequate treatment (UNICEF 
2012).  
To lift everyone in the world from extreme poverty would cost $60 billion 
annually. Many argue that this cost is unbearable even for high-income countries, but it 
would merely require the reduction of the share of high-income countries of the global 
product from 78.98% to 78.90% (Pogge 2008, pp. 9-13), or 1/4th of the income of the 100 
richest billionaires (Oxfam 2013). 
The good news, however, is that extreme global poverty worldwide seems to be 
decreasing in terms of percentages, at least according to some measures. In 2016, Gayle 
Smith, the administrator of the US Agency for International Development declared that 
poverty has been cut in half worldwide since 2000. However, many argue that these 
figures are deeply misleading. The United Nations Development Programme set out 
Sustainable Development Goals, the first of which was to eradicate poverty “in all forms 
and dimensions by 2030” (UNDP 2018). Another UN goal was to halve the number of 
people in poverty, but over time the goal changed to halving the proportion of people in 
poverty. Thus the goal was reduced by 167 million people. The goal was further reduced 
to halving the number of people in poverty in developing countries, rather than across the 
world. Following that, “they moved the baseline of analysis from 2000 back to 1990, thus 
retroactively including all poverty reduction accomplished by China throughout the 
1990s, due in no part whatsoever to the Millennium Campaign.” This reduced the target 
by another 324 million people. Thus the grand claims made by these organizations is 




(Hickel 2014). According to the World Bank, 787 million people currently live in 
absolute poverty, whereas the Multidimensional Poverty Index estimates that number to 
be 1.46 billion people (OPHI 2018). Even if poverty rates are decreasing, however, we 
cannot conclude that we could simply continue what we are doing and poverty would 
eventually be eradicated. We cannot be morally complacent when faced with the death 
and dehumanization that results from extreme poverty, even if it is slowly decreasing. In 
fact, as Pogge has argued, poverty rates may be decreasing despite the effects of our 
economic order, rather than because of it (Pogge 2008, p. 20). In Chapter 3, I will return 
to this question of the significance of changing poverty rates. 
Now that we have looked into both the good and bad news about the state of 
poverty around the globe today, we must consider its effects. Although there are those, 
like egalitarians, who take inequality to be a problem in itself, many others require a 
negative outcome in order to judge whether a situation is one that requires rectification. 
Therefore, I will now consider the effects of extreme poverty. 
 Poverty’s effects are felt on every level: individual, communal, national, and 
global. Most pertinent to this project, however, is its effects on the individual and her 
abilities to act freely. Primarily, the issues that arise from poverty are related to the stress 
of the consistent worry about mere survival. 
 Children who are raised in poverty face physiological and psychological stress.  
Physiologically, malnutrition from a young age results in vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies, which can cause numerous neurological disorders. For example, a 




Vitamin B6 (found commonly in foods like pork, beef, bananas, and chickpeas) can lead 
to polyneuropathy, a disease that affects the nerves, leading to numbness and burning 
pain. 
 Furthermore, malnutrition leads to stunted physical and mental growth. Studies 
suggest4 that when children’s development is stunted at a young age, it can lead to “long 
term deficit in cognitive development” which includes tests on “IQ…, arithmetic, 
reasoning…, and simple and complex auditory working memory” (WHO 2006, p. 113). 
A lack of micronutrients in children’s diets has dire consequences. Approximately 40% 
of children under the age of five in developing countries had Vitamin A deficiency, 
which can cause children to go permanently blind (GRP).  
Additionally, Iodine deficiency is most prevalent in developing countries. When a 
pregnant woman is deficient in iodine, permanent brain damage can occur in the fetus 
(UNICEF 2015), and many fetuses die in the womb (Kapil 2007). Iodine deficiency is 
one of the primary causes of “impaired cognitive development in children,” (WHES 
2016) and is the “single greatest cause of brain damage and mental retardation 
worldwide.” 30% of the world’s population currently lives in areas in which Iodine 
Deficiency Disorder is prevalent, and 655 million people are affected by goiter (Kapil 
2007). 
 Malnutrition that results in the deficiency of a particular nutrient may end up 
creating a deficiency in another nutrient. For example, iron, magnesium, and zinc 
                                                        
4 See for example Grantham-McGregor S, Ani C. “Cognition and undernutrition: evidence for vulnerable 
period”. Forum of Nutrition, 2003, 56:272–275. Further evidence can be seen in Grantham-McGregor S, 
Baker-Henningham H. “Review of the evidence linking protein and energy to mental development.” Public 




deficiencies can result in cases of anorexia, which can lead to further lack of intake of 
necessary nutrients like proteins, which can severely affect physical growth. Also, low 
lipid levels can affect the way that some vitamins, like A and D, are absorbed. See Table 
2 for more examples of the neurological disorders that follow from macronutrient 
deficiencies. 
 Often the physiological and psychological effects of poverty are strongly linked. 
In “Childhood Poverty and Health,” Gary W. Evans and Pilyoung Kim argue that poverty 
in early childhood leads to the body being unable to regulate stress well, which has 
numerous physiological and psychological effects, even in adulthood, particularly that of 
high blood pressure (Evans and Kim 2007, p. 953).5  The effects of malnutrition on 
childhood cognitive development are also clear and substantial. Studies show that Iron 
deficiency was associated with “lower cognitive scores, slower speed of processing, as 
well as altered socioemotional behaviors and altered parent behaviors.” Additionally, 
Zinc deficiency was associated with “lower quality exploratory behaviors and altered 
parent behaviors” (Fuglestad 2010, p. 5). 
In a large study of over 1000 children and young adults, researchers found that the 
brains of those who came from higher-income families with parents who were well-
educated had larger surface areas than those who came from low-income and less-
educated families. This was particularly prevalent in the regions of the brain associated 
with language and executive functioning. Furthermore, the study found that small 
increases in income had a much greater impact on the brain of those from low-income 
                                                        





families than others. Relatedly, when income levels dropped below a certain amount, 
brain growth dropped off significantly. “Children from families making less than $25,000 
suffered the most, with 6% less brain surface area than peers in families making $150,000 
or more” (Mariani 2017). 
The data thus suggests that brains physically change due to poverty and 
malnutrition. Seth Pollack, a child psychologist at University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
found that there was a strong correlation between family income and the volume of grey 
matter in the brain. Children from families under the US federal poverty line had 8-10% 








Section 3: Why the Capability Approach?  
 
In arguing for the CA to poverty, I am not thereby endorsing all versions of it, or 
claiming that it absolutely accurately describes what it means to be human. Instead, I 
believe that it gives us a helpful starting point for discovering the kinds of things we 
should look at when measuring poverty because it encompasses and explains the 
intuitions we have about how poverty is a hindrance to the fulfillment of our most basic 
capacities for free action. It does not solve many of the methodological problems faced 
by the aforementioned approaches, but it gives us a framework for understanding what is 
important about poverty, and therefore a greater understanding of what measurements of 
poverty should be aiming at. 
 Readers should note at this point that one of the primary advantages of the CA 
that I will argue for is that a version of the approach works within the constraints of a 
theory of negative rights. While I touch on this point here, the argument will be made in 
detail in Chapter 3. Here, I will mainly discuss some of the benefits of subscribing to the 
CA instead of other frameworks of poverty.  
 
Part 3.1: The Advantages of the Capability Approach 
 
 
One of the chief alternatives to the CA is the Rawlsian Resourcist Approach 
(RRA), as discussed above. Before we begin our comparison of the two accounts, we 
must note that there are three fundamental worries about such a comparison. First, Rawls 




the CA is grounded in understanding and evaluating our world as it is. Given the current 
project, however, I take this as a limitation of the RRA, in that it does not take into 
account current global poverty and its causes. Comparing these theories more generally 
(outside this project), this difference is of significant importance. Relatedly, Rawls only 
claims to be talking about liberal democratic societies, whereas the CA aims to be helpful 
in a variety of political situations. A final concern is that the CA is seen as “a general 
metric of well-being and well-being freedom, whereas the social primary goods metric 
emerges as one element of an integral and complex theory of political justice (rather than 
social justice more broadly, let alone the even wider category of moral evaluations)” 
(Robeyns 2016b). I am certainly taking some liberties in applying Rawls’ general theory 
of injustice to poverty specifically, but I hope to have done so in a manner consistent with 
Rawls’ thoughts. 
Sen argues that, “[p]eople have disparate physical characteristics connected with 
disability, illness, age or gender, and these make their needs diverse” (Sen 2000, p. 70). 
Therefore, one of the primary advantages of the CA over the RRA is that the CA takes 
into account human plurality, arguing that we as individuals and communities have 
different capacities and values. Because of these differing capacities, our freedom 
depends not just on having enough to survive, but having enough to be human, which 
involves the ability to do certain things, and have certain self-directed functionings. For 
Sen, having certain capabilities is what it means to be free. 
 Let us consider the case of a deaf and a hearing student. They could both go to the 




tutor or a sign-language instructor, the deaf student will learn significantly less than the 
hearing student. If we think of education as a primary good, and primary goods should be 
distributed fairly, this distribution of the resources of education is clearly going to fail a 
number of students, as it is too focused on the distribution of education, rather than its 
outcomes. It is a significant worry that the RRA cannot adequately account for these 
fundamental differences, and it is a great advantage for the CA that it can.   
The CA also distinguishes itself from utilitarian theories of well-being. This is 
because the notion of freedom of choice is so central to Sen’s version of the theory that 
the focus is not on actual human functions, but rather on their having the capability to 
perform those functions, should they choose to do so. Additionally, utilitarianism is 
reductionist in the sense that it boils down human well-being to a single measure: 
pleasure or utility. The CA purposefully acknowledges that human well-being requires a 
complex and diverse set of capabilities. Utilitarianism also tends to disregard the agency 
of the individual; instead of focusing on the life the individual has reasons to want to 
create, utilitarian theories see the individual as merely a means to the end of greater 
utility (Sen 2000, pp. 18-19). 
Another way to think about a capability in order to demonstrate its advantages is 
to do so in contrast to commodities, characteristics, and utilities. In “Poor, Relatively 
Speaking,” Sen uses the example of a bicycle to demonstrate this distinction. A bicycle is 
certainly a ‘commodity’ that one can buy or rent or receive. It also has certain 
‘characteristics’, like that of being a means of transportation. This ‘characteristic’ of a 




in a certain way. This ‘capability’ in turn could give rise to some personal ‘utility,’ like 
the pleasure that comes from this movement. Sen argues that this example makes clear 
that commodities and their characteristics cannot be the “right focus” of poverty because 
merely having the bicycle does not tell me whether I can use it. If I were handicapped, for 
example, having the bicycle may not be particularly helpful. The characteristic of the 
bicycle as a mode of transportation is an important one, and is one that underlies the 
capability of movement, but in itself does not determine whether I can use it in that way. 
Additionally, the personal utility or happiness that derives from riding the bicycle or 
getting from place to place is based on the “mental reaction to that use” rather focusing 
on the use itself. Therefore, Sen argues, if the rider naturally has a cheerful disposition, it 
has nothing to do with the bike or its use that I am happy, and my happiness does not tell 
me much about my standard of living (Sen 1983a, p. 160). 
In relation to the metrics of relative and absolute poverty, the CA demonstrates 
that the binary is unnecessary. It seeks to be a theory that is sensitive to differing 
contexts, but not entirely relative. By moving away from measuring income and moving 
towards measuring capabilities, we see that “absolute deprivation in terms of a person’s 
capabilities relates to relative deprivation in terms of commodities, incomes, and 
resources” (Sen 1983a, p. 153). Sen argues that the trend towards relative poverty is 
helpful in many respects, particularly in demonstrating that outdated notions of what it 
means to be poor are defeated, but that relative poverty ventured too far in the relativist 
direction. One major consequence of this move, as shown above, is that poverty can 




measure of inequality. If poverty and inequality are to be separate notions, poverty must 
have “an irreducible absolutist core” (Sen 1983a, p. 159). This is not to say that Sen 
argues for a vision of absolute poverty. Instead, the CA’s absolutist core asserts that one 
either has a capability or does not; one’s capabilities are not on a scale that depends on 
how many others in one’s community have that particular capability. However, the way 
that the capability is fulfilled can take a relative form, in that the commodities or 
characteristics required to fulfill a certain capability can vary greatly, and thus is 
dependent upon one’s circumstances.  
For the purposes of this project, one of the most important advantages of the CA 
is its flexibility of application. In “Capability Approach,” David Clark describes this 
flexibility very clearly: 
“Sen indicates that the CA can be used to assess individual advantage in a 
range of different spaces. For example, the assessment of poverty might 
involve concentrating on a relatively small sub-set of basic capabilities. 
Evaluating well-being or human development on the other hand seems to 
require a much longer and more diverse list of capabilities (see for example 
Sen, 1993, pp. 31-2, 40-42). The focus of the CA can be broadened further to 
include ‘agency’, which recognises that individuals often have values and 
goals (such as preserving the environment, purchasing free trade products or 
opposing injustice, tyranny and oppression) that transcend and sometimes 
even conflict with personal well-being (see Sen, 1985; 1985a; 1992, ch.4). 
The CA has also been adjusted to focus on inequality, social justice, living 
standards and rights and duties (among other things). Finally, Sen (1999, 
p.77) recognises that the CA is not sufficient for all evaluative purposes. By 
itself the CA does not provide a complete theory of justice or development 
(see Sen, 1983; 1988; 1992, p.77; 2005). We need to take note of other 
principles such as personal liberty, economic growth and efficiency” (Clark 
2006, p. 35). 
 
The flexibility of the CA therefore allows for it to work within a number of frameworks, 




people are able to do and be. In Chapter 3, the interpretation of the CA that I am 
advocating will become clear, and the fact that the CA can be a tool for evaluating 
negative rights violations becomes very important. 
 Finally, one of the greatest benefits of the CA is that it combines “valuable beings 
and doings” with freedoms, while the issue with numerous other theories of justice is that 
they focus on one or the other. The CA is based on the following proposition: “that social 
arrangements should be evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to 
promote or achieve functionings they value” (Alkire 2005b, p. 122). While some theories 
of justice look at whether there is sufficient or equal opportunity or resources for people, 
and others look at whether there is sufficient or equal results of well-being for people, the 
CA argues that the aim of our social arrangements should be the freedom to achieve 
valuable actions and states of being. It therefore does not exclusively look at either inputs 
or outputs, but rather the question of what opportunities people have to achieve their 
desired outputs, thereby emphasizing both actions and freedoms. 
 
Part 3.2: Criticisms of the Capability Approach and Responses 
 
Given that the CA ranges over multiple disciplines and questions, it has faced 
criticism from economists, philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and political 
scientists, among others. Given our focus on the CA to poverty, however, I will focus 




number of the strengths that I have attributed to the approach above are sometimes also 
taken as weaknesses, particularly in relation to its feasibility given its broad applicability. 
 The first issue is one that is brought often forward by Rawlsians, who prioritize 
the “publicity criterion,” which claims that a theory of justice must have a criterion for 
injustice that is public, and against which claims of injustice can be verified by all and 
easily accessible to all. Because Sen’s conception of capabilities are so broad, and are to 
be determined so democratically, some argue that the amount of information required to 
measure whether or not the citizens of a community are ensured of their capabilities 
would be so large and hard to obtain that the theory as a whole is “unworkable” (Robeyns 
2016b). “Given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be relevant, given the 
extent of disagreement among reasonable people about the nature of the good life, and 
given the unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen’s 
framework is operational” (Sugden 1993, p. 1953). 
Capability theorists like Sabina Alkire and David Clark, however, have developed 
methodologies for measuring capabilities at a micro-level, and for “investigating 
perceptions of well-being among the urban and rural-poor […]” (Clark 2006, p. 38). 
Additionally, the Human Development Reports, put out by the UN Development 
Programme (1990-2004) have also borrowed from the core ideas of the CA, “and also 
developed practical policy positions on key issues such as participation, gender, 
globalization, and human rights” (Alkire 2005b, p. 126).  
While further development on this area of the CA is necessary, it has not been 




this criticism is successful in pointing out a weakness of the CA as it stands, but not a 
weakness of the approach in general. Additionally as Nussbaum points out, “We know 
[…] that anything worth measuring, in human quality of life, is difficult to measure. 
Resource-based approaches simply substitute something easy to measure for what really 
ought to be measured, a heap of stuff for the richness of human functioning” (Nussbaum 
2002, p. 135). 
 Another Rawlsian critique is that the CA is not unique in its ability to take into 
account the diverse needs of individuals like those who are disabled, or those who are 
pregnant. Sen has criticized the Rawlsians for being unable to account for differing 
needs, but Thomas Pogge has argued that Rawlsian resourcists can, in fact, account for 
them. A pregnant women, Sen argues, requires more resources than others to be healthy 
and productive. An equal distribution of resources would fail her. Pogge responds that the 
RRA could see a pregnant woman as two people, an adult and an infant, and therefore she 
would receive the resources she needs, and would therefore not be worse-off than non-
pregnant members of her society. This response, however, does not seem sufficient, as 
pregnant women do not just need the resources of an adult and an infant; they require 
different kinds of resources. Pregnant women often suffer from chronic fatigue and 
subsequent loss of income, as well as numerous other ailments that can affect the way 
they are able to function, very few of which would be covered by an equal distribution of 
resources (Berges 2007, p. 19-20). Thinking of individuals as amalgams of themselves 




differing needs require truly different resources, and therefore the CA is still one of the 
best options for thinking about a free life that takes those differences into account. 
 In Chapter 3, I will explore the diverging paths of Sen and Nussbaum’s views of 
the CA. We will see that Nussbaum criticizes Sen for refusing to endorse a list of central 
human capabilities that must be assured to all citizens of a just society. I will discuss her 
criticism in light of the negative and positive rights debate. Here, however, I must take up 
the question of whether freedom is really essential for how we think about poverty. Why 
should we think that the poor want the freedom to, for example, avoid hunger and 
disease, rather than actually wanting to avoid hunger and disease?  I believe that this is a 
significant concern for Sen’s account of the CA, but one that it can adequately respond 
to.  
First, the benefit of focusing on freedom as the end of a capability set makes it so 
that the method of ensuring a capability set is an important part of the set itself. If we 
were to focus solely on outcomes, governments would be able to satisfy many criteria of 
justice through the use of force or coercion. Things like adequate nutrition, being 
educated, and being healthy can all be achieved through coercion, by practices like 
unjustifiably high taxation, or being forced to exercise under threat of punishment. As 
Rousseau says, “A tranquil life is also had in dungeons; is that enough to make 
[dungeons] desirable?” (Rousseau 1987, p.144). By focusing on freedom, we “draw 
attention to social development, and the value of empowerment, responsibility, and 
informed public action” (Alkire and Deneulin 2010, p. 36). Second, by focusing on 




that are valuable to live, and that people deserve to be able to determine which of those 
valuable lives they would want to live. Let us return to the example of the two people 
who are not eating enough; one is doing so because he cannot afford the food he needs, 
while the other is an affluent man who is fasting for religious reasons. If we were to 
ensure that everyone is eating enough, the man doing so for his religious beliefs would no 
longer be able to do so, and therefore his freedom of religious expression would be 
undermined or violated. By concentrating instead on whether they are both capable of 
getting adequate food we ensure that the poor man has access to food, while the religious 
man can fulfill his religious duties.  
 Another common line of criticism is in relation to determining capabilities. In 
C.R. Beitz’s review of Sen’s Resources, Values, and Development, he argues that Sen’s 
vision of the CA as democratic and dependent on judgments of value makes it very hard 
to make judgments comparing individuals in relation to their well-being (Beitz 1986). As 
Clark points out, however, Sen does not think that allowing for differing values entails 
that everyone’s values are entirely non-overlapping. Instead, he argues that the areas that 
lie at the intersections of people’s evaluations are “typically quite large” (Sen 1985a, p. 
53-6). As an economist, Sen has also proposed methodologies to be used to assess the 
overlap of valuations, like the “dominance ranking”, and the “intersection approach” (Sen 
1985a). Therefore, despite the fact that values can greatly vary, there is sufficient overlap 









This chapter has explored a number of prominent ways in which we see, 
conceptualize, study, and measure poverty. While there are many other approaches I have 
not covered, the goal was to provide a sufficient range of theories that span a variety of 
disciplines and approaches, in order to demonstrate the fundamental advantages that the 
Capability Approach has over others of its kind. Primarily, I have argued, the CA thinks 
about poverty in terms of how it affects what things we can do, and what kinds of people 
we can be, and therefore does not get bogged down in issues of whether equality is 
valuable in itself, or whether utility and happiness are the ends of morality. The CA 
demonstrates that while poverty has numerous faces, because people value different 
things and utilize resources in different ways, it can still be a unified concept. Poverty is a 
deprivation of fundamental capabilities, and deprives us of the ability to live free lives. 
Measuring poverty solely with a view to income, nutrition or biological ‘normality’, or 
resources, ignores the great complexity of how extreme poverty affects its victims.  
In Chapter 3, I will return to the claim that poverty is a deprivation of basic 
capabilities and therefore is a state of being unfree, and argue for what we can mean by 
fundamental capabilities, and further explore their connection to freedom. For now, 
however, I have shown that while the theory may face its own set of issues, it has 
significant advantages over related theories. In this chapter, I have also detailed the state 
of poverty in the world recently, and described its most common and prevalent effects, 
especially in regards to health and mental development. In the next two chapters I will 




that the GEO wrongs the global poor by imposing extreme poverty upon them, as it 




























CHAPTER 2:  






“If the misery of our poor be caused not by our laws of nature, but by our own 
institutions, great is our sin.” 
            -Charles Darwin, 1836 (quoted in Pogge 2008, p. 73). 
  
In the Introduction to this project, I discussed the history of negative rights, and 
underscored their origins in the natural rights tradition. We saw that negative rights, 
which primarily involve freedom from unjust interference, aim at the protection of basic 
natural rights, and we can understand their aims more clearly in this light. Chapter 1 
discussed the numerous physical and psychological effects of poverty, particularly on 
children. I established that due to poverty, huge numbers of people are severely 
malnourished and have extremely high levels of stress, and these factors often contribute 
to life threatening diseases, lifelong learning disabilities, physical disabilities, and death. 
In this chapter, having thought through some of the implications of negative rights, and 
the effects of poverty on individuals, we will look into whether the global economic order 
(GEO) harms the poor by causing much of international extreme poverty, and if so, begin 
to examine whether the harms caused are moral wrongs, resulting in moral responsibility. 
To show that the GEO bears responsibility for the harms suffered by the global 
poor, I must demonstrate that the poor are being harmed, that the GEO is the cause of a 




the ways in which the global poor are suffering, and the effects of this suffering. In this 
chapter, I will focus on providing evidence for the claim that the GEO causes much of the 
extreme poverty around the world today, and that the harms it causes are wrongs. My 
view is inspired by Thomas Pogge’s work, particularly World Poverty and Human 
Rights, and therefore part of this chapter is dedicated to detailing the evidence he 
presents, and then building upon it. I disagree most strongly with him, however, on two 
substantial points: (1) Individual citizens of developed nations have a strong 
responsibility to the global poor because their democratically elected governments cause 
much of global poverty, and (2) Human rights derived from basic needs are entailed by a 
negative rights framework. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to focus on the 
disagreements, but rather to propose an outline of the concepts of causation, harms, and 
wrongs that are compatible with a framework of negative rights. Therefore, I return to 
these disagreements in Chapter 3. 
This chapter is organized into two main sections. Section 1 delves into causation, 
and attempts to explain the meaning of “X causes harm to Y”. In particular, I present 
evidence for the claim that the policies of institutions like the IMF and WTO cause harm 
to the global poor. Section 2 discusses whether these harms done to the global poor are 
wrongs. I show that we can distinguish between harms and wrongs based on criteria like 
just desserts, preventability, and predictability, and I begin to argue that the harms the 
GEO causes are wrongs. The argument continues in the next chapter, where I discuss 




Let us quickly revisit the definition of GEO as summed up by Joshua Cohen in 
“Philosophy, Social Science, Global Poverty”:  
“[I]t comprises treaty- and convention-based rules about security, trade, 
property rights, human rights, and environment: rules that govern global 
rule-makers, the norms and standards associated with territorial 
sovereignty, policies adopted by global rule-making bodies (say, TRIPS or 
the decisions of the WTO’s Appellate Body), and the security and 
assistance policies of the world’s most powerful states” (Cohen 2010, p. 
19).6 
 
In fact, the global order today is so vast and powerful that it deeply affects national 
politics and economics all over the world. This is not to say that local and national 
politics do not influence the lives of individuals, but rather that local politics are 
significantly influenced by the global order, and at times are overridden by it.  
Two of the primary lenses through which I will analyze the reach of the global 
order are trade and international “aid.” I choose these aspects because they exemplify two 
sides of the system, one of embracing fierce competition, and the other of attempting to 
recognize shared humanity. They are also very tied together in the world today; 
international aid often comes with conditions related to trade and economic policies. 
Given the empirical nature of this work, I will consider both statistical overviews of the 
issues we look into, as well as more specific examples of the ways in which the global 
order has interfered with the lives of the poor.  
 
 
                                                        
6 TRIPS is the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement, an international trade 




Section 1: Causation and Harm 
 
 
Part 1.1: Some Examples of Causation 
 
 
 In this project I argue not only that the poor are harmed, but that there are agents 
knowingly causing the harm. To show this, I need to be clear about what I mean when I 
ascribe a causal relation in this global context. In this section I consider some examples 
of the ways in which we think about the idea that X causes Y, and demonstrate the 
strengths and weaknesses of those methods. I also explore what follows from causation in 
terms of moral responsibility. 
The idea of the butterfly effect is common in popular discussions of complexity 
theory: it is said that something as small as the flutter of a butterfly’s wings can cause a 
chain of reactions that culminates in a hurricane in a different location a few weeks later. 
Did the butterfly cause the hurricane? In one sense it seems like it did; examining how 
the hurricane came to be would eventually take us back to the flutter of the butterfly’s 
wings, and perhaps even further if we try to explain why the butterfly fluttered its wings 
at that moment and to that extent. There is a causal chain linking the butterfly’s action 
with the hurricane. In another sense, however the butterfly’s fluttering did not cause the 
hurricane. There is such a long distance in the causal chain between the fluttering and the 
hurricane that the most we can say is that the fluttering set other things into motion that 
eventually caused the hurricane. The events may be connected, but to say that they are 
causally connected is perhaps to stretch the notion of causation too far. In terms of 




flutter, the hurricane would not have occurred), but not a “proximate cause” because the 
two events are not sufficiently related. 
A more everyday, albeit tragic, example is that of Emy Brochu, a 20-year-old 
woman from Canada. In January 2012, she was driving her car and texting her boyfriend 
simultaneously. Distracted by the texting, she unwittingly drove into a tractor-trailer 
while merging with traffic, which resulted in her death. Her boyfriend, Mathieu Fortin, 
set up a Facebook page dedicated to sharing the story in hopes that it would prevent 
others from texting while driving. Questions of whose fault the accident was arise in this 
case. ““Texting is a two-way street,” said John Foreman, Air Education and Training 
Command Ground Safety Division. “Yes, the driver has responsibility not to text and 
drive. But if you are exchanging texts with someone who you know to be driving, you are 
putting their life at risk. You share in that responsibility.”” Fortin admits that he feels 
very guilty for his role in the accident, but he is not held to be legally or morally guilty 
for sending the text messages, primarily because Ms. Brochu could have chosen to ignore 
them until she was no longer driving (Barela 2012). In this case, there seems to be a clear 
and close causal connection between Mr. Fortin’s text and Ms. Brochu’s death, but the 
causal connection does not result in moral or legal responsibility. Again, Mr. Fortin’s 
actions were not a “proximate cause” of her death. 
Now let us consider a more controversial example. In June 2017, Michelle Carter 
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in a case involving the death of Conrad Roy 
III. The details of the case are numerous and complex, but the prosecution essentially 




Ms. Carter, who was 17 years old at the time, encouraged Mr. Roy to go through with his 
desire to commit suicide. Mr. Roy had previously attempted suicide, and Ms. Carter was 
aware of this. Many text messages show her egging him on. The presiding Judge Moniz 
stated that these texts by themselves were not enough to convict Ms. Carter. Instead, what 
led to her conviction was a phone call between the two parties as the suicide was taking 
place. Mr. Roy “got scared” upon feeling the effects of the carbon monoxide poisoning 
he was subjecting himself to, and got out of his car, while on the phone with Ms. Carter. 
According to Ms. Carter, she instructed him to “get back in.” There is no recording of the 
phone conversation; the only evidence for it is a text Ms. Carter sent a friend, reporting 
what happened during the phone call.7 The defense argued that the text message to her 
friend is not sufficient evidence of the contents of the phone call, and even if it were, Mr. 
Roy’s previous suicide attempts demonstrate that he would have gone through with the 
deed with or without Ms. Carter’s words. Judge Moniz, however, argued the following: 
“[Mr. Roy] breaks that chain of self-causation by exiting the vehicle. He takes himself 
out of that toxic environment that it has become.” The judge claimed that this is enough 
to show that just as was the case with his previous suicide attempts, Mr. Roy did not want 
to go through with the act, and only did so at the urging of Ms. Carter. He also argued 
that she had a duty to help by calling his family or the police, given that she knew what 
he was doing (Seelye and Bigood 2017).  
                                                        
7 “Sam his death is my fault like honestly I could have stopped him I was on the phone with him and he got 
out of the car because it was working and he got scared and I (expletive) told him to get back in,” Ms. 




The language of causation in this case is heavily debated, and many legal scholars 
argue that Judge Moniz’s decision was problematic. Nancy Gertner, a former federal 
judge and professor of law at Harvard holds that this decision “extended the law of 
involuntary manslaughter to an arena into which it hasn’t been extended before.” Some, 
like Daniel Medwed, law professor at Northeastern University, argue that because she 
was not physically present at the crime scene, she could not have “caused” the suicide 
(Seelye and Bigood 2017). Suicide in the US is typically treated as a result of an 
individual’s free will and cases of suicide related to bullying or cyberbullying typically 
only gain convictions in cases where the jury can show that the suicide was a foreseeable 
consequence of the bullying. Her physical absence, however, was treated by the 
prosecution, and ultimately by Judge Moniz, as immaterial. ““The phones that we have 
now allow you to be virtually present with somebody,” Katie Rayburn, an assistant 
district attorney, said, adding, “She was in his ear, she was in his mind, she was on the 
phone, and she was telling him to get back in the car even though she knew he was going 
to die”” (Seelye and Bigood 2017). 
In this case both the causation and the responsibility are in question. The judge 
argued that the causation is clear because Mr. Roy got scared and got out of his car, and 
we can reasonably predict that he would not have gone back in, were it not for Ms. 
Carter’s insistence. However, the defense, as well as other critics of the matter, claim that 
since Ms. Carter was not physically present to push him back into the car, she did not 




The tension between there being a causal link and actual causation, while present 
in the first two examples, is particularly salient in this case. Even if it were true that Mr. 
Roy would not have gone back into the car were it not for Ms. Carter’s urging, there is 
still a question of whether she is guilty for his death. All she did was urge him on, and he 
was ultimately the one to follow through with the action. On the other hand, a man would 
probably be alive today were it not for her fully intentional words, and so it is hard to see 
how she is not responsible.  
These cases demonstrate some of the theoretical challenges we face when 
claiming that a person or institution has caused something and is responsible for its 
outcome. A “cause-in-fact” is often determined by the “but for” test: but for the event, the 
result would not have happened. It is therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the result. The butterfly effect is an example of this. To judge responsibility, however, we 
often require a more closely linked form of causation, i.e. “proximate causation.” The 
case of Mr. Roy’s suicide shows how hard it can be to establish this. With this in mind, 
let us return to the context of the global poor and the GEO. 
I have established in Chapter 1 that the global poor today are deprived of many 
fundamentally human capabilities. The cause of these deprivations and the responsibility 
for them are the topic of this chapter. I contend that the policies of global trade and 
financial institutions, particularly the WTO and IMF, proximately cause harm to the 
global poor, and those harms are wrongs, and therefore the GEO is responsible for those 
harms. This is not to say that the GEO is responsible for all harms that befall the global 




wrongdoing, and other harms that are wrongs could be caused by other individual or 
structural factors outside the power of the GEO.  
We must first consider the question of causation in this global context. It is 
beyond the scope of this project to explain all the details of how global economics works. 
Instead, I suggest that by examining the decision-making processes of these global 
institutions, and by looking at examples of the effects of their actions, we can show that 
there are good reasons to believe that their actions proximately cause much of extreme 
poverty around the world today.  
 
Part 1.2: An Outline of Pogge’s Evidence 
 
In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge presents evidence for the 
claim that the GEO causes extreme poverty around the world today. He argues that 
international institutions, governments of developed nations, and even citizens of these 
developed nations, are responsible for global poverty. Basing his arguments solely on 
negative rights, he concludes that each of these groups owe some assistance to the global 
poor. Pogge’s work is the foundation of my argument, and therefore I go into some detail 
regarding his ideas and evidence.  
Pogge’s definition of harm is as follows: “you harm others insofar as you make an 
uncompensated contribution to imposing on them an institutional order that foreseeably 
produces avoidable human rights deficits” (Pogge 2008, p. 61). By “uncompensated 




balanced by some kind of compensation, typically monetary in kind. Additionally, 
Pogge’s focus on human rights deficits is key, though I will focus on the consequences of 
this part of his definition in the next chapter. 
In order to refine the notion of harm, and to determine the moral consequences of 
the harm, Pogge uses what he refers to as a “minimal standard” (Pogge, 2008, p. 56) of 
justice that could be used to determine whether a particular institution is just. To be more 
precise, he argues that if this minimal standard is not met, then an institution is surely 
unjust, but it being met does not guarantee its status as just. Therefore, this minimal 
standard is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justice. This baseline, he claims, 
requires that “any institutional order imposed on human beings must be designed so that 
human rights are fulfilled under it insofar as this is reasonably possible” (Pogge, 2008, p. 
56). Thus, Pogge suggests that we conclude that harms and wrongs are being done by 
discovering that the poor are worse off under this system than under another feasible and 
attainable alternative arrangement, under which their basic rights would be fulfilled.  
There are at least six ways in which the global order is unfair and harms the 
global poor, Pogge argues. 1) International trade rules are set up in such a way that even 
unjust rulers may sell their country’s natural resources; 2) Banks in developed nations 
may lend to these rulers, and demand repayment even after the ruler is no longer in 
charge; 3) These developed nations make it easy for public officials in developing 
countries to embezzle funds through accepted interactions with their banks. 4) 
Multinational corporations have to meet very low accounting standards in some 




facilitate tax evasion in developing countries; 5) Developed nations are responsible for a 
disproportionate amount of global pollution; 6) Developed nations create trade policies 
that most often severely negatively affect the economy of the developing world (Pogge 
2011, p. 29-30). 
The first two points are known as “International resource and borrowing 
privilege.” These privileges allow whomever is in power in a given country to borrow 
and trade in the name of the nation, regardless of how they came into power. This 
incentivizes coup attempts, and helps dictators retain power because it allows them to 
“buy means of repression abroad, and support from other officers at home, [so] such 
rulers [are] not dependent on popular support” for their power (Pogge 2008, p. 119). The 
GEO allows these governments to obtain and retain power, thereby affecting the well-
being of these citizens. A clear example of this is Equatorial Guinea, where Teodoro 
Obiang funds his oppressive regime by selling the country’s oil largely to American 
corporations like Exxon (Maass 2005) (Reuters Staff 2017). Another example is South 
Africa, which was repaying the debts taken out in its name during the Apartheid regime 
for decades after the regime was overthrown. People had to pay for the money used to 
hold up a racist system that repressed them, preventing the community from using that 
money to strengthen South Africa’s new political direction (Kremer and Jayachandran 
2003). 
Pogge’s third point about developed nations facilitating embezzlement in 
developing countries is supported by the Global Financial Integrity (GFI) report. 




approximately $342 billion annually because these large banks in developed nations ask 
no questions about where large international account holders got their money. Similarly, 
with respect to his fourth point, due to the lax standards of accounting that multinational 
corporations face in many developed nations, it is easy for them to transfer profits to 
other locations with the lowest tax rate. This deprives the countries where they mine and 
utilize resources and labor of the taxes they should arguably receive. The GFI estimates 
that between 2002 and 2006, $98.4 billion was lost annually by developing nations due to 
these tax loops (Kar and Curcio 2011). 
Pogge’s fifth point about pollution and climate change is supported by evidence 
from the Global Humanitarian Forum’s Human Impact Report. The report shows that the 
world’s poor are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and yet are the 
“least responsible” for it.  
“The United States -- emitting over 20 percent of total global carbon 
emissions, joined by Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada and United 
Kingdom [--] were among the top 10 emitters of carbon globally in 2004. 
This picture looks very similar when accounting for emissions over the 
last decade. In comparison, the 50 Least Developed Countries released 
less than 1 percent of total emissions” (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009, 
p. 63). 
 
To support his last point, Pogge argues that trade policies, particularly those 
between developing and developed nations, are notoriously unfair. WTO treaties often 
allow for rich nations to protect their market from cheap products from developing 
nations, but those developing nations are not permitted or able to afford to do the same 
(Pogge 2004, p. 389). As an example, he considers one of the most important agreements 




(TRIPS) Agreement. This agreement requires all of its members to enforce intellectual 
property (IP) rules that involve patents that last at least twenty years on new medicines, 
which results in slowing down the production of the generic versions of the medicine. 
Without the availability of generic medicines, people in the developing world who cannot 
afford the branded version of the medicine must either find other, often counterfeit or 
unreliable alternatives, or go without the medicine. This can result in severe 
complications or premature death (Pogge 2011, p. 26). This intellectual property rule 
disproportionately negatively effects people in the developing world. Those in the 
developing world are less likely to be able to afford the branded versions of the medicine. 
Meanwhile, the IP laws support large medical corporations, which are often based in 
developed countries. 
Pogge also brings up the issue of labor standards and their effects on the 
developing world. The WTO does not enforce any level of labor standards for its 
members. The WTO tries to maintain open markets, but does nothing to ensure that 
workers are treated humanely.  
“It thereby draws poor countries into a vicious "race to the bottom" where 
they, competing for foreign investment, must outbid one another by 
offering ever more exploitable workforces. Under the conditions of WTO 
globalization, workers cannot resist such a deterioration of their terms of 
employment because, if they succeed in securing more humane working 
conditions for themselves, many of them will end up unemployed as jobs 
are moved abroad” (Pogge 2011, p. 26). 
 
Pogge considers two frameworks within which people think of harm in relation to 
the GEO. First, we think of harm as comparative to a state a person was in at a previous 




now than they were under a previous economic regime, they have not been harmed 
according to this approach. This approach is unsatisfactory because it leads to an absurd 
conclusion. Consider a scenario in which there were institutional reforms that improved 
the lives of slaves in the US, but did not make slavery illegal. Just because the lives of 
slaves improved, does not mean that they were not being institutionally harmed and 
wronged, but the diachronic approach would not be able to be used to say that there was a 
wrong after the improvements had been made. Thus, when people argue that the GEO is 
good for the poor, because according to some statistics the percentage of those in extreme 
poverty is decreasing, Pogge sees this as mistaken. Simply because the harm is being 
reduced does not mean there is not harm being done, and that this harm is not wrong 
(Pogge 2005, p. 58). 
Another possibility is to consider harm against a baseline of the conditions of life 
under a Lockean state of nature. You would be doing harm to another, according to this 
approach, if the person would be better off in a Lockean state of nature than under the 
present conditions. Pogge claims that “one cannot even say with confidence that poverty 
would be worse in a global Lockean state of nature in which all human beings have 
access to a proportional share of the world’s natural resources” (Pogge 2002, p. 138-9). 
However, Pogge dismisses this baseline as it requires too much guesswork and too many 
hypotheticals. We do not know with any certainty what life would be like in the state of 
nature, and whether any individual would fare any better or worse in it. Even stipulating a 
Lockean state of nature, rather than a Hobbesian or Rousseausian one lies outside what 




Pogge therefore sticks with his original definition of harm: “you harm others 
insofar as you make an uncompensated contribution to imposing on them an institutional 
order that foreseeably produces avoidable human rights deficits” (Pogge 2008, p. 61). As 
I will explain, while Pogge believes the evidence he presents is sufficient to establish 
harm by the GEO, some have taken issue with it. The next section adds further evidence 
to the causal connection between the GEO’s policies and the harms done to the global 
poor. 
 
Part 1.3: Further Evidence 
 
While Pogge presents important evidence for the effects of the policies of the 
GEO on the global poor, many critics like Joshua Cohen (Cohen 2010, p. 25) and Roland 
Pierik (Pierik 2013) argue that the evidence is insufficient to prove proximate causation 
(though neither author uses that term). In what proceeds, I present information about the 
WTO and the IMF, showing how both organizations are structurally designed to work in 
the interests of their rich and powerful members, while simultaneously harming their 
more vulnerable members significantly, thereby establishing proximate causation. 
Let us begin with a simple overview of how trade agreements between countries 
often come to fruition. The ideal of free trade, which is international trade that is not 
subject to tariffs or quotas, is based on the idea of specialization: if country X can 
produce a good most cheaply and efficiently, and country Y can do the same for another 




other without governmental interference (i.e. tariffs). However, on a more local scale, if 
someone in country X is producing the good that country Y produces more efficiently 
and cheaply, that person’s business will be badly hit when the foreign competition is 
allowed to bring their goods freely into the domestic market. In order to minimize local 
job-loss, but simultaneously increase market efficiency, trade deals are often struck 
between individual nations, or between groups of nations. In this case the deal could 
involve X agreeing to allow Y’s goods to enter the country, and in return, Y would agree 
to train X’s workers, or set up factories to assemble the imported goods in X. 
International bodies like the WTO and the IMF play important roles in facilitating and 
implementing these trade agreements. It is important to reiterate here that my criticisms 
of these organizations are not about globalization or liberalization per se. Instead, I focus 
on the ways in which trade liberalization is selectively brought about, in ways that allow 
rich countries to profit, while harming developing countries. That is to say this is not a 
criticism of open markets themselves, but, as Pogge puts it, the GEO “has opened our 
markets too little and has thereby gained for us the benefits of free trade while 
withholding these benefits from the global poor” (Pogge 2008, p. 18). 
In the next few sections I will provide further evidence for the claim that the 
WTO and IMF harm the world’s poorest. The World Bank also plays a significant role, 
but I will not delve into its workings here. I focus most on the WTO because I see its 





Part 1.3.1: The World Trade Organization 
 
 
The WTO is the international organization that plays the largest role in 
international trade. Its goal is “to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and 
importers conduct their business.” In attempting to reach this goal, the WTO sees itself as 
performing the following functions: opening up trade markets, acting as a forum in which 
governments can negotiate trade deals and settle trade disputes, and (perhaps most 
importantly) it “operates a system of trade rules” (WTO, “What is the WTO?”). While 
international trade agreements are lengthy and complicated, the WTO claims that its 
work is fundamentally grounded on a few principles, like non-discrimination, lowering 
trade barriers, discouraging practices that lessen competition, protection of the 
environment, and being “more beneficial” to developing countries (WTO, “What We 
Stand For”). The WTO works on the premise that neo-liberal free trade is the best and 
perhaps only method by which trade can be developed in a way that is most beneficial to 
all. 
Before we explore its negative effects, let us look into the ways in which the 
WTO attempts to fulfill its goal of being “more beneficial” to developing countries. In 
November 2001, the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations took place in 
response to anti-free-trade and anti-globalization sentiments, which were taking root 
particularly in the developing world. As a result of this meeting, the WTO put forth the 
“Ministerial Declaration,” which states: “We recognize the need for all our peoples to 
benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading 




place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
Declaration.” In order to do so, they say that “enhanced market access, balanced rules, 
and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-building 
programmes have important roles to play.” Additionally, the WTO “recognize[s] the 
particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and the special structural 
difficulties they face in the global economy. We are committed to addressing the 
marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to improving their 
effective participation in the multilateral trading system” (WTO, Ministerial Declaration). 
However, one of the most systematic problems with the WTO is its power 
structure. On the face of it, the WTO is structured very democratically: each of its 164 
members has one vote. However, in actuality decisions are rarely made together. Many 
proposals are worked on in informal meetings, and countries are selectively invited to 
these meetings. Third World Network, a non-profit organization that studies issues 
related to development in developing countries, regards the WTO as the “most non-
transparent of international organizations” due to these backroom meetings that tend to 
dominate the decision-making processes of the WTO (TWN 1999). Additionally, many 
developing countries feel pressured into voting in accordance with developed nations, for 
fear of economic retaliation (Eskelinen 2011, p. 53-55). 
Moreover, particularly in the case of African nations, it is clear that less-
developed countries are being priced out of fair contract negotiations. The cost of 
accessing the enormously complex legal system of the WTO is prohibitive to many 




been initiated in the WTO, and not a single one of them involved an African nation as the 
complainant (WTO 2018, “Chronological List of Disputes Cases”). Additionally, many 
smaller or poorer nations cannot make all or even most of the WTO meetings, because 
they cannot afford to regularly travel to Geneva for the meetings, and they also cannot 
afford to have permanent embassies there. Switzerland is one of the most expensive 
countries in the world, and Geneva its most expensive city. In fact, Switzerland recently 
offered Guyana help in funding its embassy, so that it could participate more fully 
(Kaieteur News 2016). Other countries have not had that benefit extended to them, and 
consequently almost a quarter of the members of the WTO are unable to attend many 
meetings, and therefore are underrepresented in the decision making process 
(Michalopoulos 2001, p. 156). 
The WTO has expressly committed to putting the needs of less-developed and the 
least-developed countries at the core of its mission. On its website, the WTO imagines a 
conversation with someone who is skeptical of their mission. The skeptic wonders about 
how the WTO can be helping developing countries when it ensures that developed 
countries, which can give huge subsidies to their own businesses, are allowed to enter and 
flood developing markets. The response to this worry is as follows:  
“But that’s what the WTO is trying to stop. If it were allowed to do its job 
properly, trade would help the poor to be fed. It would even fill in the gaps 
when there are local shortages. It would help poor farmers produce and 
sell more without having to compete with cheap subsidized produce. And 
the WTO is actually cutting those subsidies gradually. Without the WTO 






Much of what the WTO rests on is its claim that things would be worse without it, 
and that “even the most critical developing countries acknowledge that the system offers 
them benefits” (WTO, “The WTO Can Help Countries Develop”). The Bali Agreement 
was reached in 2013, and one of the major advancements made through the agreement 
involved developed countries agreeing to more duty-free and quota-free imports on some 
goods from the world’s poorest countries. Additionally, a temporary agreement was made 
that India could continue stockpiling its grain to feed its poorest citizens, against criticism 
from the US, which claimed that this stockpiling and subsidizing affected the world 
market. WTO rules state that market distortion happens if more than 10% of a country’s 
grain is subsidized by the government (Bagri 2014). 
Between 1997 and 2005, 150,000 Indian farmers committed suicide due to their 
inability to pay back agricultural loans. Previously, the Indian government would 
subsidize farmers for problems related to lack of irrigation, and low quality or overused 
land. Once restrictions from institutions like the WTO were imposed, these subsidies 
were drastically reduced. Because a simultaneous decrease in import tariffs was also 
imposed, the prices of Indian crops shot up, while imported crops became far more 
affordable (as they were being subsidized by their governments)8, and flooded the Indian 
market. In 2005 over 50,000 Indian farmers protested in front of the WTO gathering in 
Mumbai. The causal connection between the desperate state of the Indian farmers who 
                                                        
8 Many varieties of fruit, wheat, and vegetables were being imported into India from the US and Western 
Europe, and all these products were being heavily subsidized by their own governments with nominal or 




felt like they had no other option but to take their lives, and the policies of the WTO, is 
direct and uncontested (Chandhoke 2010, p. 68). 
Another prominent example of a WTO policy decision that directly negatively 
impacts the developing world is the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights 
(TRIPS) agreement. TRIPS was enacted in 1995, and is one of the most contentious and 
humanly damaging agreements to come out of the WTO. The primary idea behind 
TRIPS, as described earlier in Part 1.2, is the enforcement of stronger intellectual 
property (IP) laws around the world. Its stated objective is the following:  
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations” (WTO, 
“TRIPS: General Provisions and Basic Principles”).  
 
Ideally, this would create investment in developing countries by large Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs), as these corporations would feel like they could safely create their 
products in developing countries without being undercut by cheaper knockoffs. However, 
TRIPS has been widely criticized for enforcing strong IP laws that in reality serve to 
protect MNCs and developed economies, hurting developing economies in the process.  
One of the primary outcomes of TRIPS is the expansion of what kinds of things are 
covered under IP law. According to this agreement, computer programs are to be treated 
as literary works, and therefore covered by IP laws. Also covered by these laws are patent 
protection for pharmaceutical drugs, DNA sequences, and micro-organisms. As Pogge 




impacts the poor in developing countries who cannot afford life-saving drugs without a 
generic alternative.  
Typically, as a country develops its economy, it can afford to strengthen its IP 
laws; developing countries, however, have to balance economic development with 
ensuring that its poorest have access to basic necessities, which is a concern that 
developed countries do not have to prioritize with the same urgency and to the same 
extent. This balancing act for developing countries arises out of a combination of 
multiple needs. Given that TRIPS extends patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs, it 
effectively ensures that many people in developing countries will suffer or die before 
they can have access to the drugs (see the example of Thailand below). On the other 
hand, as mentioned above, without strengthening its IP laws, many MNCs would refuse 
to do business or build production facilities in a developing country, for fear of their 
information or product being reproduced at a lower cost. Therefore TRIPS is presented as 
an agreement that will result in an influx of business for developing countries, and allow 
for international knowledge-sharing. Developing countries are thus incentivized to ignore 
the plight of their poorest (at least temporarily) in order to develop economically. 
Many developing countries, including India and Kenya, have vocally decried 
these aspects of TRIPS, due to the fact that IP laws “do not by themselves lead to FDI 
[Foreign Direct Investment], neither encourage technology transfer nor local innovation” 
(Kenya, TRIPS Council submission, 2000). Numerous studies corroborate this. While 
there is a strong correlation between developed economies and strong Intellectual 




suggests that strong IPRs result from and are furthered by an already strong economy 
(see, for example, UNCTAD 1996 and Correa 2000). Therefore TRIPS is an agreement 
that primarily serves to benefit developed countries, while hurting the economies of 
developing nations that cannot afford to have strict IP laws.  
It is important to note here, however, that Article 8 of TRIPS allows for some 
flexibility of these rules when it concerns a country’s public health issues. It states:  
“Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement” (WTO, “TRIPS: 
General Provisions and Basic Principles”). 
 
While this flexibility may be theoretically laudable, the final provision emphasizes the 
fact that the flexibility is limited to those measures that are “consistent” with the other 
terms of the Agreement. This flexibility is therefore minimal. In an official 
communication to the members of the WTO, the Mission of India argued that use of the 
flexibility provisions are purposefully questioned:  
“[E]xercise of legislative or administrative flexibility by Members to 
accommodate competing public values, such as the use of compulsory 
licenses or Government use, have been the subject of some repeated 
follow-up questions, meant primarily to question the use of such 
flexibility” (India, October 2000, Submission on TRIPS). 
 
In this sense the flexibility in TRIPS is largely nominal: it is restricted to a few industries, 
repeatedly held in check by countries whose economies are more developed, and thereby 
profit more from strict IPRs. When a developing country attempts to use it, the attempts 




One of the more prominent examples of the negative effects and inflexibility of 
TRIPS is the case of HIV/AIDS drugs. As stated above, although TRIPS allows for some 
flexibility in the enforcement of strong IPRs in matters of public health, developing 
countries have a hard time availing themselves of these flexibilities. When the Thai 
government attempted to allow the creation of generic versions of HIV drugs that had 
been patented, appealing to these flexibility provisions in TRIPS, the US government 
threatened to bring sanctions against them. As noted above, the expense of fighting such 
sanctions can be too great a cost for a developing country to bear. Similarly, in 1997 the 
US Trade Representative threatened sanctions against South Africa when it introduced 
the Medicines Act, “a bill that allowed parallel importation of patented HIV/AIDS drugs” 
(Colins-Chase 2008, p. 776). This would “encourage the importation of patented 
medicines from the cheapest markets” (Colins-Chase 2008, p. 776, n. 65). In 2001, as a 
response to this inflexibility, the WTO declared that,  
"[e]ach Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency" (WTO, 
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, 5(c)). 
 
However, this has not stopped the US and other developed countries from strong-arming 
developing nations into strengthening their IPRs (Colins-Chase 2014, p. 778).   
While TRIPS is a good example of how WTO laws can negatively affect the 
developing world, it is also important to note another challenging problem: the WTO’s 
inactions or weak action in the cases of rule violations by some developed countries. 




making it impossible for other countries to compete with US prices. In 2010 a cotton 
farmer in Mali would optimistically make about $400 over the course of the year whereas 
a US cotton farmer was being subsidized about $250 per hectare (Fairtrade Foundation 
Report 2010, p.3, and UNDP Case Study 2007, and Smith and Rice 2004). Oxfam 
estimated that removing the US cotton subsidies would boost the average household 
income in Western Africa by 9-10%, which would be enough to feed a million starving 
people (Fairtrade Foundation Report 2010, p. 3, and Dugger 2007).  
In 2005, Brazil brought a case against the US in the WTO for its use of cotton 
subsidies. After a series of “wins” for Brazil over the next decade, Brazil and the US 
reached a final settlement in 2014, leading to the US paying $750 million in 
compensation to Brazil for its lost business. The US also promised to substantially 
change its subsidy program (Lau et. al 2015). However, the WTO did not strongly 
enforce this promise. While US direct cotton subsidies have decreased, in the 2014 US 
Farm Bill, the US government “doubled down on subsidies for government programs that 
insure cotton farms against reductions in their revenues from lower market prices and 
unexpectedly low crop yields.” Studies show that these subsidies are still suppressing 
world cotton prices by at least six percent (Sumner 2016). The WTO has failed to do 
anything about these continued subsidies that greatly affect agriculture in the developing 
world. This demonstrates that even after an ultimately “successful” decade-long legal 
battle (a battle that most developing nations could not afford), many powerful developed 
nations are not penalized sufficiently to deter blatant rule-breaking. Additionally, the only 




developing nations are also strongly negatively affected by the US cotton subsidies. This 
kind of activity contributes to the view that it is often not worth it for developing 
countries to bring a challenge against the practices of powerful nations to the floor, 
because of the time and resources involved in doing so, and the fact that it rarely brings 
about any substantial change in the offending country’s actions.  
Both structurally and in terms of the content of the laws enforced and ignored, the 
WTO selectively opens markets, overall benefitting developed countries and harming 
developing ones. It is an undemocratic, irregularly operated and overseen institution that 
allows vulnerable populations to be strong-armed into agreeing to deals that often harm 
them or make them worse-off. In fact, not only does it allow for this, but parts of its 
structure seem to be designed to do this, despite the fact that it expressly claims to be 
“more beneficial for less developed countries” (WTO, “What We Stand For”).   
We cannot yet conclude from this evaluation of the WTO, however, that the 
institution is doing anything wrong in a robust moral sense. It is certainly morally 
culpable for failing to live up to its own mission, which expressly articulates a desire to 
help developing countries. However, there is a deeper wrong here that cannot simply be 
resolved by removing the parts of the mission that declare an intent to help.9 We have a 
common intuition that in business, there will be some winners and some losers, and the 
harm that the losers experience does not necessarily give rise to an obligation on the part 
of the winners to alleviate that harm. In Section 2 of this chapter, as well as in Chapter 3, 
I will consider the moral consequences of these harms, and the moral obligations of the 
                                                        




institution. For now, all I have shown is the ways in which the powerful member nations 
create and exploit the setup of the WTO.   
 
Part 1.3.2: The International Monetary Fund 
 
The IMF is an economic institution aimed at global economic cooperation. Its 
goals are to “provide policy advice and financing to members in economic difficulties 
and also work with developing nations to help them achieve macroeconomic stability and 
reduce poverty.” While the IMF was founded after World War II, its stated goals have 
changed as globalization has developed: “Helping a country benefit from globalization 
while avoiding potential downsides is an important task for the IMF” (IMF, “What We 
Do”).  
Beginning with the accomplishments of the IMF, we see that the organization is 
most often praised for its improvement in the realm of Balance of Payments (i.e. helping 
countries balance their budgets and repay their debts). Countries that are in serious debt 
or have inefficient or corrupt economic systems often face terrible economic difficulties, 
including the devaluation of currency, inability to borrow more money necessary for the 
basic functioning of a nation, and capital flight (the withdrawal of investment from 
international sources) (IMF, “Factsheet”). In situations like these, the IMF steps in to help 
the country in question reform the economic system, and thereby allow them to build and 
sustain growth. It does this through lending money in order for the country to get out of 
debt and stabilize the economy. In addition to paying back the loan, the borrowing nation 




Adjustment Policies (SAPs). These SAPs aim primarily at debt repayment and the 
development of new economic structures. As we will see, these goals are often achieved 
by sacrificing public goods like education and health, as was the case in Greece.  
Structurally, the power of members of the IMF is determined monetarily. The 
number of votes a country has is based on a quota system that is primarily determined by 
the amount of money the country contributes. Poorer countries therefore have much less 
say than the developed countries. The developed countries, i.e. those with the most votes 
and the most money to lend, act in the interest of the loaners, not those who have taken 
out the loans. There is thus a huge borrower/creditor divide in the IMF. The IMF also 
frequently works secretively, making huge decisions in closed-room meetings that are not 
subject to either public scrutiny or the formalities of official meetings. Documents are 
also only released selectively, and tend to be biased and ignore the negative effects of the 
body’s decisions (Head 2005, p. 64). The institution is undemocratic, its workings are 
opaque, and there are important reasons to question the fairness of its procedures.  
One of the key criticisms of the IMF is that it creates a race to the bottom. When 
countries are required to deregulate their markets as part of the terms of the loan, 
corporations manufacturing in these countries have increased competition and decreased 
regulation on the working conditions of their laborers. Additionally, when consumption 
and government expenditure decreases, the value of labor concurrently decreases. It is 
therefore quite common in these circumstances to see a spike in profits for corporations 




In A Fate Worse than Debt, Susan George connects these worries with the simultaneous 
benefit of these policies for developed countries:  
 
“Dozens of countries must compete for shrinking export markets and can 
export only a limited range of products because of Northern protectionism 
and their lack of cash to invest in diversification. Market saturation ensues, 
reducing exporters’ income to a bare minimum while the North enjoys 
huge savings. The IMF cannot seem to understand that investing in … [a] 
healthy, well-fed, literate population … is the most intelligent economic 
choice a country can make” (George 1990, p. 143). 
 
The IMF also tends to encourage developing countries to significantly increase 
the amount of resources that they export, as part of the SAPs. The result of this, however, 
is that labor-intensive resources from the country are sold to developed nations, which 
utilize the resources and make enormous profits. This imbalance is partly why, “an 
industrialized product-exporting/commodity-importing country is wealthy and an 
undeveloped product-importing/commodity-exporting country is poor” (J.W. Smith 1994, 
p. 127). Developing countries are therefore made to sell their resources in order for the 
developed world to profit off them, which increases the gap between developing and 
developed nations. Citizens of these developing nations can also be badly affected by the 
emphasis on exports, as nations may be forced to export agricultural resources or timber 
that are necessary for their own survival and development. 
A recent example of a seeming success of the IMF’s policies is in Sri Lanka. In 
2016, the IMF approved a $1.5 billion loan to Sri Lanka in order to help the country 
through its balance of payments crisis. The loan would be paid out in three installments, 
and each new installment would depend upon the completion of certain measures. For 




unsustainable. In 2015, its budget deficit was 7.4% of its GDP. The IMF stepped in, 
offering this loan in exchange for certain economic changes (Aneez 2016). Included in 
these terms is raising VAT (Value Added Tax), reducing tax exemptions, and simplifying 
revenue collection (Sri Lankan News 2016). The reform the IMF is pushing strongly is 
the new Inland Revenue Act, a tax reform act that improves tax collection methods, 
makes taxes more equitable, and is expected to generate significant revenue for 
development programs. Thus far, the changes in Sri Lanka seem to be positive; the 
budget deficit went down to 5.4% of GDP in 2016 (from 7.4% in 2015), though this 
reduction slowed down to 5.2% in 2017, rather than the originally projected 4.8% (Lanka 
Business Online 2017, and Reuters Staff December 2017). 
However, there are numerous cases in which the neoliberal policies that the IMF 
imposes on the recipients of its loans have backfired. An obvious case is that of Greece. 
The Greek economy has been plagued by debt for some time, and in 2015 its economic 
crisis reached its peak. The IMF stepped in, along with other international organizations, 
and instead of a writedown or debt default, they loaned money to keep paying off the 
interest on Greece’s loans, leading the country into even more debt (The Guardian 
Editorial Opinion 2013). Part of the terms under which the IMF loaned this money 
involved very strict austerity measures, leading to the interests of big banks being put 
above the interests of Greek citizens (Chakrabortty 2011). None of these crippling 
measures have helped the Greek economy, as it is still in approximately the same state it 
was in years ago, though its people have had to experience much more suffering 




The issue of export and import inequalities is clear when looking at the example 
of Ghana. Before loans from the IMF and World Bank, the northern part of Ghana 
produced large amounts of rice, and with subsidies from its government, was able to 
produce enough rice for the whole nation. The loans, however, came with conditions that 
dictated a great reduction of subsidies to the rice farmers. The reduction in subsidies 
meant that the farmers were no longer able to buy combines for harvesting, or even mills 
to separate the husk from the grains. Harvesting must now be done by hand, and the rice 
is separated by having a car run over it. This leads to broken crops with dirt and stones in 
them. These crops are now both more expensive and of a lower quality, and therefore 
there is less demand for them, which leads to the crop being even more expensive and 
being of even worse quality. Instead, Ghana now has to import rice from the US. US rice 
is both cheap and high quality, due to the high amount of subsidies American rice farmers 
receive from their government, with little to no consequence posed by the IMF. The 
subsidies of US rice production were no small matter. In 2003, the US government gave 
its rice farmers $1.3bn in subsidies for crops that were sold for $1.7bn. The US 
government therefore “effectively [foot] the bill for 72% of the crop” (Moore 2005). As a 
result, the formerly prosperous northern region of Ghana is now destitute, and the 
markets of Ghana are full of bags of Chicago Star Rice. "The plight of rice farmers in 
Ghana shows how western policies and unfair agricultural subsidies in the US and the EU 
are destroying the livelihoods of farmers in developing nations," said Harriet Binet, a 




To make matters worse in the case of Ghana, experiments of market 
liberalization, particularly in the context of rice-farming, had been tried before, and had 
achieved similar results.  
“In the early 1980s conditions attached to loans given to Ghana by the 
IMF and the World Bank resulted in the country liberalising its markets 
and cheap imported rice flooding the market. The IMF and World Bank 
now admit that such conditions do not help the world's poor but reversing 
the damage of such policies is difficult” (Moore 2005).  
 
Not only had rice markets in Ghana been devastated before by similar policies, but these 
institutions supposedly admitted the error of their policies. And yet, when it came time 
for new loans and new SAPs, the same terms were insisted upon, and they yielded the 
same results. The IMF justifies this logic by claiming that it attempts to minimize 
subsidies all over the world. However, it ignores the fact that it can only really enforce 
subsidies in developing countries dependent on its loans, and therefore paves the path for 
the destruction of developing economies. Mats Karlsson, the country director for Ghana 
for the World Bank in 2005 unequivocally stated: “Let us be clear. The biggest problem 
facing farmers in the developing world are the subsidies the west provides to its own 
farmers. These are deeply unfair” (quoted in Moore 2005). Yet the IMF continues to seek 
subsidy minimization in the developing world despite the knowledge that it is not only 
ineffective in development, but often actually counterproductive to it. 
 There is a similar story to tell in the case of rice production in Haiti. After loans 
from the IMF and World Bank in 1995, Haiti dropped its import tariffs from 50% to 3%. 
Haiti has “700,000 hectares of underutilized arable land […] but it nevertheless maintains 




those of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo” (O’Connor 2013). In a country 
with a population of only 10 million, and in which 70% of the population work as 
farmers, the IMF’s SAPs have ensured that the country now imports 60-70% of its food. 
This is shocking when contrasted with the fact that until the 1970s, Haiti only imported 
19% of its food. In 2010, after the devastating earthquake that destroyed much of Haiti’s 
infrastructure, former US President Bill Clinton called his subsidies of US rice farmers a 
mistake and a “devil’s bargain” because of its effects on the poverty and food security of 
Haiti (O’Connor 2013).  
Unfortunately, the solution is not simply as easy as trying to take back what has 
happened. “If imports drop and prices rise, not only will there not be enough local 
product to feed the population, but it will likely be difficult for average Haitian citizens, 
75 percent of whom live on less than $2 a day, to afford the household staple” (O’Connor 
2013). This is a large reason that countries that have been made worse off by the IMF 
policies cannot simply pay off their debts and restructure their economy; the damage 
done is lasting, and getting help paying off the debt often results in even further 
dependency on developed nations or international institutions. I will return to this point in 
Section 2 when we discuss the lack of alternatives to the current GEO. 
There are numerous other examples of IMF interference that resulted in economic 
collapses in its short history: IMF loans greatly exacerbated Russia’s economic crisis in 
the 1990s (Rutland 1999), IMF loans and “advice” devastated the Korean economy 
(Shiin and Chang 2003, p. 34-82), and the bailout of Argentina in 2000 also served to 




predatory lending schemes of the IMF often harm the nations that need to accept their 
conditions. However, in Section 2 I address the concern that this harm is consensual (the 
countries sign on to the conditions of the loans), and therefore these institutions are not 
wronging the loan recipients. For now, I have shown that although the policies of the 
IMF can sometimes help, they often harm these nations significantly, and their one-size-
fits-all neoliberal policies are actually enforced asymmetrically, so as to 
disproportionately and unfairly benefit the economies of developed nations.  
Returning to the larger project, it is important to note that Joshua Cohen argues 
that while Pogge may have shown that there is a connection between the actions of these 
global institutions and poverty on the ground in many countries, Pogge has not done 
enough to show that bad local institutions are often created by these global rules (Cohen 
2010, p. 25).  As I have shown, Pogge argues that the inefficiencies and corruption of the 
governments of developing countries do not exist in a vacuum; they are often helped by 
the international borrowing privilege and international resource privilege, both of which 
are central tenets of our current economic system. The global poor are continuously and 
purposely getting deals that are disadvantageous to them, yet they do not have the 
economic nor political power to reject those deals (Landes, 1998, Prasad, et al., 2005, 
Henisz et al, 2005). Cohen criticizes Pogge for not providing sufficient evidence for his 
claim that the local institutions are so deeply affected by the global ones.  
 I am sympathetic to Cohen’s criticism, which is why I have spent a significant 
portion of this chapter attempting to show how local politics are shaped by these global 




nature of Pogge’s arguments. By using policies like those of international borrowing and 
resource privilege, the GEO creates incentives for the kinds of corruption, tyranny, and 
political instability that plague many developing nations. Pogge’s central claim, 
therefore, is that: 
“national causal factors notwithstanding, we share causal and moral 
responsibility. This insight should not lessen the moral responsibility we 
assign to dictators […] in the poor countries any more than our initial 
insight into their moral responsibility should lessen the moral 
responsibility we assign to ourselves” (Pogge 2008, p.122).  
 
Even if it is the case that the evidence, even after my additions to it, is not sufficient to 
establish the effects of the global order on local institutions, it certainly seems to have 
strong explanatory power, and so we have very good reasons to accept it.  
Despite all of this information on the effects of the policies of these institutions, the 
reader may be unsure of how to think of these harms in the context of the fact that nations 
are in competition with each other, and we often think harm is permissible in the context 
of business. Therefore, let us now consider whether these harms are moral wrongs. 
 
Section 2: The Harms of the GEO as Wrongs 
 
The harm that the GEO is imposing on the global poor is immense, and the 
empirical evidence establishes that this is so. This evidence has been around for quite 
some time, and is not especially controversial. More generally, we know that large 
swathes of people are in extreme poverty, and those who study these institutions and their 
effects have known for a long time that the institutions are at least partly responsible for 




The next step to make this argument more robust must be an ethical one that links 
these harms to wrongs. Harking back to the framework of negative rights that we are 
working within, there are two things I need to show in order to argue that the GEO 
wrongs the global poor. First, as I have done in the section above, the causal connection 
between the actions and policies of the institutions of the GEO and the poverty in 
developing countries needed to be established. Second, I have to show that not only is 
poverty being sustained, which is harming the poor, but this harm is unjustified, and is 
therefore wrong.10  
First, it is clear that not all harms are wrongs. I take harms here to be either 
physical pain or a setback of one’s interests or desires. Instead of starting from a 
particular definition of wrong, let us consider a few examples on this issue, ranging from 
least to most controversial. I will then trace some of the common threads that run through 
these examples and articulate some conditions of wrong-doing as separate from harm. 
The goal here is to demonstrate the intuitive force behind an idea of wrong-doing that 
works within a negative rights framework. 
1) When a student who rarely comes to class, fails his exams, and does not 
participate in class discussion is given a failing grade in the class, the student is 
often hurt by that grade. The teacher who gave that grade caused that pain. 
However, we do not fault the teacher for causing harm because the student earned 
the failing grade by not doing the required work for the class. While the student 
                                                        
10 As a quick refresher, the negative rights of an individual are violated if her life is unjustifiably interfered 




himself may have a hard time agreeing, the norms of justice in the classroom 
should be known and recognized by participants.  
2) At the end of a marriage there is often pain, and in situations where one person 
terminates the marriage, they are often the cause of the pain the other person feels. 
There could, of course, be complications depending on the circumstances of the 
end of the marriage, like infidelity or lies. Therefore the actions of both parties in 
the marriage do have a bearing on how painful the ending is, and can be part of 
deciding whether or not the harm caused is a wrong. However, in a situation in 
which the relationship has run its course without wrongdoing on either side, the 
person who ends the relationship is not wrong to do so, even though doing so may 
cause pain. This is primarily because people are free to choose whom they want to 
be in a relationship or a marriage with, and when one person no longer chooses to 
be in that marriage, they should not be forced to do so, despite the possible 
negative consequences to the partner. Even in the cases of lies and infidelity, the 
wrongdoing stems from those actions, not the ending of the relationship. 
3) A more contested but politically relevant example involves political rights. By 
1856, all white men who did not own property were granted the right to vote in 
the US, alongside propertied white men who had always had the right to vote. In 
1870, the US Congress passed the 15th Amendment, codifying the voting rights of 
all male citizens (including African Americans and former slaves), although it 
was not until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that these voting rights began to be 




right to vote in the US, through the 19th Amendment. All these developments 
were met with strong resistance from those who had previously been the only 
recipients of voting rights: white men who owned a certain amount of property. 
While some of these developments were met with more resistance than others, 
they all served to add to the number of enfranchised people. While this increased 
number of potential voters did not entail that propertied white men were no longer 
able to vote, it certainly entailed that each of their votes was potentially less 
powerful. Much of the resistance around expanding voting rights stemmed from 
this worry; more voters means less power, which may be said in one sense to 
harm the propertied white man.  
               I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that this harm is not a wrong. We 
think that it is a fundamental right that all citizens above the age of 18 should be 
able to vote in a democracy. The fact that more people are now able to vote may 
indeed reduce the amount of power some previously privileged individuals had, 
but in doing so, a wrong has not been committed. The privileging of white males in 
the US is a fact of its history, but arbitrary from the point of view of democratic 
norms of participation; what has transpired by expanding voting rights is that the 
principle of democratic power has been enacted. There are, in fact, persuasive 
arguments even against the idea that any harm has been done to propertied white 
men in this scenario. Expanding the scope of the right to vote does not take away 
the right to vote from those who currently have it, it merely gives more people 




votes diminishes, though, we can at least see the argument for the claim that 
propertied white men have been harmed by the expansion of voting rights. What is 
clear is that these harms, even if they are to be called this, do not constitute 
wrongs. 
4) One of the most widely applicable arenas in which the unclear boundary between 
harms and wrongs is felt in moral and legal theories lies in questions of intention. 
A) If you accidentally trip over my foot, I seem to have harmed you but not 
wronged you. B) If, however, I left my banana peel lying on the floor, knowing 
that someone could slip on it, but hoping no one would come by, and you slip on 
it, it becomes a little less clear whether or not I have wronged you. This may be a 
case of negligence, or even moral wrong, depending on other circumstances. C) If 
I left my banana peel on the ground knowing that you walk that route every day, 
and distract you so that you do not see it on the ground, then when you slip on it, I 
venture that I have both harmed and wronged you. 
Let us look through these examples in order to begin to examine how it is that we 
should distinguish between harms and wrongs. In example 1, the teacher has not harmed 
the student because we would say that that the student deserves a failing grade. There are 
rules or norms in a class which involve both the student and teacher putting in a certain 
amount of work. If one of the parties fails to do their portion of the work, then the 
consequent harm is not a violation of their rights, but rather the consequence of their 




Example 2 points to the fact that when we discuss whether a harm is a wrong, we 
often look to whether a right has been violated. Thinking purely of negative rights, we 
seem to have the right not to be forced to be in a relationship or a marriage we do not 
want to be in. While a person may harm their partner by ending a relationship, the 
partner’s rights are not being violated, because an individual does not have the right to be 
in a relationship with whomever he chooses, simply because he chooses it. Even if, as in 
the first scenario in example 2, one of the parties was unfaithful or lied, we would only 
morally blame the person for the infidelity or the lie, not for ending the relationship if 
they no longer want to be in it.11  
There are at least two ways in which one could argue that example 3 does not 
constitute a wrong. First, if the right to not be prevented from voting in the context of a 
democracy is considered a great good or a fundamental right, then the logical 
consequence of that right, i.e. that each individual has an equal ability to vote in their 
country, cannot be a wrong.12 Second, it cannot be a wrong to take away power from a 
group that has only kept its power through the wrongful oppression of others, as long as 
the members of that groups are not now granted less of a right to vote than others. Before 
women, racial minorities, and people who did not own property were allowed to vote, 
those who could vote retained their power by ensuring that others did not have access to 
                                                        
11 It is worth noting that there may be cultures in which, for example, a father has a legal right to choose his 
daughter’s husband, but this right is antithetical to the negative rights tradition that we are currently 
considering, so I will not take on this issue here. 
12 I recognize that this claim is not entirely uncontroversial. Believing a final outcome to be an important 
good does not mean that I necessarily endorse all the things that lead up to it as goods, or claim that they 




the same rights they did. By ending their ability to disenfranchise others, the loss of their 
extra power is not a wrong, despite possibly being a harm. 
Finally, example 4 involves questions of intention. How can a harm be a wrong if 
there was no intention behind it? 4B shows that negligence does not involve intentionally 
harming someone, but can plausibly result in a wrong under certain circumstances. I 
could easily have predicted that someone would fall on the banana peel, or at least there 
was a non-zero chance of that happening. It is also possible for me to pick up the banana 
peel. Therefore, I suggest, a wrong can be done even when there is no intention to wrong 
someone, as long as the harm is predictable and preventable.13  
One kind of example that has not been considered are harms caused by omissions. 
If, for example, you fall on my property because I fail to de-ice the pathway up to my 
house,14 you have been harmed, but not only is it unclear that I have wronged you, it is 
also unclear whether I have harmed you. In a way this is similar to 4B, but the important 
difference is that I did not put the ice on the ground in the way I put the banana peel on 
the ground. This removes me further from your fall in the causal chain, and therefore 
perhaps the negative rights theorist would say that I have not harmed or wronged you, 
even though you have been harmed. The examples does, however, show that the question 
                                                        
13 4C is a situation that seems to be an uncontroversial wrong, but it brings up worries about whether 
intention is a sufficient condition for declaring something to be a wrong. If I fully intended for you to slip 
on the banana peel, but you did not come by that day, or you did not fall for my distraction, have I wronged 
you without harming you? I recognize the importance of this question, but must put it aside for this project 
because of the complications related to understanding the motivations of institutions and governments. 
Instead of motivation, I focus on what is known to these institutions. 
14 There are laws in many areas that require that a sidewalk must be shoveled and de-iced, but in this case I 




of causal chain is not a clear one, and even the legal notion of a proximate cause is not 
transparent in all cases. 
These examples have led us to a few ways to distinguish between harms and 
wrongs. Wrongs have occurred when harms are: 1) not deserved, 2) predictable and 
preventable, and 3) rights violations. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list or 
definition of wrongdoing, but rather merely one that highlights some of the most 
uncontroversial and common ways in which we distinguish between harms and wrongs. 
Circumstances are certainly going to have a large role to play in determining harm in any 
given scenario. The third feature, that a harm is a rights violation, is most important. A 
harm that is not deserved may not always be a wrong (like example 4A). Similarly, a 
harm that is predictable and preventable may not always be a wrong (like example 3). But 
I propose that a harm that is a rights violation is always a wrong, and is even more clearly 
so when the harm is also not deserved and the harm is predictable and preventable.  
When evaluating the morality of the actions of the GEO, it may be tempting to 
consider the overall costs and benefits of the policies of these institutions. Despite the 
harm they may cause to some segments of the world (like rice farmers in Ghana and 
Haiti, or cotton farmers in Mali and Brazil, or HIV/AIDS patients in Thailand), if they 
create an overall benefit to the world’s economy, or even the economy of the nation in 
question, should we really deem the harm a wrong? 
It is worth noting here that all this talk of harm can cause significant confusion, 
because evaluating the morality of an action according to the harm it causes seems like a 




negative rights framework, this may raise the reader’s suspicions. As discussed in the 
Introduction to the project, negative rights violations are not easily subject to utilitarian 
concerns; for example, a government cannot violate the negative rights of a person or a 
group of people simply because the violation would create the most overall utility. This is 
not to say that negative rights theorists must entirely ignore the human consequences of 
actions, but rather that negative rights are a side constraint for right action. We therefore 
do not need to conduct a cost/benefit analysis of the effects of these policies in general to 
determine whether they violate negative rights, and are therefore wrongs. 
Let us return to Pogge’s analysis of the injustices arising from actions of the 
GEO. He gives five conditions that need to be met in order to determine if a person or 
community X can be said to have wronged and be responsible for a certain harm.  
First, X is morally responsible only if a human rights deficit is encountered.  
Second, X must cooperate in imposing this institution.  
Third, the human rights deficit created must be foreseeable.  
Fourth, the deficits themselves must be reasonably avoidable, “in the sense that an 
alternative design of the relevant institutional order would not produce comparable 
human rights deficits or other ills of comparable magnitude” (Pogge, 2005, p. 60).  
Fifth, this alternative design must also be available and foreseeable. 
As discussed above, there are certainly huge debates between consequentialists 
and deontologists on what constitutes harm, and what role consequences and intentions 
play in determining that judgment. While my argument primarily inquires into the effects 




issues of intention and requires not only that there are harms, but that these harms were 
undeserved, foreseeable, preventable, and were negative rights violations. Pogge’s focus 
on the availability of an alternative is also crucial, and I will consider this aspect as we 
move forward. 
 Given that the GEO involves international trade, let us now consider cases 
involving the harm that comes from competition. There are certain situations with zero-
sum outcomes. If there is one job and multiple candidates, the person who gets the job 
has not wronged those who did not get the job. If I open a restaurant opposite yours, and 
customers enjoy my food more and therefore flock to my restaurant instead of yours, it is 
clear that you have been harmed and I am the cause, but it is less clear whether I have 
wronged you. After all, if my product is better than yours and competitively priced, I 
deserve to have your customers. Tweaking the scenario a little however, we can find a 
situation in which I have wronged you. Think, for example, of sabotage. If I try to 
sabotage your restaurant by poisoning the food you are going to serve, or by burning 
down your restaurant, even if my food is better and the price is better, I have both harmed 
and wronged you.  
Discussions of wrongful harms in the context of business necessitate a distinction 
between fair and unfair competition. Many countries, including the US, currently have 
anti-monopoly laws based on the notion that monopolies have an unfair advantage of 
scale over smaller businesses, which often minimizes competition, and a lack of 
competition is bad for consumers and citizens. There are also laws against price collusion 




between the ways in which companies should behave and the ways in which governments 
should behave. The priority of any government is to protect the interests of its citizens, 
but even the pursuit of these interests must be subject to some constraints.  
The nature of these constraints is largely what is at issue here. In the aftermath of 
World War II, numerous international treaties were enacted based on the fundamental 
principle of equality of human worth; while all nations should be free to act in their own 
interests, this freedom should not come at the expense of fundamental rights of the 
citizens of other nations. 
Recall that Pogge argues that there is a minimal standard against which a society 
should be judged as just or unjust, and that this standard requires that “any institutional 
order imposed on human beings must be designed so that human rights are fulfilled under 
it insofar as this is reasonably possible” (Pogge, 2008, p. 56). The current global order 
falls short of this proposed standard, and is thus not even minimally just. Pogge has an  
"institutional understanding according to which a human right to X gives 
you a moral claim against all others that they not harm you by 
cooperating, without compensating protection and reform efforts, in 
imposing upon you an institutional order under which you lack secure 
access to X as part of a foreseeable and avoidable human rights deficit" 
(Pogge 2008, p. 67).  
 
Therefore, his understanding of human rights does not entail that if you have a right to X, 
you have a claim against everyone to give you X, but rather that human rights are claims 
against social institutions and those who uphold those institutions. Those in charge of the 
global order, like the members and leaders of the IMF and WTO, and the heads of the 
governments of many developed nations, as well as the citizens of these nations, have 




certainly not to say that those mentioned above are the only entities to wrong the global 
poor; many despotic and corrupt rulers in developing nations harm and wrong their own 
people, but I am focusing here on the moral implications of the global system and those 
who run it. 
The question of whether a harm is a wrong is further complicated by the issue of 
consent. For example, when a parent pays ransom in exchange for their kidnapped child, 
although they are technically handing over the money consensually, it is indisputable that 
they are being wronged because they have no feasible alternative. In the context of the 
GEO, one of the most salient questions is whether the GEO is imposing its rules on the 
world coercively. The GEO is not an independent body; its membership consists of most 
countries in the world. In a basic sense, therefore, its rule can be thought of not as an 
imposition, but as a decision. If countries choose to join the IMF and the WTO and 
follow their rules, is the excessive moralizing about their effects paternalistic?  
I agree that our concerns would be unnecessarily paternalistic if there were a 
legitimate alternative to joining the GEO. For most developing nations, however, there 
are no feasible alternatives to being members of these international institutions, and 
thereby being influenced by the GEO. For many there are also no feasible alternatives to 
accepting loans from the IMF, or agreeing to the trade terms of the WTO. Although loans 
and terms of trade are agreed upon by both sides, I have demonstrated above that these 
are often predatory loans that take advantage of a bad political situation, or an industry 
that had been destroyed by the terms of the previous loans. Developing countries do not 




(Landes 1998, Prasad, et al. 2005, Henisz et al. 2005). Therefore, the economic system 
has been created in such a way that developing nations that opt out are economically 
disadvantaged even further than those who remain. Many developing countries are 
therefore in a lose-lose situation.  
The fact that developing countries sign their names to the loans and trade 
agreements of the IMF and WTO does not mean that the harms that follow from these 
agreements are not wrongs. Therefore, if a rights violation arises out of a contract that 
both parties agreed to, it can still be considered a wrong if the victims of the rights 
violations had no feasible alternative but to agree to the contract, i.e. consent was attained 
coercively. It is one thing for developed nations to take advantage of the misfortunes of 
the developing world, but it is quite another to be the cause of the misfortunes and then 
take advantage of them, particularly (as I argue in the next chapter) if this results in the 
deprivation of the basic capability sets of many of the citizens of the developing 
countries.  
Returning to the three conditions for wrongdoing I proposed above, let us 
consider what we know thus far about the moral status of the harms the GEO inflicts on 
the global poor. I have suggested that a harm can be considered a wrong if it is not 
deserved, is predictable and preventable, and is a rights violation. The GEO has created a 
system that forces developing countries to open their markets at a pace that is detrimental 
to them, while allowing developed countries to employ protectionist methods in relation 
to their own industries. These institutions also prey on countries that desperately need 




developed countries benefit from the destruction of those industries through “free trade.” 
These developing countries also often have no alternative but to sign on to these 
agreements, as doing so would put them at risk of total economic isolation and 
blacklisting. There are vast amounts of data that demonstrate the effects of global trade 
policies, so these institutions are aware of the effects their policies have on the 
developing world. The harms caused are also reasonably avoidable; these institutions 
could, at the least, adopt more democratic methods of governance, including eliminating 
back-door deals among developed nations. They could also either apply anti-protectionist 
rules equally amongst all member nations, or even (as their mission statements suggest) 
allow developing countries to begin to apply these rules more slowly, in order to protect 
them from the adverse effects of rapid globalization. In relation to international resource 
privilege, more care could be taken in evaluating the adverse effects of natural resource 
depletion in a country before trade contracts are agreed to. My aim here is not to propose 
specific reforms, but to show that they are possible and that they are needed, if we want 
to prevent the violation of the negative rights of the global poor. The harms the GEO 
causes are therefore not deserved, and are both predictable and preventable. Whether or 




In this chapter I have expanded on Pogge’s framework empirically, and added to 
it some intuitive criteria with which to evaluate the contents of harms and wrongs. It is 




governments of developed nations that have powerful voices in these organizations, like 
the US and Germany - are causally responsible for the harmful effects of their finance 
and trade policies on the global poor. Beyond this, I have also begun to argue that 
because these effects are unjust harms, in the sense that these harms are substantial, 
undeserved, predictable, and preventable, they are also wrongs. In order to fully justify 
this conclusion, I must also show that the harms are rights violations, which is the subject 
of the next chapter. In the next chapter, I will delve further into what kinds of rights are 
really generated by the negative rights framework, and therefore what kinds of 
obligations are derived from it as well. In doing so, I will show that the harms the GEO 
causes to the global poor are rights violations, and therefore are wrongs, and therefore the 







CHAPTER 3:  






 This chapter has one overarching goal, and three instrumental goals. The 
overarching goal is to demonstrate that the harms inflicted upon the global poor by the 
GEO are negative rights violations, and therefore the GEO has a duty to help alleviate 
global poverty. To achieve this goal, I must also achieve the following three instrumental 
goals. The first is to consider some significant worries about Thomas Pogge’s view of 
global obligation to alleviate global poverty, and show that his view that harms are 
violations of human rights is too expansive to fit within the negative rights framework. 
Thus, while Pogge succeeds in establishing that the harms caused by the GEO are not 
deserved, and are both predictable and preventable, he fails to show that they are negative 
rights violations. The second goal is to demonstrate that a version of the Capability 
Approach to poverty (CA) that is based in negative rights can be coherently formulated. 
The third is that this version of the CA gives us the resources to determine negative rights 
violations based on the deprivation of basic capability sets. I thereby argue that the harms 
the GEO causes the poor are wrongs when they result in basic capability deprivation, and 
this generates a more accurate understanding of the obligation that the GEO bears to help 
alleviate global poverty than Pogge’s account does. This is due to the fact that the version 
of the CA that I propose does not require any functionings or outcomes to be guaranteed, 
but instead requires that a basic capability set is not made impossible to achieve for the 




because, despite its protests, it requires positive rights in order to prove the obligation, 
and because it is founded on Resourcism.  
 This chapter is the culmination of the project, and therefore builds upon the 
conclusions of both the previous chapters. In Chapter 2 I have shown that there is strong 
evidence to support the claim that the GEO harms the global poor, and given reasons to 
believe that those harms are wrongs. I also suggested that Pogge’s argument does not fit 
neatly within the negative rights framework in the way that he intends it to. In this 
chapter, therefore, I will strengthen the claim that the harms are wrongs in a minimal 
sense, i.e. according to a negative rights framework, from a viewpoint different from 
Pogge’s. Harking back to Chapter 1, I will reintroduce the CA and propose a version of 
the approach based in negative rights (as described in the Introduction). This version, I 
argue, allows for a truly minimal and ecumenical theory of responsibility for extreme 
global poverty based on negative rights.  
 This chapter is therefore structured in the following way. First, I briefly restate the 
theory and content of a negative rights framework, which I argued for in the Introduction 
to the project. Next, I consider a few arguments against Pogge that show that the way in 
which he conceives of wrongs do not map onto the way most negative rights theorists 
conceive of wrongs. I then reintroduce the CA from Chapter 1, and show that although 
some influential capability theorists (like Martha Nussbaum) argue that the CA must be 
grounded in positive rights, a minimal version of the CA grounded in negative rights is 
possible and is not incompatible with the core tenets of the CA. I then build upon this 




would allow us to identify which harms being caused by the GEO are truly negative 
rights violations. Next, I make the case that limiting the CA in this way has particular 
advantages for the CA itself. Finally, I consider and respond to a number of clarifications 
and potential objections to the view I present. 
 
Section 1: Negative Rights: A Brief Reintroduction 
 
 As discussed in the Introduction to this project, negative rights and the duties that 
arise from them are not set in stone, and there are great divisions about their content and 
consequences among their proponents. Most fundamentally, “[t]o say that an individual 
A has a negative duty to another individual B with respect to a certain object O is to say 
that A ought not to harm B by depriving them of access to O” (Gilabert 2006, p. 194). In 
order to make headway in founding a theory of international moral responsibility upon 
these rights, therefore, I have identified the central tenets of the theory that would be 
acceptable to a large number of these theorists. Even though no such list is free of 
controversy, I set out the seven following principles as central to a theory of negative 
rights: 
1) Negative rights are rights to be free from unjust obstruction or interference.  
2) Negative rights claims are often based on natural right theories that do not 
presuppose social recognition or enforcement. The fact that these rights are 
natural is coextensive with the fact that we do not have to consent to them, or 




3) Negative rights are based on self-ownership and aim at self-determination. 
4) Governments and institutions should not encroach upon the rights of citizens 
except in cases where they violate the negative rights of others, or if they violate 
legally enforceable agreements. 
5) In order to determine responsibility for an unjust harm, the causal connection 
between the actions of the alleged perpetrator and the harm done must be 
established. 
6) Negative rights and freedoms are so essential that broader notions of group 
welfare may not override these rights.  
7) Positive rights and duties only arise out of consent or contract. 
Positive rights involve the right to attain certain ends or well-being, and require 
that certain goods are guaranteed to all. The proponents of these rights often appeal to the 
intuition that morality dictates that we actively help each other, and that we should do 
what is necessary to ensure each other’s well-being. Therefore, unlike negative liberty, 
which requires the absence of coercion or obstacles, positive liberty requires the presence 
of things like food, healthcare, or aid, and therefore positive rights are rights to be 
assisted (Carter 2016). As Gilabert expresses it, “[t]o say […] that A has a positive duty 
to B with respect to O is to say that A ought to assist B in gaining or maintaining access 
to O” (Gilabert 2006, p. 194). 
In order to achieve the goals of this project, the following restrictions are 
essential. To show that there is an obligation based on negative rights, we are working 




rights theorists claim that negative rights can only lead to negative obligations, i.e. the 
obligation to stop interfering unjustly in the lives of others. Others, like Zwolinski (2018), 
have argued that the consequences of violating negative rights can be positive in nature, 
in cases in which some compensation would be deserved for a rights violation. In cases of 
wrongful imprisonment, for example, a negative rights theorist could claim that the 
victim deserves not simply to go free (i.e. to stop the interference), but for some 
compensation to be made to make up for the wrong done. Even for these negative rights 
theorists, though, the negative obligations that arise from negative rights are, all things 
being equal, the most stringent of obligations. Additionally, compensation is only 
certainly necessary in the case of intentional rights violations. 
It is important to remember here that the minimization of our rights and 
obligations within a theory of negative rights are in service of a significant goal: freedom. 
Negative freedom is the freedom from unjust interference, but this freedom is aimed at an 
individual being able, as Isaiah Berlin put it, “to do or be what he is able to do or be 
without interference by other persons” (Berlin 1969, p. 121). As detailed in the 
Introduction to the project, this often boils down to self-determination and self-
preservation. This emphasis on performing actions, and becoming the person one wants 
to be, underlies both the negative rights tradition as well as the CA, and therefore I argue 
that these theories work well together to establish the minimum obligation the GEO bears 






Section 2: Pogge on Rights Violations 
 
 
Pogge speaks not only of negative rights and the obligations that stem from them, 
but also negative duties. While Pogge does not necessarily use this terminological 
distinction between obligations and duties, it can be helpful to think of them as ways to 
distinguish between what arises from a violation of a negative right (an obligation) and 
what we naturally must refrain from doing in order to avoid negative rights violations (a 
duty). For Pogge, it is not only necessary to stop rights violations, but it is also necessary 
to “perform” negative duties. One of the most important negative duties, he argues, is to 
not cooperate with institutions that undermine or violate the rights of others, and instead, 
we have a duty to cooperate with just institutions, which do not undermine or violate the 
rights of others (Pogge 2008, p. 140). He defines negative duties as “any duty to ensure 
that others are not unduly harmed (or wronged) through one’s own conduct” (Pogge 
2008, p. 136). Thus, while institutions must not be structured in such a way as to violate 
human rights, individual citizens of developed nations have a duty not to support or gain 
advantages from their governments, or the global institutions that cause these rights 
deficits. These individual duties can include protesting, urging their fellow citizens to 
vote in certain ways, or even leaving the country, so as not to contribute to its injustices. 
For Pogge, these duties and obligations arise equally clearly from a theory of negative 
rights. Individual citizens could also fulfill this negative duty via compensation for the 
harm caused by their own institutions, which is a positive obligation. Therefore, Pogge 




Pogge proposes an institutional understanding of the status and contents of human 
rights. He explains the concept of human rights as follows:  
“A commitment to human rights involves one in recognizing that human 
persons with a past or potential future ability to engage in moral 
conversation and practice have certain basic needs, and that these needs 
give rise to weighty moral demands. The object of each of these basic 
human needs is the object of a human right” (Pogge 2008, p. 64). 
 
Human rights therefore relate to basic human needs. Pogge goes on to argue that what we 
should talk about when talking about human rights are whether or not powerful 
institutions are violating them. Thus, although we may well have rights and 
responsibilities to each other as individuals, human rights should be seen as purely 
relating to institutions and whether they “official[ly] disrespect” these rights (Pogge 
2008, p. 65). Pogge sees the “maximalist” account of human rights as claiming that 
having a human right to X automatically gives you a claim against all other people to 
ensure that you have secure access to X. He does not endorse this view, and argues that 
his institutional understanding delivers a different view. According to his account, having 
a human right to X: 
“gives you a moral claim against all others that they not harm you by 
cooperating, without compensating protection and reform efforts, in 
imposing upon you an institutional order under which you lack secure 
access to X as part of a foreseeable and avoidable human rights deficit” 
(Pogge 2005, p. 67). 
 
The difference between this and the maximalist account is significant: just because I have 
a human right to X does not mean that I can claim that you owe me X if I lack it. Instead, 




rights deficits on me. This distinction, Pogge argues, ensures that his theory is compatible 
with the libertarian position, while still demonstrating the need for substantial change. 
The idea of justice that follows from Pogge’s understanding of human rights, 
therefore, is that when we say we have a human right to X, 
“one is asserting that any society or other social system, insofar as this is 
reasonably possible ought to be so (re)organized that all its members have 
secure access to X, with “security” always understood as especially 
sensitive to person’ risk of being denied X or deprived of X officially: by 
the government or its agents or officials” (Pogge 2008, p. 70).  
 
Justice involves a societal organization or reorganization that ensures secure access to 
human rights. Powerful institutions therefore are morally obligated to organize 
themselves so as to ensure this access, as far as is reasonable, and individuals are also 
morally obligated not to support any institution that does not ensure this access. Pogge 
argues that all these obligations and duties stem from negative rights of noninterference, 
because actions are only required when unjust interference has occurred. 
This institutional understanding allows Pogge to retain his Rawlsian bent of 
focusing on procedure, but has come up against some powerful objections related to 
Pogge’s insistence that his view is purely institutional and not “interactional” (see, in 
particular, Besson 2003 and Cruft 2005). While this debate is engrossing, most important 
for the purpose of the present project is Pogge’s use of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in relation to what we discuss when we talk about rights. While 
he does not go so far as to say that the list of rights in the UDHR are the ones that must 
be ensured, he discusses particular articles of the declaration and argues what they 




lightly in this area. He takes the institutional aspect of his theory of human rights to be 
important because he thinks that by doing so, we can talk about the form of human rights 
rather than the content. The subject of human rights is basic needs, and while he does not 
list them, he does at times refer to them as “basic social and economic needs” (Pogge 
2008, p. 182), and frequently refers to lack of nutritious food and access to clean water as 
examples of the non-fulfillment of basic needs.  
 Article 25 of the UDHR asserts a human right to basic needs. Pogge argues that 
his institutional understanding of human rights makes this need more plausible because it 
shows that no one must provide these basic needs to the poor, they simply cannot support 
institutions under which everyone does not have secure access to these needs. At the end 
of the chapter on human rights, however, he contends that he still has not given any 
content to human rights (Pogge 2008, p. 75-6), and therefore his institutional structure 
can work with numerous conceptions of rights. He therefore does not concretize what 
basic needs are but argues that they are the subject of human rights, and that they must 
not be institutionally disrespected.   
 
Section 3: Criticisms of Pogge’s Account of Rights and Duties 
 
 
Pogge’s focus on negative rights and what they entail allows him to reach 
libertarian audiences. However, we must consider the practical consequences of this 
strategy. If the obligation to help alleviate global poverty rests on the fact that this 
poverty is a harm and wrong caused by the GEO, then those who institute and benefit 




What kind of help, however, are they obligated to give? Pogge argues that at the least, 
they are owed the ability to live without their human rights being violated, which entails 
that “each member of society, according to his or her means, is to help bring about and 
sustain a social and economic order within which all have secure access to basic 
necessities” (Pogge, 2008, p. 75). In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, Pogge 
requires a more robust conception of wrongdoing than he lays out. Because he ties 
wrongdoing to the violation of the UDHR, Pogge takes on worries about the justification 
for human rights, and that human rights are either too broad or too narrow to be truly 
helpful. In this section, I first consider some criticisms of Pogge that are also applicable 
to my argument, in order to clarify the similarities and differences between Pogge’s 
position and mine. I then consider objections to Pogge’s view that demonstrate the 
necessity of another view that is not subject to those important criticisms. 
In his comments on Pogge’s work, Alistair Macleod (2014) argues against the use 
of negative rights as the central constraint of Pogge’s theory. Macleod argues that 
Pogge’s thoughts on the difference between rights violations and those rights that are 
merely unfulfilled boil down to three conditions. Something is a rights violation if there 
is 1) a “causal relationship between the acts and omissions of human agents and 
agencies” (Pogge 2014, p. 96), 2) a way in which the rights violation was foreseeable and 
avoidable, and 3) a negative duty that has not been discharged. Macleod contends that 
while 1 and 2 are consistent, 3 does not fit neatly into the schema. He objects to the 
negative rights approach primarily on three grounds. First, he disputes the distinction 




more stringent. Second, he argues that it is unclear that negative rights really are more 
stringent than positive rights. It seems to be a more “urgent” duty to help create new 
international institutions that help alleviate poverty, which would be a positive duty, than 
the negative duty that Pogge and I suggest of changing the structure of the IMF or the 
content of the TRIPS Agreement. Third, he claims that Pogge thinks that breaches of both 
positive and negative duties are “culpable”, but reserves the notion of rights “violations” 
purely to breaches of negative rights.  
Pogge’s response to this criticism primarily aims at Macleod’s second objection, 
which he takes to be the core objection. He concedes the point that demonstrates that not 
all negative duties are obviously more stringent than positive duties; my duty to rescue a 
drowning child seems more stringent than my duty to not to prevent someone from going 
somewhere, for example. However, Pogge explains that his claim about the stringency of 
negative rights involves an “other-things-being-equal” clause: “Other things equal, it is 
worse to let an injustice persist if one is complicit in it than if one is merely an 
uninvolved bystander. If the injustice manifests itself in human rights deficits, then one is 
a human rights violator in the first case but not in the second” (Pogge 2011, supra note 1, 
p. 16). Pogge also argues that part of his project is an attempt to make individuals see that 
they, their governments, and these international organizations are actively contributing to 
these human rights deficits, and removing the negative rights dimension of his argument 
would lose this central motivation (Pogge 2014, p. 83). 
I agree with Pogge’s response to Macleod’s important criticism. In addition to 




merely a rhetorical and political advantage, but also philosophical advantages to 
articulating a minimal principle of justice.15 Having a widely agreed-upon philosophical 
consensus allows for philosophical progress. Rediscovering the wheel every time we 
have to talk about global justice hampers this progress, and so the closer we can get to an 
elegant and agreeable minimal articulation of justice, the better. Additionally, negative 
rights are attractive because they involve “controlling one’s own behavior by refraining 
from harmful actions and do not depend on the neediness of others” (Mieth 2008, p. 24), 
and therefore involve things that are under one’s control, rather than having one’s 
obligations dictated by the fortunes of others. Christian Barry also argues that negative 
rights are more acceptable because the obligations that arise from them are not as costly 
as those that arrive from positive rights, and therefore allow for the greatest amount of 
freedom (Barry 2005, p. 210). Finally, as Zwolinksi has argued, it may be the case that 
the negative rights approach “yield[s] a stronger case for redistribution than many 
alternative theories” because one strain of it (i.e. the Nozickian strain) is a historical one, 
and therefore takes into account the background forces that create the system of poverty 
we have in place today when determining the obligations we may have to alleviate it 
(Zwolinski 2018, p. 336).16  
                                                        
15 I acknowledge here that this vision of justice is not minimal in an absolute sense. An absolutely minimal 
form of justice would not rely on negative rights, but would start from the stance that we owe nothing to 
each other at all. When I refer to this as a minimal form of justice, I am using the term in the context of an 
assumption that there is something we owe to each other, and the narrowest version of that is the negative 
rights version.  
16 For a more in-depth look at some of the intuitions behind and advantages of using the negative rights 
framework, please refer back to the Introduction to this project. I also take up this topic again in the 




Corinna Meith (2008) argues against Pogge’s assertion that positive duties can 
arise from human rights violations, particularly given that one of the advantages of 
negative rights is that they are less costly to us to fulfill. Pogge argues that the violation 
of human rights leads to an obligation to act in response to the violation. Our negative 
duty demands that we must not: 
“harm others by cooperating, without compensating protection and reform 
efforts, in imposing on them an institutional order that foreseeably gives 
rise to avoidable human rights deficits. This is a generative duty that, in 
conjunction with our cooperation in imposing an [unjust] institutional 
order […], generates obligations to make compensating protection and 
reform efforts for those whose human rights remain unfulfilled under this 
order. These are positive obligations” (Pogge 2005, p. 68). 
 
He therefore derives positive obligations from negative rights, and Mieth is skeptical of 
this move. In particular, however, she criticizes the fact that he starts within the negative 
rights framework because, among other things, we take negative rights to be less costly 
for us to fulfill than positive rights. In this scenario, however, where we are being called 
upon to do something about our government and these international organizations they 
support, she calls into question how “cheap” the actions we would need to perform are. 
For example, one could leave one’s country in protest, but that could be just as, or even 
more, costly to us than giving to charity or completely changing one’s lifestyle to avoid 
contributing to problematic industries or governments. The obligations he suggests seem 
to be as onerous as if we had started with a positive rights framework in the first place. 
She argues that this is especially salient given that Pogge places responsibility not only 




nations, but also on the citizens of those developed nations. Since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, 
if there is to be a responsibility on individual citizens, there must be a recognition of how 
burdensome the proposed obligations will be on the individual (Mieth 2008, p. 24-5). 
Mieth’s criticism gets to two central issues in Pogge’s work: the scope of the 
responsibility, and the burden of it. I diverge sharply from Pogge’s view because I agree 
with Mieth that including individual citizens as equally obligated is problematic. While 
global poverty can be causally linked to particular foreign policies, trade deals, and 
international borrowing and lending privileges, the link between individual citizens and 
their actions is simply too tenuous to derive strong obligations. Individual citizens have 
so little impact on their governmental systems (even those who live in a democracy), and 
have even less of a say in non-democratic institutions like the WTO or IMF. Therefore, 
under the stringent conditions for obligation that are entailed by a theory of negative 
rights, citizens cannot be deemed to have violated the rights of the global poor. 
Mieth’s worry about the burden of responsibility is largely alleviated if we 
eliminate Pogge’s individual responsibility clause. Requiring a profound or costly change 
is not in itself a reason to reject a moral theory. Asking more than a person or 
organization is able to do however, may be so. Given that the causal link between global 
poverty and the actions or inactions of citizens of the developed world is so tenuous, we 
cannot reasonably expect or demand too much. But given the evidence of the causal link 
between global poverty and the actions and inactions of institutions like the WTO and 




workings of these institutions does not disqualify the framework. These institutions are 
able to make these changes, and they ought to. 
Furthermore, Alan Patten argues that even though Pogge attempts to start from 
libertarian principles, his ideas rest on a principle that most libertarians would reject, 
“namely that a society must protect its most vulnerable members” (Patten 2005, p. 27). 
Patten considers Pogge’s example of domestic violence. He agrees with Pogge that if a 
society has a high rate of domestic violence, and the governing institutional order could 
reasonably be doing more to lower that level, then we can fairly judge the institutional 
order as unjust. He argues that this is an injustice because this kind of society is not 
protecting those who are most vulnerable. However, although he agrees with Pogge’s 
conclusion about the injustice of the institution, he does not see how the negative rights 
principles Pogge supposedly employs allows him to arrive at the agreed-upon conclusion, 
as protection of the vulnerable seems to stem from a positive right on the part of the 
vulnerable to be protected (Patten 2005, p. 27). 
 Pogge rejects this interpretation of his theory. Instead, his theory involves not a 
right of the vulnerable to be protected, but a right to not have unjust schemes imposed 
upon them. Thus, in relation to the example of domestic violence, Pogge reiterates what 
democratic governments and citizens do: enforce rules created democratically, and 
punish those who do not follow the rules. This imposition would be unjust if the rules 
being enforced and the punishments being delivered were not designed to avoid human 
rights deficits when possible. Therefore, the theory does not necessitate protecting the 




In “Do We Have a Negative Duty Towards the Global Poor? Thomas Pogge on 
Global Justice,” Roland Pierik argues that the responsibility of global institutions and 
citizens of developed nations to alleviate global poverty does not necessarily follow from 
negative duties. His argument is similar to Mieth’s, in that he picks up on Pogge’s claim 
that positive duties may arise from negative rights. This happens particularly in cases in 
which a negative right has been violated, and in order to make up for that harm, a positive 
obligation arises. As Pogge puts it: 
“To be sure, promoting institutional reform is doing something (positive). 
But the duty requiring one to do so may nonetheless be negative for those 
who would otherwise, through their involvement in upholding the relevant 
institutional order, be harming its victims. This is analogous to how the 
libertarians’ favorite negative duty may entail positive obligations: one 
must do what one has promised or contracted to do pursuant to one’s 
negative duty not to promise/contract without performing. In both cases, 
the negative duty gives rise to positive obligations only through prior 
voluntary conduct: one’s promise, or one’s involvement in upholding a 
coercive institutional order” (Pogge 2008, p. 178). 
 
This duty of institutional reform to “prevent and mitigate the harm [the global economic 
order] continually causes” (Pogge 2008, p. 22), commits Pogge to far more than he had 
originally intended. While Pierik admits that the attempt to stick to negative rights is a 
“smart strategy” (Pierik 2013, p. 601), he argues that in the context of tort law, Pogge 
overreaches. 
 Before going into the issue of tort law, Pierik shows that in taking on the negative 
rights framework, Pogge also takes on a commitment to corrective rather than distributive 
justice. While distributive justice is concerned with fair distribution of benefits and 




private law, and its intuitive strength is derived from the analogy to tort law” (Pierik 
2013, p. 602). This form of justice, Pierik argues, has three primary features. 1) It is 
backward-looking, meaning that it looks at events that have already occurred and 
searches for a strong causal connection between the action and its harmful effects. 2) It 
seeks to find an agent responsible for the harm, and absolve all others of responsibility 
for the same harm. 3) It determines how the responsible party can rectify the harm with 
proper compensation. Pierik argues that the strength of this vision of justice lies in the 
fact that it “conveniently arranges cause and effect, action, responsibility and 
rectification” (Pierik 2013, p. 602).  
 As discussed in Chapter 2, numerous issues arise when attempting to show a 
causal connection between an action and a consequence. Pierik argues that in tort law, the 
least controversial basis for claiming compensation is intentional harm. Negligence and 
strict liability are more controversial because causal responsibility and moral 
responsibility are not intrinsically linked. Remedial responsibility, i.e. responsibility to 
somehow remedy a situation, only automatically arises from intentional harm. Pogge 
does not argue that the global economic order intentionally harms the global poor, and 
therefore simply showing the causal connection between the global poor and the global 
economic order does not suffice to prove moral responsibility (Pierik 2013, p. 603-4). 
Pogge’s argument would therefore have to rely on the idea that the link between the 
actions of the GEO and global poverty is a result of the negligence of the GEO. The 
connection between negligence and remedial responsibility is not absolutely clear cut, 




really does follow from the negligence of the GEO. Pierik’s criticism is a strong one, and 
Pogge does not provide a sufficient answer to it.17  
Relatedly, in “Confining Pogge’s Analysis of Global Poverty to Genuinely 
Negative Duties,” Steven Daskal very carefully combs through Pogge’s analysis of 
negative rights, and both the positive and negative obligations that follow from them. As 
we saw above, Pogge argues that positive obligations can follow from negative rights 
violations, and thus individual citizens are obligated to actively protest against or change 
any institutional order that violates the negative rights of others. Daskal, however, 
problematizes Pogge’s easy movement from negative rights to positive obligations. 
Daskal considers, for example, the following statements: “(5) Don’t participate in 
institutions that generate global poverty” and “(6) Don’t participate in institutions that fail 
to prevent global poverty” (Daskal 2013, p. 9). He argues that it is important for Pogge 
that individual citizens of developed nations violate both (5) and (6). However, he agrees 
with Mieth (2008), that “negative duties in any familiar version imply that they can be 
fulfilled by simple forbearance” (Mieth 2008, p. 34). He concludes that the positive 
obligations that stem from Pogge’s analysis simply do not follow from most conceptions 
of negative rights and duties. 
Finally, in looking forward to the rest of the argument, I ask the reader here to 
think back to Chapter 1, where Rawlsian Resourcism was discussed. Pogge endorses this 
view, and his notion of human rights is reflective of this endorsement. Human rights 
relate to basic social and economic needs for Pogge, which effectively translate to Rawls’ 
                                                        




idea of primary goods. This emphasis on resource deprivation as the content of rights 
violations leads Pogge to face most of the criticisms that face Rawlsian Resourcism 
(some of which I described in Chapter 1). I will not rehash them here except to reiterate 
that a fair distribution of primary goods does not necessarily lead to justice. Instead, as I 
argued, we should be focusing on what people can do with these resources, because the 
harms of poverty are most helpfully described through the lens of capabilities. We should 
describe rights violations in terms of what fundamental activities people are capable or 
incapable of doing, rather than what resources they do or do not have. This is not to say 
that the resources are not important, but rather they are not the subject of fundamental 
negative rights. Resources often help people create structures that promote capabilities, 
but I contend that it is the capabilities themselves that are the subject of fundamental 
rights within a negative rights framework.  
 
In Sections 4-8, I argue that a minimal version of the Capability Approach to 
poverty can achieve Pogge’s aims without being subject to these criticisms. Framing 
wrongdoing and rights violations in terms of the deprivations of a basic capability set, 
rather than in terms of violations of the institutional duties Pogge proposes, encapsulates 
the vision of the negative rights approach more faithfully, creating an ethical system that 
is in service of freedom and is determined democratically, in accordance with the 






Section 4: The Capability Approach: A Brief Reintroduction 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I detailed the nuances of the CA, and explained it in the context of 
other theories that take on poverty and well-being metrics. In this section, I will briefly 
reintroduce some of the aspects of the theory most important to the project at hand. The 
fundamental insight of the CA in relation to poverty is that when we conceive of poverty 
in a unidimensional way, we miss out on the heart of how poverty harms those it affects. 
Thus, instead of determining the well-being of the citizens of a country or community 
simply by referring to GNP or GDP, Sen argues that we must focus on “the centrality of 
human lives” and “the well-being and freedoms that human lives can bring” (Sen 2009, p. 
225).   
Moving away from measuring poverty in terms of income, the CA suggests that 
we think of poverty as a deprivation of human capabilities instead. Humans are 
fundamentally creatures of action, and one of the main issues with poverty is that it limits 
our abilities to act in many ways. Therefore, measuring poverty by measuring capability 
deprivations is a way of developing a multidimensional approach to poverty. In relation 
to the CA, Sen distinguishes between functionings, capabilities, and capability sets (Sen 
1985a and 1993).  
 ‘Functionings’ are the things people actually do, i.e. their actions. 
 ‘Capabilities’ are the real abilities of people to actually accomplish functionings. 
‘Capability Sets’ are the groupings of capabilities that an individual has available 




Being educated, therefore, is a functioning, while having access to education is a 
capability, and having access to education can be one of the capabilities in my capability 
set. These can come apart when someone has access to something but does not use it; if I 
am able to go to school but choose not to do it, going to school is in my capability set, but 
it is not a functioning. For Sen, the CA emphasizes capabilities rather than functionings; 
this shows that his emphasis is on the real options individuals have, while still allowing 
for individuals to choose which of these options they take advantage of. The CA 
therefore avoids the charges of paternalism that plague some liberal theories like 
Resourcism, focusing instead on what kind of choices need to be available to an 
individual in order for her to live a free life. 
In relation to measuring poverty in this way, the hard problem for the CA is 
determining which capabilities are sufficiently essential to functioning freely, so that 
when we are deprived of them, we know that an injustice has occurred. As I will discuss 
in the next section, there are numerous ways of answering this question, but for now it is 
sufficient to note that there is a lot of controversy about the answer to this question, and I 
will attempt to answer it by determining the kinds of capabilities that can be fulfilled 
within the framework of negative rights, i.e. capabilities that can be significantly 







Section 5: The Case for Positive Rights as Essential for the Capability Approach  
 
 
Given the understanding of the distinction between positive and negative rights 
above, it should perhaps be unsurprising that many see the Capability Approach to 
poverty as firmly grounded in the tradition of positive rights. If we conceive of positive 
rights as those that require the performance of certain actions, and that involve being able 
to achieve one’s goals, the CA, prima facie, seems to rest on these kinds of rights. 
 The case for this is made explicitly by Nussbaum in “Capabilities as Fundamental 
Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice”. She characterizes the US Constitution as 
fundamentally based on principles of negative liberty, where rights are seen as 
“prohibitions against interfering state action and if the state keep its hands off, those 
rights are taken to have been secured.”  Exploring the language of the US Constitution, 
she shows that although we often think that what we have is a positive freedom of 
speech, what the Constitution actually guarantees is that “Congress shall make no 
law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” This and many of the rights we 
think of as fundamental in the US are framed negatively. On the other hand, Nussbaum 
considers the Indian Constitution, which she argues has many rights framed in positive 
terms. For example, “All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and 
expression.” Additionally, the Indian Constitution also explicitly approves of affirmative 
action schemes for those from disadvantaged groups (Nussbaum 2003, p. 38). 
 Given these characterizations, Nussbaum argues that the CA “sides with the 




(Nussbaum 2003, p. 39). In service of this vision, she proposes a list of ten “central 
human capabilities” that should be part of any “fundamental constitutional guarantees,” 
and argues that a society that does not ensure all of them is unjust (Nussbaum 2003, p. 
40). Sen, on the other hand, has refused to endorse such a list, due to his commitment to 
the idea that the process of democracy should lead each community to create its own list 
of central capabilities, based on their values and circumstances. Without this list, 
Nussbaum places Sen with those who see freedom as a good in itself, rather than a means 
to some greater end (like equality or flourishing), which is often those who believe solely 
in negative rights. That being said, she argues that Sen’s view already implicitly endorses 
some kind of list of central capabilities, due to his repeated insistence on the importance 
of capabilities that relate to health and education (Nussbaum 2003, p. 43). Other scholars 
have similarly argued that Sen and the CA are committed to a notion of positive 
freedom.18 
 The argument, therefore, is that because the CA cares not about freedom 
simpliciter, but specifically freedom to achieve certain valuable ends, it requires a 
government not merely to refrain from interference, but to actively ensure that these 
capabilities are met, in order to be considered just. Nussbaum even argues that the 
advantages of the CA over a negative-rights-based approach is partly this positive 
element that ensures the safety and empowerment of vulnerable members of society 
(Nussbaum 2003, p. 39). 
 
                                                        




Section 6: The Case for a Capability Approach Based on Negative Rights 
 
It is important to reiterate first that the argument I present is not meant to be one 
that is faithful to either Sen’s or Nussbaum’s account of the CA. In order to conceptualize 
a minimal formulation of the CA, I use some of both thinkers’ foundational views of the 
goals of the CA, and argue that it is not contrary to the central tenets of the CA to satisfy 
certain capabilities in purely negative ways.  
  Capability deprivation can happen in a number of ways. Returning to an example 
used earlier, I may have money but choose to fast due to my religious beliefs. In such a 
case, it does not appear that any of my negative rights have been violated, as I am free to 
get food and consequently not fast if I so choose; there is no person or thing in my way. 
In another case, my goal may be to live a healthy life, but the nuclear waste from the 
factory nearby pollutes the local water supply, which significantly negatively impacts my 
health. Here, there is an obstacle put in my way by an outside force, and since I am being 
interfered with in regards to that goal, one might hastily conclude that my negative rights 
are being violated due to the deprivation of the capability of health. The conclusion 
would be hasty because, as I argued in Chapter 2, not all harms are wrongs. We must 
learn more about the situation (including whether the pollution is reasonably avoidable) 
in order to determine whether this capability deprivation is really a rights violation, and 
therefore a wrong.   
 As we saw in Chapter 2, not just any interference with my life constitutes a 




success may have interfered with my goals, but neither she nor the hiring committee has 
violated any of my rights (assuming a fair hiring process). Therefore we take into account 
whether an unjust harm or interference has taken place in determining whether a negative 
rights violation has occurred. Inherent in this notion is the idea of a causal relationship 
between the harmed and the harmer, as well as a notion of agency. If a tornado destroys 
my house, it may be much harder for me to achieve my goals, but there has been no 
injustice done, because the tornado had no agency. In order for a right to have been 
violated, the violator must have been able to do otherwise, which was not an option for 
the tornado. But if I am physically stopped from entering a public building due to the 
color of my skin, then I have been unjustly harmed, or wronged. 
I would quickly like to address an aspect of the CA that is not related to negative 
rights, but is interesting to note within its context. In the Introduction to this project, I 
emphasized that my desire is to work within the negative rights framework, and while 
many have equated this framework with libertarianism, it is not wholly appropriate to do 
so. One of the main reasons for this is that many contemporary libertarians do not hold a 
strict negative-rights-only view, but rather put more weight on the belief that private 
enterprises are more efficient and autonomy-producing than public enterprises. My 
argument does not touch on this aspect of libertarianism. However, in 
“Capabilitarianism,” Ingrid Robeyns makes the following claim: 
“Clearly, most political philosophers believe that in order to provide 
public goods and to solve collective action problems that are needed to 
reach certain levels of capabilities, we need a strong government. But not 
everyone agrees; […] [some argue] that giving the government the power 




consequences, which are much more important than the positive 
contributions the government could make. Thus, while at the descriptive 
level it is true that most capabilitarian scholars envision a considerable 
task for the government and public policy, conceptually, there is no reason 
to believe that this needs to be the case” (Robeyns 2016a, p. 403). 
 
While not essential to this project, it is important to note that even among those who 
argue that the CA often implies substantial positive duties, these duties need not be 
provided by the government. This adds further evidence to the claim that the CA is a 
flexible framework, compatible with a variety of methods of attaining capabilities and 
freedom. 
 Returning to the project at hand, one of the most important connections between 
the CA and the negative rights approach is the centrality of freedom in both frameworks. 
The negative rights approach developed in response to individual injustices in the state of 
nature, and worries about governmental overreach once outside of it. The CA developed 
partially as a way to incorporate a democratic ideal of freedom of choice into notions of 
poverty that tend to be too prescriptive. 
 The centrality of freedom in the CA is, however, a fundamental point of 
disagreement between Sen and Nussbaum. Nussbaum criticizes Sen for arguing that 
“capabilities are to be seen as instances of this more general good of human freedom” 
(Nussbaum 2003, 44), arguing that the focus on freedom, while not incompatible with her 
vision of the CA, makes it much harder to claim that some capabilities are more 
fundamental than others. As discussed above and in Chapter 1, however, one of the 
benefits of Sen’s focus on freedom as the core of the CA is that depending on what one 




rights.19 With freedom as the end goal, and capabilities as instances of that freedom, a 
minimal version of the CA has the potential to be grounded in negative rights. What I 
propose, therefore, is that in order to picture a minimal form of justice, we can accept 
parts of both Nussbaum and Sen’s approaches to the CA. We can do so by understanding 
freedom as not being unjustly interfered with, but also allowing for the fact that there 
may be certain things that must be present in most people’s capability sets in order for 
them to be negatively free. For example, it may be essential that a community has the 
capability of providing itself with basic nutrition and education.  
 In order to think through what this would look like, we must take a step back and 
once again think of what the negative rights approach entails. The core of this approach, 
like the CA, is self-determination, i.e. that we must be free to live the lives that we desire 
or value. However, since we are constantly interacting with each other, we are constantly 
interfering in each other’s lives, and we must be able to distinguish between rights 
violations and acceptable competition, as was discussed in Chapter 2. For negative rights 
theorists, the goal is to be as free as we can, without obligating others to help us.  
 
Section 7: The Contents of a Basic Capability Set 
 
One of the primary aims of this project is to demonstrate that we can ground an 
obligation to alleviate global poverty on negative rights, and that the CA gives us a 
helpful framework through which to determine what kinds of interferences in the lives of 
                                                        




the global poor actually constitute unjust interferences or wrongs. The CA is particularly 
helpful for this because the version of the theory I have proposed (which aligns closely 
with Sen’s version) focuses on the freedoms that having certain capabilities affords us. 
As seen in Section 3, many who criticize Pogge argue that a number of the duties he 
proposes are fundamentally positive in nature, and therefore many of the obligations he 
proposes go beyond the scope of negative rights.  
 I see a form of the CA as being able to overcome this criticism, while still calling 
for substantial change. Given that the common thread between the CA and the negative 
rights approach is the focus on freedom, we can perhaps identify some capabilities that 
are so fundamental, that if someone does not have those capabilities in her capability set, 
then she is unfree in the most basic sense to perform activities she has reason to value, 
and therefore that her negative rights have been violated. Thus, the following question 
arises: which capabilities are so essential for freedom that they must not be interfered 
with, and why? In this section I do not try to formulate a list, as I agree with Sen that one 
of the benefits of the CA is that it can allow for communities to determine for themselves 
the kinds of activities required for their freedom. Instead, I consider specific example of 
the kinds of activities or opportunities that could be said to be fundamental in a very 
minimal way. To fully comply with the demands of negative rights, these activities must 
be judged against a metric of freedom.  
The CA has been taken up by scholars in a large number of disciplines, including 
economics, sociology, public health, and philosophy. The methodologies and aims in all 




empirical methods for measurement, while philosophers tend to use capabilities for 
normative theorizing, and therefore approach them as a theoretical framework through 
which we determine the morality of our communities (Robeyns 2005, p. 193). This 
recognition is important for our current discussion, as a philosophical study of the CA 
looks at capability-realization as the foundation of a just society, while an economic 
study of capabilities could be aiming to understand certain behavioral trends (Robeyns 
2005, p. 194). The goals of these studies are therefore significantly different, and so 
vastly different capability sets could arise from these vastly different goals. 
How do we determine which actions or capabilities are so fundamental that if we 
cannot fulfill them, then our rights are being violated? Nussbaum’s list of ten 
fundamental human capabilities is a helpful place to start. The list is both popular and 
relatively straightforward, and Nussbaum defines it as “the innate equipment of 
individuals that is necessary for developing the more advanced capabilities” (Nussbaum 
2000, p. 84). The following capabilities, she argues, must be supported by all just 
democracies: 
1) Life. This means that a person must have the capability to live for a normal length 
of time (as determined by current life expectancy), and that a person’s life must 
not be harmed until the life is no longer “worth living.” 
2) Bodily Health. This capability involves basic bodily functionings, and also 




3) Bodily Integrity. This comprises of the ability to move between places freely, to 
be safe from violent assault, sexual assault, and domestic abuse, and also to have 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in regards to matters of 
reproduction. 
4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought. This involves the ability to use one’s senses in 
such a way that one can imagine, think, and reason in a “truly human way,” and 
that these abilities are informed by an adequate education. This capability also 
involves freedom of religion and expression, along with the ability to seek 
pleasure and meaning, and avoid unnecessary pain.  
5) Emotions. This capability involves being able to have attachments to others, 
including love, loss, and anger. 
6) Practical Reason. This involves being able to determine one’s own conception of 
the good, and reflect upon it. 
7) Affiliation. This capability has two aspects:  
A) Being: The ability to live with, care about, and empathize with others with 
justice and friendship. Institutions can often help develop this capability. 
B) Having. The ability to have self-respect and being treated with dignity. This 
involves not being discriminated against based on things like race, sex, 




8) Other Species. This involves the ability to have concern and care for non-human 
animals, plants, and the environment at large. 
9) Play. This involves the ability to laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities. 
10) Control over one’s Environment. 
A) Political: The ability to participate in public life, which involves freedom of 
speech and association. 
B) Material. The real opportunity to own property, be considered equally for 
employment, and freedom from “unwarranted search and seizure”.  
(Nussbaum 2003, pp. 41-42) 
There are numerous criticisms of this list, including that it is paternalistic, anti-
democratic, and based on western values (for example, Okin 2003, Stewart 2001, Alkire 
2005a). Paul Streeten, for example has asked, “Who is to determine the basic needs? Is it 
the people themselves, who may prefer circuses to bread, television to education, or soft 
drinks, beer and cigarettes to clean water and carrots? Would it not be very arrogant to 
lay down what people should regard as basic?” (Streeton 1984, p. 973). Additionally, for 
the purpose of this project, two issues are particularly pertinent. First, Nussbaum argues 
that the contents of her list are good because they promote human dignity. The current 
project is interested in proposing an outline of a capability set that is good insofar as it 
helps realize freedom. The motivation for Nussbaum’s list, therefore, is not in line with 




the capabilities that were good at promoting freedom, we would not have a hard time 
adopting the list. However, the more important issue with Nussbaum’s list is that many of 
its contents rely on a robust notion of positive rights in order for it to be well-grounded. 
The capability on her list that perplexes most people is that of “Play,” which involves the 
ability to laugh and enjoy recreational activities. One wonders, in this context, what is 
required to fulfill this capability. Having a capability to do something does not mean that 
an individual must do it, but rather that they must be free to choose to do it. In order to 
guarantee that one is capable of play, perhaps it is necessary to ensure that they have free 
time and recreational activities, both of which would require providing something, and 
would therefore require positive obligations. 
The reader is reminded here of the difference between capabilities and 
functionings. As we recall, functionings are the achievements of people, things we 
manage to actually do, or states we are actually in. Capabilities, on the other hand, are our 
abilities to accomplish functionings. When I discuss basic capability sets, particularly in 
regards to negative rights, I am primarily referring to capabilities rather than 
functionings. The negative obligations that stem from the CA are therefore merely 
obligations to not make the attainment of a basic capability set impossible. We are not 
obligated to ensure that everyone has access to a basic capability set, nor are we obligated 
to ensure that everyone achieves basics functionings. Here it would be helpful to return 
once again to the previous example of two people, one who starves due to poverty and 
another who chooses to fast due to religious convictions. The two people have identical 




person fasting for religious reasons eat (i.e. change his functionings), but instead aim to 
allow the person starving due to poverty to attain the capability of being able to feed 
himself, should he choose to do so.  
If the goal of this section was to determine the list of capabilities that are 
necessary to live a free life, this section would be nearly impossible to complete. Instead, 
it sets a far more modest goal: what are the kinds of things that tend to restrict 
fundamental freedoms? In choosing this goal, I follow Sen’s desire to democratize 
capabilities. In “Poor, Relatively Speaking,” Sen gives examples of a few “basic 
capabilities” without resorting to making a list of capabilities that must all be fulfilled in 
the same way in every country. He gives six examples of capabilities that are “not 
tremendously variable between one community and another” (Sen 1983a, p. 163). The 
examples are the capabilities “to meet nutritional requirements, to escape avoidable 
disease, to be sheltered, to be clothed, to be able to travel, and to be educated” (Sen 
1983a, p. 162-3). Note, of course, that by the capability to travel, Sen does not mean that 
everyone needs to be given week-long vacations on tropical islands, but rather simply the 
freedom of movement. Sen gives these examples almost off-handedly, and does not give 
any details as to why these are ‘basic’ capabilities, and does not really bring them up 
again in detail. We therefore have only this outline to go by when determining Sen’s 
commitments. What we do know, however, is that these examples are not meant to be 
entirely universalized; they are simply the kinds of things that most people in most 




Other scholars who discuss capability sets, like Sabina Alkire (2002) and David 
Wiggins (1998) tend to discuss basic capabilities in terms of our most basic needs. 
Wiggins, for example, has defined “absolute needs” by the following test. I absolutely 
need X if and only if I need X to avoid being harmed, and if and only if I have avoided 
being harmed means that I have X (Wiggins 1998, p. 14).  An advantage of this idea in 
relation to the current project is the emphasis on the notion of harm, which is central to 
the negative rights framework. However, the harm that Wiggins refers to is expansive, 
and involves a lack of numerous “basic needs”; harm has been done insofar as basic 
needs (which Wiggins believes can be relative) are not met. Harm for the negative rights 
approach, however, relates to an unjustified lack of freedom, and therefore Wiggins’ 
approach also does not give us what we need. 
In search of clear examples of how our freedom can be violated, I look at four 
spheres of life: 1) education, 2) shelter, 3) nutrition, and 4) politics. The first three are 
present in Sen’s examples, while the last is conspicuously absent. In what way do these 
four spheres contribute to freedom, and can they be realized within the negative rights 
framework? It is also important to note that I am not asking about the best life, and the 
capabilities that must be guaranteed in order to achieve it. I am asking about a life that 
can be considered to be free, regardless of what individuals choose to do with that 
freedom. The project has always been a minimal one, and this section follows that 
guideline. 
 Education poses a particularly hard problem for the negative rights approach. 




children seem to be natural artists, mathematicians, or poets. However, it is clear that 
natural talent is not sufficient to create a great artist, because the skill must be developed 
through training and practice. This is true for most skills. Additionally, one may not have 
a natural talent for something, but through practice and training may be able to develop 
great skills. Harkening back to one of the most basic ways in which we can differentiate 
negative and positive rights, we remember that positive rights typically require some kind 
of action in order for them to be fulfilled, whereas negative rights typically involve 
refraining from an action in order to stop unjust interference in the lives of others. If 
education is a right, therefore, it seems clearly to be a positive right, as it minimally 
requires teachers to teach, textbooks to read, and buildings within which to teach.  
 On the other hand, without a basic education we are significantly unfree; there 
may not be a person preventing us entrance into a building, but we are certainly often 
prevented from doing the things we have reason to value. As of 2014, one in four young 
people living in the developing world were unable to read a written sentence. Women and 
girls who do not receive an education are far more likely to be forced into marriage at a 
young age, “suffer domestic violence, live in poverty, and lack a say over household 
spending or their own health care than better-educated peers, which harms them, their 
children, and communities” (The World Bank 2014). It also “prevent[s] many of the 
world’s women from achieving their potential,” according to World Bank Group 
President Jim Yong Kim (The World Bank 2014). On a physiological level, a lack of 
education of mothers can also affect the children because of how education can shape our 




access to antenatal care were 39% less likely to have stunted growth, all things being 
equal. In Vietnam, children whose mothers had a lower-secondary education were 67% 
less likely to have stunted growth (The World Bank 2014). Mothers with adequate 
education gain some amount of independence and develop their abilities to make 
decisions that are best for themselves and their children, allowing both parties to live 
freely.  
Education not only affects our opportunities, but also our sense of self. In 
“Framing Social Justice in Education: What Does the 'Capabilities' Approach Offer?”, 
Melanie Walker considers the example of apartheid South Africa. Under the Bantu 
Education Act (aka Black Education Act), education was segregated on racial lines. 
Black children under this system were taught to view themselves as unskilled, and taught 
to believe that only a few lucky students would end up going into professions like 
teaching and nursing. “Their choices and aspirations were deformed in and through the 
tiny and big details of their everyday lives in school” (Walker 2003, p. 169). This 
particular example is one in which local political situation affected the education of its 
citizens, but as was made clear in Chapter 2, local political realities are often affected by 
the actions of the GEO, and oppressive regimes are often allowed to thrive due to the 
actions or inactions of the GEO. In this case of South Africa, the IMF gave the 
government billions of dollars in loans, propping up the government that enacted and 
instituted this segregated educational system that led to huge swathes of the country’s 
children believing that their lives should be restricted by the ‘fact’ that they were always 




We are therefore stuck in a situation wherein the importance of an education for a 
free, self-determined life is clear, but we are not in the position to claim that anyone else 
has an obligation to provide us with this education. We are, however, in a position to 
determine whether individuals or communities are prevented from setting up sufficient 
educational structures for themselves. Societies upon which systemic extreme poverty 
has been imposed are unable to create structures within which citizens can receive a 
quality education. The income that citizens of these communities receive is often barely 
enough for mere survival, and therefore real freedom is out of the question, as there is not 
enough to create an educational system.  
In response, one might look at the fact that today, of the 54 countries in Africa, 42 
guarantee a free education at the primary level to each citizen. However, because these 
communities are not actually able to afford this free education, in at least 17 of these 
countries families are still required to pay fees (even though this is technically illegal), 
and in those countries where families do not have to pay fees, essentials like school 
uniforms and textbooks are not covered, and out of the reach of most. In countries like 
Rwanda and Zambia, households have to pay more than 50% of this “free” education. 
Contrast this with developed nations like Austria and Finland, where households pay less 
than 10% of educational costs. The reality is that educational costs involve far more than 
school fees, and therefore these communities simply cannot afford to educate themselves 
(Global Education Monitoring Report 2016). As we saw in Chapter 2, the trade policies 
of global financial institutions, which are heavily influenced by governments of rich 




provide access to education. The lack of access to quality education does not require 
global institutions to come into these societies and provide educational infrastructure or 
opportunities, but instead requires them to cease the policies that create an inability for 
societies to provide quality education for themselves. One of the misunderstandings 
common in the discussion of the necessity of education is the idea that most people could 
choose to get an education, but that they choose to do something else instead, out of 
laziness or greed. Being in extreme poverty makes it impossible for people to access 
education, which in turn makes it impossible for them to be free to be anything but 
extremely poor.  
 The argument for a right to shelter, or having a place to be, is even stronger from 
the negative rights perspective. In “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom”, Jeremy 
Waldron argues that we are embodied beings so we take up space, and therefore we must 
have a place we are free to be, otherwise we cannot freely exist. He defines what it means 
not to be free to be somewhere: “An individual who is in a place where he is not allowed 
to be may be removed, and he may be subject to civil or criminal sanctions for trespass or 
some other similar offense” (Waldron 1991, p. 297). Part of the plight of the homeless, he 
argues, is that they are only free to be in public spaces. If the libertarian dream of all 
spaces being privatized is made into a reality, then the homeless literally have no place 
that they would be free to be, and therefore in a sense would not be free to even exist. 
Waldron works with a negative conception of freedom, arguing that private property laws 
are inherently designed to be obstacles in the path of others, so that we can be secure in 




they are inherently wrong, he shows that if they result in a negative rights violation for 
some (i.e. the homeless), then a person or society that values freedom “should put himself 
on alert when questions of property are being discussed” (Waldron 1991, p. 307).  
 One of the most striking things about Waldron’s essay is how clear he makes the 
problem of negative rights: my right to a particular X often inherently prevents others 
from obtaining X, and is therefore an interference in their lives. The case of homelessness 
clearly shows that we are always making tradeoffs between freedoms, but to assume that 
the freedom of one group (property owners) is more important than the freedom of 
another (the homeless) is to bring moral theories outside that of negative rights to bear on 
the question. Additionally, when we choose to uphold one freedom (in this case, the 
freedom to disallow others from entering your private property), we cannot ignore the 
corresponding rights that will be automatically limited or violated. Returning to the CA, 
thinking of those capabilities that can be fulfilled negatively (i.e. through the prevention 
of certain policies that cause unjust interference) in relation to a capability set, could help 
determine which tradeoffs can and cannot be fairly made. If we think about a certain 
community’s capability set, the negative rights framework allows us to narrow in on 
those capabilities that are essential for living a free life, like having a space where you are 
free to be. Therefore, to fulfill the negative right to be somewhere does not require the 
eradication of private property, or to deny that private property is a right, but rather to 
ensure that a community is capable of creating for itself structures of public property that 




 In addition to merely being somewhere, it is also crucial that people have a place 
to perform bodily functions. Just like having a space to physically be is crucial to human 
existence, having access to bathrooms and safe spaces to sleep is inextricably linked to 
the embodied condition of humanity. While it is not the role of the GEO to provide this 
for everyone, its policies often directly contribute to making these spaces impossible to 
achieve for many. In Chapter 2, I presented the example of the rice market in Ghana, and 
the destructive impact of the IMF and World Bank loans upon it. Consider the following 
excerpt from an article about the state of Ghanaian women who are unemployed due to 
the devastated rice markets: 
“In the middle of a windy roundabout [in Accra], a stone's throw from the 
market, a group of women and children have made the hard concrete their 
home. Fusheina Alhassan says the women try to sleep in the nearby 
railway station. 
"But if it rains we cannot sleep. Often the men come and steal our clothes 
and money while we sleep. Sometimes they rape us," she says” (Moore 
2005). 
 
While the quote and the article may be from 2005, Ghana’s rice market is still not even 
close to where it was before the loans. Prior to the loans, Ghana used to produce enough 
rice to feed its entire population, yet in 2016, it imported $300 million of rice to fill its 
need (Ghana Business News 2017). Considering the quote above in relation to the 
evidence from Chapter 2, it is clear that the effects of these loans have led to women not 
only being incapable of attaining secure work, but also being incapable of having a 




constantly subject to the fear of thievery and rape, undermining all sense of self-
preservation and self-determination.    
 Living freely also requires the ability to provide oneself with the necessary basic 
nutrition. In Chapter 1 we focused substantially on the effects of poverty on nutrition, and 
subsequently the effect of malnutrition on our bodies and minds, which in turn has an 
effect on poverty. This is one aspect of the “cycle of poverty”. Our lives are significantly 
impacted by malnutrition in such a way that our lives are significantly less free if we are 
subject to it.  
 The diseases that are borne from malnutrition often affect us for the rest of our 
lives. As discussed in Chapter 1, this includes night blindness and vision problems from a 
Vitamin A deficiency, neurological defects from Vitamin B1 and B6 deficiencies, and 
lowered IQ, mathematical and reasoning skills, and memory, caused by general 
malnutrition. Iodine deficiency, which is very common in children in developing 
countries, can severely impact cognitive abilities. Some of these effects can be reversed 
by a proper diet later in life, but some of them are permanent. Additionally, the strain of 
malnutrition can lead to “toxic stress – the strong, unrelieved activation of the body’s 
stress management system” (American Psychological Association 2016). In relation to 
education, hunger and malnutrition cause individuals to spend their cognitive bandwidth 
on thinking about food and where it is going to come from, rather than being able to 




 The struggle in determining our rights to adequate nutrition lies in the following 
query: is “normal” mental and physical growth a right? Why should I have to ensure that 
I do not interfere in the ability of another to secure adequate nutrition, leading to this 
normal growth? A theory of natural rights would help here, and as I suggest in the 
Introduction, there is good reason to believe that the negative rights traditions stems from 
the natural rights tradition. If we had natural rights, the argument could be made that we 
have a right to develop the natural capacities that we are born with. This would lead to 
the conclusion that enforced poverty, which leads to enforced malnutrition, which leads 
to an inability to develop our natural capacities, is a violation of our natural rights. 
However, grounding the negative rights tradition in the natural rights tradition creates as 
many issues as it solves, as we are then bound to think through how to determine what 
our natural rights are, and how we determine what obligations we have to secure the 
natural rights of others.  
 We must therefore think about the right to “normal” mental and physical growth 
from the perspective of freedom. Just as we saw that a lack of education leads to a lack of 
opportunities in life, we see that a lack of nutrition leads not only to a lack of career 
opportunities, but a lack of opportunity to perform our most basic function: self-care. 
Those with severe disabilities that arise from malnutrition can be dependent on others for 
the rest of their lives, not only for food and shelter, but even for performing bodily 
functions. Certainly some people are born with disabilities that lead them to live lives that 
are fundamentally unfree and dependent on others, no matter how good their nutrition is. 




the poverty imposed on the global poor leads to malnutrition, and the malnutrition leads 
to disease or disability, then it can be said that the freedom and rights of those who suffer 
these effects have been violated.  
  Good or adequate nutrition may not be a right in itself, at least not by the 
standards of negative rights. However, insofar as the GEO is imposing systemic poverty 
upon many parts of the world, it is creating an environment in which people are unable to 
gain the means through which proper nutrition is a possibility for them. Because adequate 
nutrition is so fundamental to our physical and mental capacities, this environment is 
preventing people from having the opportunity to act freely.   
Political freedom is the final, and potentially most contentious example of a basic 
capability. Because of our focus on capabilities rather than functionings, by “political 
freedom” we certainly cannot mean guaranteeing each individual their desired outcome 
in political matters. We cannot even mean guaranteeing that each individual’s point of 
view is heard, as that would impose an obligation on others to hear them. Instead, 
political freedom must involve the real opportunity to express one’s political viewpoints 
without fear of governmental retaliation. The questions at hand are whether the global 
economic systems hinder our ability to have this political freedom, and whether our 
ability to live a free life is hindered by this lack of political freedom. 
 One of the reasons this is the most contentious example is that it is the hardest 
realm in which to prove that wrongdoing has occurred, i.e. that the policies of the GEO 




establish the GEO’s impact, there is first a basic economic point to make. Many local 
political policies are made based on economic factors. The size of an army a country can 
have depends in part on how large an army it can afford. Similarly, how much a 
community can spend on education and welfare partly depends on how much money the 
community has. In this fundamental way, economics and politics cannot be separated, 
and due to the GEO’s economic influence, its impact on local politics is certainly strong.  
However, there are more insidious ways in which global policies affect local 
politics. As we also discussed in Chapter 2, the conditions that come along with loans 
from the IMF often involve much more than simple repayment of the loan. Thus, in many 
cases, international organizations are writing local policies, heavily infringing upon the 
sovereignty of countries and communities in the name of ‘economic development.’20 The 
GEO can wield influence over far more than the economic policies of a developing 
country, and therefore we see many cases in which local citizens and governments are not 
free to engage politically because the outcome has already been determined by the global 
institutions. Therefore, the GEO interferes with the ability of the global poor to have the 
capability of being politically sovereign in a number of ways. 
 The next question that arises is whether this influence constitutes an unjust 
interference in their lives, and therefore whether political freedom is a basic capability 
that must be guaranteed. In order to answer this question, we must look at whether a lack 
                                                        
20 Although I have responded to the claim that because countries accept the terms of the agreement, their 
sovereignty is not being infringed upon (in Chapter 2), it is important to reiterate here that there are things 
that we cannot and should not be able to sign away. We cannot contract ourselves into slavery, and 
similarly countries cannot freely contract themselves into giving up their autonomy, particularly in relation 




of basic political freedoms for individuals truly inhibits their freedom. The intangible 
nature of this deprivation makes answering this question particularly difficult. While 
malnutrition is very complicated, there are tests that can be performed, as well as obvious 
physical symptoms when it occurs, and its effects are therefore quantifiable in a certain 
way. While there are specific ways in which we can see the influence of the GEO’s 
policies on both economic and non-economic decisions of developing countries, the 
question of how that affects the freedom of the lives of individuals is difficult. Certainly 
if the policies are a forgone conclusion, then individuals do not have a voice in their 
government, but they may not have had that voice for other reasons. For example, a 
country under a dictatorship coercively prevents its citizens from having political 
freedom. Additionally, claiming that political freedom is only expressed in democracies 
goes beyond the scope of any of the frameworks I am working within. Often countries 
that claim to be wholly democratic are not so in practice, whereas a country like the UK, 
which is technically a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy, is quite 
democratic. Thus, there are many reasons individuals may not have political freedom. 
However, this is true of all the basic capabilities listed above as well. The fact that the 
GEO, and especially the IMF and the World Bank, coercively infringe on national 
sovereignty and individual political freedom does not change based on the possibility that 
this freedom could also have been infringed on in other ways.  
 Therefore, to determine whether political freedom is a basic capability, we must 
return to how political power is derived. The role of government is, at minimum, to 




consent to their government and its workings, then the government’s power is 
illegitimate. The role the GEO often plays in the economic and non-economic decision-
making of developing countries is coercive, preventing citizens from consenting to the 
workings of their government. Consequently, when the GEO’s policies prevent a 
government from fulfilling its basic functions, or from fulfilling its contracts with its 
citizens, and it deprives the citizens of the capability of political freedom, or of being 
legitimately governed. The capability of self-government at least in relation to the 
fundamental duties of government, therefore, is a basic one. 
 
Section 8: Proposal Advantages 
 
 
As described in Chapter 1, the CA has significant advantages over rival theories, 
particularly in describing the problems of poverty. Thus far in this chapter, I have also 
argued that a minimal version of the CA has an advantage over Pogge’s approach in that 
it fits within the negative rights framework in ways that Pogge’s does not. Pogge’s vision 
is in the service of preventing human rights violations as they relate to basic needs, 
whereas the version of the CA I propose sees rights violations in terms of basic capability 
deprivations, which are important insofar as they obstruct freedom. While investigating 
the nature of negative rights in the Introduction to the project, I argued that these rights 
gain their force due to the fact that they create freedom. The aims of my proposed version 




One might ask, however, what the advantage is to the CA to be limited in such a 
way. First, as previously mentioned, this minimal vision does not claim that the CA 
cannot also be used with a more expansive vision of what freedom is, or in accordance 
with Nussbaum’s claim that some freedoms seem more important to preserve than others. 
Pairing the approach with negative rights therefore expands the usefulness of the theory, 
so that the primary insight of the CA in relation to poverty (i.e. that poverty should be 
seen as a deprivation of fundamental capabilities) is preserved and utilized from a 
number of different viewpoints.  
Moreover, one of the key criticisms against Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of the 
CA is that determining whether the capability sets of individuals are being guaranteed 
would be a task so enormous that it is impractical (for example Williams 1987 and 
Qizilbash 1996). By bringing in the institutional nature of Pogge’s critique, the CA is 
being given the ability to look not only at the ways in which individuals are affected by 
poverty, but also at how communities are affected. Determining whether a community is 
being deprived of the resources to ensure its members have a basic capability set does not 
take away from the question of whether individual members of the community have 
access to a basic capability set. However, it does give us a more straightforward way to 
determine whether capability deprivations are taking place, and whether they are being 






Section 9: Objections and Clarifications 
 
In Section 2, we faced Pierik’s arguments that Pogge’s use of corrective justice as 
a basis for his argument about remedial responsibility is wrongheaded or lacks evidence, 
because remedial responsibility requires intention on the part of the perpetrator, in order 
to justify substantial compensation. While this is a significant worry for Pogge, my view 
has the resources to respond to this. In Chapter 2, I argued that the GEO may not 
intentionally harm the global poor insofar as they desire that the poor are deprived of 
their negative rights. However, the harm is intentional if we think about the fact that these 
institutions have access to all the information laid out in Chapter 2, and either 
intentionally ignore the consequences of their policies, or they know the consequences 
and simply accept the rights violations that follow from them. In either scenario, the harm 
they cause is foreseeable and preventable, and because intent is almost impossible to 
establish with certainty in complex institutional situations like this, foreseeability and 
preventability should be the primary relevant factors. If, for example, my aim in 
performing the action of stealing your laptop is to have your laptop (not specifically that 
you are deprived of a laptop), the fact that you are foreseeably and preventably harmed in 
the process of my achieving that aim is essential even though it was not my goal to harm 
you. Additionally, because I am not proposing specific compensation, I am not arguing 
for the same form of remedial responsibility that Pogge does.  
A worry with my proposed version of the CA runs along the same lines as a 




fundamental capabilities "runs counter to an essential thrust of the capabilities approach 
which has been the attempt to redirect development theory away from a reductive focus 
on a minimally decent life towards a more holistic account of human well-being for all 
people” (Alkire 2005a). The minimal notion of justice I have proposed is certainly even 
more susceptible to this objection than Nussbaum’s is. However, the goal is not to define 
the CA in a new way, excluding other forms of the approach. Instead, while the fact that 
the CA provides a “holistic” way of determining human well-being is important, I 
suggest that the framework can serve the purpose of illuminating the consequences of the 
negative rights approach. The CA can show that if freedom is a priority, and that freedom 
is in service of self-determination, then there is a duty not to undermine the freedom and 
self-determination of others through (at the least) non-interference.   
 Another potential worry with this minimal version of the CA is its utilization of 
parts of Sen and Nussbaum’s visions, which when paired together could be seen as 
problematic or even incompatible. Nussbaum has criticized Sen for centering the CA on 
freedom, as it makes it harder to prioritize certain freedoms and say that “some freedoms 
are central for political purposes, and some are distinctly not” (Nussbaum 2003, p. 44). 
Sen, on the other hand, has not endorsed the idea of a list of fundamental capabilities 
because of its undemocratic nature. The version of the CA I proposed does both these 
things: centers the CA in freedom, while also creating a potential list of minimal 
capabilities that must not be undermined because, as Sen says, they are “not 
tremendously variable between one community and another” (Sen 1983a, p. 163). 




freedoms, would prevent it from being too circumstantial. For example, the freedom to 
physically be somewhere is one that is so basic to human existence that a democratic vote 
could not make it less essential. Therefore, even though the focus of the approach would 
be on freedom, it would satisfy Nussbaum’s notion that some freedoms are more 
fundamental for self-determination than others. 
 Next, we must reconsider the distinction between freedom and ability. The 
negative rights approach often prioritizes the legal and effective freedom to do things 
over the ability to do so, whereas the CA seems to emphasize the connection between 
freedom and ability. This fundamental tension makes it very hard to see how these views, 
despite their overlap in relation to freedom, could work together. My suggestion, 
however, is that a minimal version of the CA asks primarily that social and economic 
policies that deprive people of these basic capabilities, which they would naturally have, 
are stopped. For example, by stopping the economic and social policies that cause 
poverty, which in turn causes malnutrition, which in turn causes severely stunted 
cognitive capabilities, the GEO would not be giving a child adequate nutrition. Instead, it 
would be enforcing the child’s right not to have her cognitive capabilities unjustly 
interfered with. Given the enormous impact that malnutrition can have on the life of a 
poor child or adult, if the GEO is imposing the kind of poverty that makes it impossible 
for individuals and communities to provide adequate nutrition for themselves, the GEO is 
ensuring that the global poor cannot live free lives. Once again, ensuring a basic 
capability set does not guarantee that individuals will have adequate nutrition, but that 




 Regarding the four spheres of basic capabilities I argue for above, one might also 
wonder what the limitations are when determining whether or not something is a “basic” 
capability. After all, I give examples of the kinds of things that could be considered basic 
capabilities, but I do not give an overarching method for determining whether other 
capabilities should be considered “basic”. The reasons I give for considering education a 
basic capability may seem to be different from the reasons that having a place to be and 
perform basic human functions is a basic capability. The former is basic because it allows 
individuals to develop important skills, but most importantly because it affects our self-
determination and independence. The latter are basic because of a fundamental fact of 
human embodiment, and that without a place to be or perform our functions, we cannot 
exist. As I argued above, however, the common thread that binds these capabilities are 
that a lack of either one results in a life that lacks a fundamental freedom to be and do 
things we have reason to value. I have given reasons to believe that these spheres are 
fundamental because without them, our actions and lives are constrained at a 
foundational level. That being said, a more sophisticated method of determining which 
spheres are so fundamental that a life is significantly unfree without them is an important 
avenue for future research and argumentation. 
 Additionally, one of the central worries that arises from a theory like mine 
involves situations in which fundamental rights conflict. One of the reasons that it is so 
hard to prove proximate causation, particularly in the case of something as widespread, 
complicated, and at times anarchic as the GEO, is that we see both the costs and the 




and perhaps even agree with the conclusion of this chapter (that the harms of the GEO are 
wrongs), and still be unsure about whether halting or changing these policies will truly 
result in fewer rights violations, and consequently fewer wrongs. After all, while the 
SAPs that come along with IMF loans may infringe on political sovereignty, the reality 
for most developing nations is that the money is so essential for the basic survival of so 
many of their citizens, that the sovereignty infringement could be seen as worthwhile, or, 
as I have argued, inescapable. Not taking the loans could therefore deprive even more 
capabilities, and result in far more deaths. This, however, is precisely the point. The GEO 
we currently have in place allows for, and perhaps even creates these dichotomies, where 
a utilitarian calculus is our only option for determining a path of action, because both 
options are so terrible in their effects on many lives. When Pogge talks about an 
alternative global economic system being possible, he has in mind a system in which 
these tradeoffs of fundamental rights are not necessary. It may be impossible, and 
perhaps undesirable, to eliminate all harm that arises from international business and 
cooperation, but there is no reason to believe that we cannot form a system that makes the 
attainment of fundamental capabilities possible for all. According to the view of rights as 
side constraints to all actions, it is the GEO’s duty not to create and perpetuate systems in 
which we have no option but to choose between rights violations. 
 Consequently, the reader may wonder why I consistently frame my argument in 
terms of poverty alleviation, when the focus of my argument seems to boil down to the 
capability deprivations caused by the policies of the GEO, particularly because I am not 




reasons for this are twofold. First, in Chapter 1 I argued that defining poverty purely in 
terms of a lack of income or resources is mistaken, because poverty’s effects are best 
understood in terms of capability deprivations. Therefore, there is no disconnect between 
arguing for poverty alleviation and the prevention of capability deprivations. Second, I 
would never deny the fact that capabilities are often inextricably linked with resources 
and income. Resources are necessary for building schools, building public homeless 
shelters, making nutritious food available, and building polling stations for voting. 
However, I have argued that it is misguided to have these resources as the end-goal of 
poverty alleviation, because they are merely instrumental to building up capability sets. 
The basic capability of political freedom, for example, requires more than merely the 
resources to set up polling stations. Such measures would be useless without the halting 
of the policies of global institutions that infringe on the sovereignty of developing 






This project has three primary aims: 
1) Accept Pogge’s general approach of grounding an obligation to help alleviate global 
poverty on negative rights, but demonstrate the insufficiency of his definitions of harm 




2) Describe the Capability Approach to poverty, show its benefits, and argue that the 
GEO’s wrongdoing in relation to the global poor should be thought of in terms of 
deprivation of the basic capabilities that result from its policies, and  
3) Create a version of the CA that is more minimal than Sen or Nussbaum imagined, but 
apply it on a communal and institutional level, rather than purely an individual one. In 
doing so, show that this proposed version of the CA makes up for what Pogge’s theory 
lacks in a conception of wrongdoing acceptable to negative rights theorists, while still 
deriving an obligation that the GEO has to help alleviate global poverty.  
In this chapter I hope to have argued for 3, and added to the reasons for believing  
2 (which was originally taken up in Chapter 1). The primary issue that this project takes 
with Pogge’s work is that situating human rights in basic needs does not adequately take 
into account the limits and motivations of negative rights theories. The version of the CA 
I propose take wrongs to be deprivations of a basic capability set, where basic capabilities 
are seen as those minimally necessary for a free life, and therefore this vision does not 
take on all the problems that Pogge must take on by appealing to basic needs. The 
evidence presented in this chapter, combined with that in Chapter 2, leads us to the 
conclusion that capabilities like education, nutrition, space, and political freedom are 
necessary for a free life, and therefore depriving individuals or communities of these 
capabilities is a violation of their negative rights. The GEO does deprive individuals and 
communities of these basic capabilities, and therefore has an obligation, at the least, to 






In the Introduction to this project, I stated that the argument of the dissertation could be 
formalized in the following manner: 
(P1) The most helpful way to think about poverty is as a deprivation of capabilities, 
and extreme poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities. 
(P2) The deprivation of basic capabilities causes a hindrance to fundamental 
freedoms. 
(P3) When fundamental freedoms are hindered, negative rights are often violated.  
(P4) The policies of the GEO have a large causal role to play in the deprivation of the 
basic capabilities of the global poor. 
(C1) Therefore, the GEO violates the negative rights of the global poor 
(C2) Therefore, the GEO has a responsibility to help alleviate global poverty.  
I demonstrated Premise 1 in Chapter 1 by evaluating a number of typical 
approaches to thinking about and measuring poverty. I considered both absolute and 
relative poverty in terms of their goals and methodologies, and argued that conceiving of 
poverty as merely a lack of income ignores aspects of poverty that are not measurable 
through income. I also considered Rawlsian Resourcism, arguing that fair distribution of 
resources is insufficient to truly account for the diversity of ways in which humans utilize 




presented the Capability Approach to poverty, demonstrating that its description of 
poverty in terms of its effects on the capabilities of individuals to act in certain valuable 
ways gets to the heart of what poverty is, and that its emphasis on both inputs and outputs 
account for aspects of poverty that other approaches fail to account for. 
 Chapter 1 also laid the foundations for Premise 2. I demonstrated that according 
to Amartya Sen’s account of the CA, capabilities are valuable because they promote 
freedom. Sen does not provide a specific definition of freedom, allowing for the CA to be 
compatible with a variety of ethical and political theories that conceptualize freedom in 
different ways. In Chapter 3, I developed my defense of Premise 2, arguing that despite 
Martha Nussbaum’s conceptualization of capabilities as requiring positive rights and 
obligations, the core tenets of the CA support a basic capability set where the capabilities 
can be guaranteed negatively, i.e. by non-interference rather than by providing goods, 
resources, or income. I also discussed the effects of poverty on capabilities and freedoms 
in both Chapters 1 and 3, demonstrating the ways in which capabilities and freedoms are 
linked, and establishing the ways in which the global poor are prevented from living free 
lives. 
 Premise 3 is primarily established in the Introduction to the project, but in Chapter 
2, I defended an intuitive notion of harms and wrongs in line with the negative rights 
approach, in order to establish the ways in which we can evaluate whether fundamental 
freedoms have been hindered in a particular situations, and to determine whether moral 
responsibility follows from that hindrance. Additionally, in Chapter 3 I connected the 




extreme poverty on individuals around the world today. In doing so I showed that those 
in extreme poverty today are deprived of the fundamental negative freedoms that ought to 
be secured for all human beings. 
 Chapter 2 provided much of the empirical evidence for Premise 4. By exploring 
both the structure and some of the policies of two of the world’s most influential global 
institutions, the IMF and the WTO, I showed that these institutions create economic and 
political structures that serve their most powerful members while harming those without 
the ability to advocate for themselves or resist the plans put forward by these institutions. 
This occurs despite the fact that both of these institutions (as well as numerous others) 
explicitly claim that helping the global poor is one of their aims. In doing so they conjure 
up a mirage, making policies that reinforce the economic status quo, while outwardly 
claiming that they are helping poor communities develop. While the evidence I provided 
does not prove that all poverty is caused by the policies of the GEO, it does indicate that 
the social, political, and economic directives forced upon governments and communities 
of the developing world by these institutions strongly contribute to the situation that these 
countries, and the extremely poor within them, are currently facing. I then utilized this 
evidence in Chapter 3 to demonstrate that many of these harms are deprivations of 
fundamental capabilities, and are therefore wrongs. 
The supporting evidence I presented for this argument in Chapter 2 came from a 
variety of sources. The reader might have noticed, however, that many of the sources that 
detail the horrors of extreme poverty come from the World Bank, WTO, and IMF. Given 




poverty on their shoulders, this may strike the reader as very strange. The large amount of 
data put out by these institutions is actually very relevant to my argument. These 
institutions do not act in ignorance of the state of the world, nor of the effects of their 
actions. Within the World Bank in particular, there is a huge gap between two of the 
bodies of the institution: researchers and policy-makers. The researchers in these 
institutions are publishing a lot of important information, but the executive bodies are 
choosing to act in such a way that often undermines the consequences of the findings, 
often because it is to their benefit to do so. Additionally, the researchers typically do not 
have the “inclination for long-winded debate” and therefore the gap between the policies 
themselves and the data collected on the outcomes of the policies grows ever-wider 
(McNeill 2004, p. 115). 
 Let us return to the main argument of the dissertation. By defending all the 
premises listed above, I conclude that, given a framework of negative rights, the GEO is 
largely responsible for the plight of the global poor, and therefore has an obligation to 
help alleviate global poverty. One of the biggest questions we are left with, however, is 
what kind of help my view entails. I see three potential answers to this question, and 
choosing between them depends upon what we think results from a violation of negative 
rights. As mentioned in the Introduction, Robert Nozick, one of contemporary 
philosophy’s most prominent libertarians, argues that reparations are due to those who 
have been unjustly harmed, particularly those whose property has been unjustly taken. 
Nozick’s reasoning for this claim is that without just acquisition of property and 




unjustly acquired, compensation must be made to those whose rights have been violated 
by that injustice (Nozick 1974). If this is the model of negative rights we are working 
within, then the compensation due to the developing world for the harm caused recently 
would be enormous. This amount, however, would be insignificant in comparison to what 
would be owed if we considered not just the current setup of the global order, but the 
historical usurpation of income, resources, and political power of much of the world by 
governments like those of the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. At the beginning of this project I restricted the scope to the current global 
order, so we must bracket these historical injustices for now. I cannot propose a particular 
amount of compensation that the GEO owes the global poor, primarily because capability 
deprivation goes far beyond income and resources (even though resources are important 
to ensure capabilities). A problem with this approach is that the strictest legal duty of 
compensation requires the establishment of intent, which neither Pogge nor I have 
established indubitably. 
Second, we may think that because many of the institutions that make up the GEO 
expressly state their desire to help developing countries in their mission statements, that 
they could owe monetary compensation to developing countries for not living up to these 
stated goals. The WTO, for example, claims that one of its goals is to be “more 
beneficial” to developing countries (WTO, “What We Stand For”). Similarly, the IMF 
asserts that part of its mission involves “[h]elping a country benefit from globalization 
while avoiding potential downsides” (IMF, “What We Do”). On the one hand, given the 




and therefore simply by breaking their contract, they appear to owe the global poor some 
compensation. However, if we look closer at these stated ideals, we see that it is harder to 
prove wrongdoing than it seems. For example, in spelling out how the WTO will be more 
beneficial to developing countries, it states that it will do so by: 
“Giving them more time to adjust, greater flexibility and special 
privileges; over three-quarters of WTO members are developing countries 
and countries in transition to market economies. The WTO agreements 
give them transition periods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, 
difficult WTO provisions” (WTO, “What We Stand For”). 
 
As seen in Chapter 2, this “flexibility” and “privilege” that is meant to apply to 
developing countries often exists in name only. However, despite its ineffectiveness, the 
WTO is not technically violating this goal, because the flexibility does at least exist in 
writing. Additionally, we are left to wonder what exactly the WTO is purporting to be 
“more beneficial” than. Perhaps it is more beneficial to the developing world than a 
system in which there is no international trade. While that does not amount to much, it 
can still be argued that it is technically not violating its stated goals. 
 The IMF would have a harder time making the case that it helps countries benefit 
from globalization, while avoiding its downsides. However, when describing its goals in 
more detail, it says it aims to “facilitate the growth of international trade, thus promoting 
job creation, economic growth, and poverty reduction” (IMF, “What We Do”). Job 
creation, economic growth, and poverty reduction are all considered side effects of 




long as the IMF is indeed growing international trade, it can claim that its aims have been 
accomplished. 
 Thus, the fact that these institutions seem to be violating their stated objectives 
does not undeniably lead to an obligation for compensation. While positive duties can 
emerge from a theory of negative rights (as long as the duties arise from a contract), these 
institutions protect themselves from these obligations by carefully engineering the 
specifics of the help they claim to give. They either deliver on their promises in name 
only, or define the specifics of their promises in terms of their own desired outcomes, 
thereby not technically violating their end of the contract. 
 Given that a number of negative rights theorists disagree with Nozick’s view on 
reparations, and the fact that these institutions could defend themselves against claims of 
objectives violations, it is important that we consider the view that negative rights 
violations obligate us purely negatively, i.e. obligate us to stop unjust actions, rather than 
provide compensation for past injustices (unless, of course, there is a contract that 
stipulates damages from rights violations). It is this view that principally interests me, 
because despite its minimal exterior, it has truly radical consequences for our current 
global order.  
 To spell out these radical consequences, we must revisit the argument from 
Chapter 2, where I showed that the policies of the IMF and the WTO create inescapable 
cycles of poverty for a large proportion of the world’s poorest. If negative rights 




that these institutions are obligated to stop these harmful policies. Should they choose to 
do so, they may instead alter these policies in such a way that the rights violations are 
prevented.  
 Why do I call this obligation radical? If the evidence I presented in Chapter 2 is 
accurate, and these policies truly do create and sustain much of the poverty in the world 
today, then halting these policies could have an enormous effect on the lives of the global 
poor. Returning to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) described in Chapter 2, we remember that while its goal is to enforce 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) around the world, IPRs are, in reality, only strongly 
enforced in developing countries (which often need weaker intellectual property laws for 
development). Moreover, consider the example of the Thai government, which was 
threatened with sanctions if it allowed for the creation of generic versions of HIV/AIDS 
drugs. If the flexibility clause that already exists within the agreement were more than 
just nominal, those suffering from HIV/AIDS in Thailand who are unable to afford the 
expensive brand-name drug would have access to life-saving medicine. Similarly, if the 
WTO either did not enforce sanctions against crop subsidies unequally by allowing the 
US to heavily subsidize its cotton farmers (resulting in the suppression of worldwide 
cotton prices by at least 6%), while significantly sanctioning other countries that do the 
same, cotton farming could be a lucrative or sustainable career for many around the 
world. Similarly, if the IMF stopped enforcing SAPs that merely promote its powerful 
members’ ideological agendas and economic prosperity, perhaps IMF loans would come 




economic strings attached, the strings could be personalized in the context of the realities 
of the country receiving the loan, rather than merely in the interest of the richest members 
of the institution.   
 One might object, however, that this potential picture is far too rosy. In reality, if 
these organizations were to democratize their decision-making structures, and stop the 
policies that are creating and reinforcing systems of poverty, many of the powerful 
members of these organizations who are benefitted by these policies would simply leave. 
This would render these institutions useless or ineffective, thereby negating any of the 
good they do, and leaving the global poor in a worse situation than they are in currently. 
Thus, while my argument may have aimed to help the poor, it may instead create even 
more harm. After all, the loans given by the IMF may come with unreasonable strings 
attached, but I have never denied that the loans themselves are often necessary. In fact, I 
argued that these SAPs are coercive precisely because the loans are essential to those 
who “accept” the terms. If the rich members of the IMF left the organization, wouldn’t 
the fate of these countries be worse? 
 There are a number of potential responses to this very valid worry. First, from the 
purely theoretical standpoint, these counterfactuals are unnecessary and only serve to 
confuse the issue. Our question was whether these institutions cause negative rights 
violations by imposing systemic poverty upon the global poor, and the answer is yes, they 
do. The negative rights view distinguishes itself from the utilitarian view partially by 
setting its end-point as negative rights violations, rather than positive or negative 




irrelevant, so long as the new policies are not also creating negative rights violations. 
Responsibility is tied to causation, and once the causal link is severed, we must depend 
on other theories to argue that the results are morally problematic. 
 From a more practical standpoint, however, it is unlikely that the pessimistic 
scenario above would take place. The developed world currently benefits so much from 
the resources and labor of the developing world that it cannot afford to simply sever its 
ties with it, even if substantial institutional reform were to occur, decreasing its power 
and profit. The global economic system is, to use a terrifying phrase, too big to fail. The 
negative repercussions of such a failure would certainly be felt strongly by the global 
poor, but it would be truly devastating for the developed world. Of course, economic 
changes tend to hit the poor harder than the rich, but a change of this magnitude would be 
irrecoverable for many developed economies, and is therefore very unlikely to occur. The 
economic backlash experienced in the UK in the wake of the Brexit vote is indicative of 
this result. The UK has not even officially left the EU yet, and within a year of the vote, it 
has already gone from the best-performing economy in the G7 to the worst. By 2019, 
investment is expected to be 25% lower than previously forecast (Musaddique 2017). The 
actual social and economic impact will only be seen after the separation of the UK from 
the EU has taken place, but early signs are not optimistic, and many other countries 
previously considering leaving the EU have taken notice.21  
                                                        
21 Of course, there are a number of ways in which Brexit can play out. As of the time of writing, “soft 
Brexit”, “hard Brexit”, and everything in between has been suggested, and it remains unclear what this 
separation is actually going to look like. Additionally, even if a “hard Brexit” occurs, the UK has trading 
partners in other large economies like the US and Australia, and therefore even Brexit is not a perfect 




 In essence, I am arguing that from a practical standpoint, the developing world 
has significant leverage. It is not impractical to demand an end to oppressive and coercive 
policies that result in systemic poverty and hindered freedom, as the developed world’s 
economy cannot flourish without the labor and resources of the developing world. 
Therefore, there is good reason to believe that the repercussions of the halting of policies 
that cause negative rights violations will actually result in a significant alleviation of 
global poverty in the long term (even though this is not the explicit goal of the negative 
rights approach).  
 I would like to say a few more words here on the role the CA plays in this project. 
From the outset of the project I argued that in Sen’s view, capabilities are valuable 
because they reflect and result in freedom, and therefore capability deprivations are a 
problem for the negative rights view. Another feature of the CA that I would like to 
reemphasize is the fact that because of its focus on valuable “beings and doings,” i.e. our 
ability to perform certain actions, the CA is able to show the importance not only of the 
economic factors, but also the social and political factors that affect freedom. This is 
because social and political regimes affect, and can limit, our valuable actions 
significantly; approaches to poverty that focus primarily on income or resources can 
result in these factors being ignored in favor of ensuring sufficient income or resources.  
 In a similar vein, there is something more to be said about the benefits of the 
negative rights approach. Because social and political institutions can affect our freedom, 
the negative rights framework is, in fact, better suited to address big-picture systemic 




our intuitions when considering cases of pain or suffering that may not have an 
intentional or agencial cause. However, when we consider situations in which rights 
violations are actively being caused, the positive rights approach shares focus on 
relieving immediate suffering and changing the system causing the suffering, whereas the 
negative rights approach asks us primarily to look for the cause of the rights violation, 
and put an end to it. There is a strong argument to be made for focusing our resources on 
the source of the problem.  
 There are also two rhetorical advantages to be gained by my focus on the negative 
rights approach. The first applies if we are seeking to convince the largest number of 
people that the GEO has an obligation to help alleviate global poverty. Because the 
negative rights approach is seen as minimal, and is perceived as not being excessively 
demanding, it has intuitive appeal to a larger number of people than the positive rights 
approach does. Many may not believe we have the right to food, for example, but 
everyone can see the moral importance of not unjustly harming others.  
 The second rhetorical advantage is one I take to be even more important, and it 
involves how we think about the poor. When we disassociate poverty from its causes, and 
instead derive an obligation to alleviate poverty from the suffering experienced by the 
poor, we create and reinforce an idea common in affluent societies, that poverty is caused 
by a lack of will, hard work, planning, or motivation (to say nothing of the racist notions 
of innate inferiority that are reinforced by this talk). One could object, however, by 
saying that positive rights approaches do not disassociate poverty from its causes, they 




cause does not matter, or because those who cause it are not willing or able to prevent it. 
While there is some merit to this view, there is something to be said for the allocation of 
responsibility; if these global institutions know that the negative externalities are being 
reduced by the generosity of those giving to charity, they may not have a moral incentive 
to change the systems that make that charity necessary. This also raises concerns about 
creating a dependency on charitably organizations. The notion of the “white man’s 
burden” has resulted in many social, economic, and political institutions that have only 
served to further oppress those whom they purport to help. This is not to say that charity 
is wrong, but it has been known to be counterproductive, and therefore must be 
approached with significant knowledge of the situation. We should focus instead 
primarily on the elimination of the need for charity.  
 In conclusion, I return once again to my claim that the view I have argued for in 
this dissertation is a radical one. It starts with one of the most uncontroversial views of 
ethical obligation: we naturally owe each other non-interference. However, it ends with 
the substantial claim that global poverty is the foreseeable and preventable outcome of 
some the policies of the GEO, and therefore these harmful policies must be ended or 
changed in such a way that the fundamental freedoms and capabilities of all human 
beings are no longer hindered. Harking back to Sarah Grimké’s call for men to remove 
their feet from the necks of women, thereby allowing them to be free, we now understand 
the ways in which the policies of the GEO act as the suffocating force on the lives and 
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